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Abstract 
 
The Fight Over John Q: How Labor Won and Lost the Public in Postwar America, 1947-1959 
 
by 
 
Rachel Burstein 
 
Adviser: Joshua Freeman 
 
This study examines the infancy of large-scale, coordinated public relations by organized 
labor in the postwar period.  Labor leaders’ outreach to diverse publics became a key feature of 
unions’ growing political involvement and marked a departure from the past when unions used 
organized workers – not the larger public – to pressure legislators.  The new recognition of the 
liberal public as an important ally and the creation of a program for targeting it signaled larger 
shifts in the American labor movement: the embrace of bureaucracy akin to other major postwar 
institutions; the promotion of politics over collective bargaining as the defining objective of the 
labor movement; the prominence of a new, educated class of labor leaders; and the 
deradicalization of American unionism in favor of the postwar liberal consensus. 
The dissertation details PR approaches of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) at particular crisis points in the late 1940s and 
1950s, after World War II and before the emergence of the civil rights movement and New Left.  
These campaigns were responsive and defensive and showed the difficulty labor leaders had in 
controlling the terms of debate, even as they were successful in maintaining rhetorical popular 
support.  The case studies examined in this dissertation are: 1) the AFL and CIO’s efforts to 
defeat the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947; 2) the role of politics – particularly the 1948 election and the 
third party campaign of Henry Wallace – in forcing CIO leaders to expel communist unions from 
their ranks; 3) the 1955 merger of the AFL and CIO and labor’s efforts to counter the trope of 
v 
 
“big labor” in a world in which large institutions and elite groups increasingly vied for control; 
and 4) the AFL-CIO’s efforts to redefine itself in the face of accounts of union corruption during 
Congressional hearings on racketeering in organized labor from 1957 to 1959.  In all of these 
cases, labor leaders positioned themselves and the union members they represented as part of a 
larger public committed to the same political objectives.  Ultimately, this was a losing bet; they 
traded relevance for acceptability.   
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Introduction 
 
 In the fall of 1955, with the merger of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) almost complete and labor union membership rates 
poised to reach new heights, the Teamsters dedicated a fancy, new building in Washington, D.C., 
a stone’s throw from the U.S. Senate.  Nicknamed the “Marble Palace,” the Teamsters’ 
headquarters epitomized the new image of the labor movement in the postwar period – 
modernism, professionalism, power, bureaucracy, and sophistication.  Violent strikes and tense 
contract negotiations still made headlines, but, increasingly, unions like the Teamsters showed 
their strength in gleaming buildings positioned close to the halls of Congress.  
At the building dedication, AFL President George Meany told attendees, “Good public 
relations begin at home, rather than in Washington.”  Meany plugged local unions’ community 
service programs and hailed the Teamsters’ efforts to promote better housing, roads, schools and 
social services in towns and cities throughout the nation.  To be sure, these activities had value in 
their own right.  But for Meany and other high-ranking labor officials in the middle of the 
twentieth century, the significance of local efforts lay elsewhere.  If the public recognized the 
value of organized labor, then “their elected representatives in Washington are bound to become 
more friendly and less hostile to our cause,” Meany argued.1  Increasingly, union leaders sought 
political influence on behalf of their own members and the larger public – groups they saw as 
less distinct than in the past.  And increasingly, they pursued outreach to the public in order to 
advance that legislative agenda. 
 Labor leaders’ conception of the public owed much to a developing understanding of the 
value and meaning of public opinion in the twentieth century.  Journalist Walter Lippmann’s 
                                                 
1
 George Meany, Teamsters Headquarters Dedication Speech, November 4, 1955; George Meany Papers, Box 59, 
Fol. 73; GMMA. 
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1922 work, Public Opinion introduced the idea of an irrational, uninformed public, whose 
opinions could and should be influenced by responsible media capable of synthesizing facts 
representing truth.
2
  Lippmann argued that without such intervention, political elites – 
themselves unable to see the forest from the trees – would make decisions with potentially 
disastrous consequences.  For Lippmann, the public was essential to democracy, but he remained 
pessimistic about the public’s ability to sort reality from propaganda.   
In the late 1940s, the sociologist C. Wright Mills sought to break down Lippmann’s 
undifferentiated mass of the public, distinguishing six “politically alert publics” (the far left, the 
independent left, the liberal center, the communists, the practical right, and the sophisticated 
conservatives) from “the great American public of politically passive people.”3  Mills’ political 
publics were not subject to the manipulation that Lippmann described.  They were informed and 
engaged.  Mills also expressed the belief that members of the politically passive public might 
enter the ranks of the politically active publics.  As such, Mills saw an opportunity for union 
officials to engage both groups in order to obtain and retain “status and future power.”   
But Mills also recognized that it made far more sense for labor leaders to court the 
independent left and the liberal center than it did to engage other political publics.  He argued 
that these groups – particularly liberals – were most likely to support organized labor and could 
be mobilized to labor’s advantage.  Mills painted liberals as naïve members of the middle class 
who sought to retain their political purity and connection to the “the people” by supporting 
unions.  Mills’ liberals were timid and unambitious when it came to the future of labor, 
presuming that unions were and should be no more than member organizations with a narrow 
political agenda.  But the liberal center could also be a valuable ally. 
                                                 
2
 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Bruce and Company, 1922). 
3
 C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power: America’s Labor Leaders (New York: Harcourt, 1948), 14. 
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A younger generation of anticommunist AFL and CIO leaders of the late 1940s and 
1950s embraced Mills’ belief in the power of the liberal public to advance labor’s political 
agenda, though most viewed the liberal center as a more sophisticated and compelling ally than 
Mills did.   It was this public that they most courted, though they sometimes also pursued a 
general public akin to Lippmann’s undifferentiated masses and Mills’ politically passive public, 
particularly when using the channels of mass media.  Like Lippmann, labor leaders at mid-
century saw the potential of external groups like labor to influence the public and political elites 
alike, but they viewed this role without cynicism, as a responsibility and public service.   
To perform this role, labor unions in the postwar period adopted far reaching public 
relations strategies.  These were broader than just the activities of public relations departments – 
themselves largely postwar creations.  Labor leaders reached out to both members and the liberal 
public in numerous ways through both paid and unpaid media: speeches, press appearances, 
pamphlets and publications, radio and television programs, Congressional testimony, 
advertisements, and word-of-mouth.  They deemphasized the specifics of collective bargaining 
negotiations and, instead, focused on the power of unions to better the quality of life for all 
Americans.  This betterment came through contracts that raised wages and benefits for all 
workers, regardless of union membership; through the maintenance of industrial peace that 
allowed production to keep pace with consumer demands; and most importantly, through labor’s 
power to influence policy in Washington.  Union leaders claimed that twisting arms on Capitol 
Hill on issues as varied as health care, Social Security, housing, infrastructure improvements, the 
minimum wage, and labor law demonstrated their status as a public interest group, speaking for 
all Americans.   
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 Business leaders, industry groups, and conservatives countered this contention, arguing 
that organized labor was a narrow special interest group, representing its members in ways that 
were often damaging to the American public at large.  They expressed alarm over the power that 
unions displayed in the 1950s, demonstrated through larger bureaucracies, merged organizations, 
greater outspokenness around issues unrelated to collective bargaining, and, most importantly, 
increased political spending and involvement. For conservatives, the pendulum had swung too 
far in the direction of unions, creating a labor behemoth whose enormous power was wielded on 
behalf of union officials and some members, rather than the larger public, or even all union 
members. 
 The reality was far murkier.  At the same time the nation entered an era of so-called “Big 
Labor,” large corporations grew larger through mergers and acquisitions, and the federal 
government’s bureaucracy and spending also increased.  All three institutions increasingly 
boasted educated, professional, white collar workers.  Labor leaders argued an era of big labor 
was necessary if unions were to keep pace with these changes in American society.  Big labor 
run by responsible union statesmen could police and eliminate communists and racketeers; 
ensure industrial peace by keeping wildcat strikes at bay and entering into comprehensive, 
lawyer-negotiated collective bargaining agreements; raise wages and improve working 
conditions for all; lobby for legislation beneficial to the American public; and help to rein in the 
excesses of business.      
Even as union membership grew, postwar demographic, political and economic changes 
produced new anxieties for union officials.  The union vote only extended so far.  Two-thirds of 
union members were concentrated in just ten states in the North, Midwest and West Coast as 
World War II ended.  The South’s unionization rate remained half that of the rest of the country, 
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and organizing efforts there were unsuccessful.
4
  Furthermore, states tempted employers to 
relocate through so-called “right-to-work” legislation in the wake of Taft-Hartley, increasing 
union leaders’ anxiety about a decline in unionization.  The increase in white collar workers in 
the nation’s workforce demanded new organizing drives and models that postwar labor unions 
were often ill-equipped to offer to workers without a significant union tradition.  Automation 
threatened union jobs, while suburbanization and new social organizations not tied to work 
threatened the primacy of unions as a defining feature of workers’ lives.   
Unions were sometimes victims of their own success.  As they raised wages and bettered 
working conditions, the urgency of their work lessened.  As Meany’s speech before the 
Teamsters indicates, unions still turned to their members to make the case for organized labor in 
their local communities, but in a world in which groups controlled by elites vied for power, the 
uniqueness of organized labor as a representative for the general public was less compelling.
5
 
Unions at the mid-twentieth century faced a catch-22; by ultimately choosing to accept cold war 
liberalism, mainstream unions made themselves acceptable to wide swaths of the general public, 
media outlets, government, and business.  But they also lost an opportunity to promote a larger 
vision for what America could offer the public.  Unions became just another special interest 
group, even at the height of their power.  They won over the public, but public support ultimately 
mattered little in terms of a radical rethinking of what American society could be for union 
members and non-members alike.   
This narrative of unions’ engagement with the public has remained obscure in the 
literature on postwar labor.  Instead, much debate has centered on the value of the shift to so-
                                                 
4
 Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 17. 
5
 This view was developed by sociologist C. Wright Mills. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956).  
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called “business unionism” in which deradicalized unions traded a large-scale vision of social 
change for fleeting power as economic organizations.  Historians like Nelson Lichtenstein 
criticize this postwar “deal” as obscuring the labor question that had driven political discourse 
for much of the century.
 6
  According to Lichtenstein, labor leaders’ narrowing of the function of 
unions to collective bargaining agents removed any potential for the industrial democratic vision 
earlier described by Progressives and advanced by leftists marginalized by labor’s turn toward 
liberalism.  Critical historians have argued that labor embraced electoral politics narrowly in the 
postwar years, becoming a wing of the Democratic Party, publicly recognized but with little 
influence.  In this view, unions – not their conservative adversaries – drove themselves to 
obscurity, failing to provide “a model of collective action” that could be used by the civil rights 
and anti-war movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  For these groups, unions were irrelevant at 
best, and hostile to progress at worst.
7
 
Given such analysis, it seems that C. Wright Mills’ gloomy evaluation of “the labor 
leader’s shift from political ideas and the will to carry them out to the fumbling confusion and 
false security of practical politics” came to fruition in the postwar period.8  Certainly, a turn to 
the general public was part of this push toward practical politics.  And with this turn came a 
decline in union influence at both the bargaining table and in the public arena – a fact that 
scholars critical of the so-called “business unionism” of the consensus period are right to point 
                                                 
6
 Historians and activists making such arguments include Stanley Aronowitz, David Brody, Mike Davis, Nelson 
Lichtenstein, George Lipsitz, Kim Moody, and Christopher Tomlins.  See Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises: The 
Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); David Brody, Work in 
Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Mike 
Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and the Economy in the History of the U.S. Working Class (New 
York: Norton, 2000); Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); George Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1994); Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism (London: Verso Press, 
1997); and Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor 
Movement in America, 1880-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
7
 Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 141; 141-77. 
8
 Mills, The New Men of Power, 169. 
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out.  But we should not assume that public outreach necessitated this embrace of liberalism at the 
exclusion of a broader movement for social change.  Instead, we should view labor’s new 
thinking about the role of the public in the late 1940s and 1950s as a reasonable response to 
powerful economic, demographic and social changes in America.   
Examining labor’s public relations efforts and labor leaders’ evolving notion of the 
liberal public as an important ally in the postwar period offers a new perspective on the old 
debate over the labor bargain of the 1940s and 1950s.  It suggests that labor unions of the 
postwar years were more than the sum total of narrow legislative victories and collective 
bargaining agreements.  Instead of merely capitulating to the right or the weight of their own 
desire for respectability, they sought to shape the political discourse of the day more broadly, and 
emerged as a far more powerful political influence than they would otherwise.  The fact that this 
political influence was wielded in concert with and with attention toward Mills’ “liberal center” 
reflected a pragmatic decision by labor leaders to court the public who could advance labor’s 
aims.  It also reflected heartfelt beliefs among labor leaders.   
With a few notable exceptions, these efforts to court public opinion were driven by a new 
type of labor leader.  When compared with their older compatriots, few high-ranking labor 
leaders born in the 1890s or twentieth century had worked extensively in the industries that they 
now represented.  Instead, many boasted college degrees and had made their careers as salaried, 
white collar workers within labor unions.  This new breed of labor official had little experience 
with strikes from a rank-and-file member’s perspective and saw industrial peace as a realizable 
and desirable goal.  With their early careers spent as leftist critics or supporters of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, they saw the power of political influence in advancing labor’s aims and 
in achieving social standing on par with the leaders of business and government. They embraced 
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bureaucracy, in general, and public relations techniques, in particular, in order to reach wider 
segments of the public across the country.
 9
   
Nowhere can these trends be seen better than in the AFL and the CIO, the nation’s two 
largest labor federations that merged into the AFL-CIO in 1955.  Composed of affiliated unions, 
the AFL and CIO did not negotiate contracts themselves but, instead, coordinated policy across 
unions.  In general, the CIO was more centralized than the AFL and had a longer tradition of 
political involvement, though the AFL moved to consolidate power and expanded its political 
activity under Meany.  Both the AFL and the CIO possessed considerable resources and 
undertook large-scale, national public relations campaigns that most individual unions were ill-
equipped to undertake.  In addition, their presidents – William Green and George Meany of the 
AFL, Philip Murray and Walter Reuther of the CIO – possessed name recognition among the 
general public and were generally well-respected.   
The study takes 1947 as its starting point and concludes in 1959.  These years represented 
the height of cold war liberalism, an ideology that the labor federations came to embrace, albeit 
with considerable dissent.  The defeat of labor-backed candidates in the 1946 election, outrage at 
high prices for consumer goods and a strike wave, as well as the 1947 passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act that placed new restrictions on unions demonstrated the limits of union power.  
These events convinced many labor leaders that a more robust political strategy that targeted the 
public was necessary, leading directly to a new commitment to political activity in the AFL.  The 
events of 1946 and 1947 put the AFL and the CIO on the defensive, forcing them to fight new 
restrictions on labor and improve the image of unions, rather than constructing a new 
progressive, political vision for America.  By 1959, some proponents of pluralism were having 
                                                 
9
 The characterization of younger labor leaders in this paragraph comes from Mills’ 1946 survey of AFL and CIO 
leaders as described in Mills, The New Men of Power. 
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second thoughts and, within a few years, the New Left would challenge the values that organized 
labor promoted to the public throughout the 1950s: respectable leadership, industrial peace, 
moderation, modernism, and sophistication. 
This study examines the infancy of large-scale, coordinated public relations by organized 
labor in an effort to understand how and why union leaders saw the public as vital to their 
political goals, and the ways in which their strategies in reaching that public shaped the future of 
the American labor movement.  This study takes a broad definition of public relations, 
particularly at moments when official PR departments exercised far less power and received far 
less traction in the press than the activities of labor leaders.  Chapter 1 traces the AFL and CIO’s 
campaigns to defeat the Taft-Hartley Act in the public arena, arguing that this marked a critical 
shift in the way that labor federations regarded the political importance of the public, and 
examines key differences between the AFL and the CIO’s efforts.  It also sketches broader 
political and economic trends of the postwar period and earlier labor public relations efforts in an 
effort to distinguish the novel PR strategies of the post-Taft-Hartley era.  Chapter 2 examines the 
role of politics – particularly the 1948 election and the third party campaign of Henry Wallace – 
in forcing Philip Murray’s hand in expelling communist unions from his organization’s ranks.  
The chapter explores how the issue of communism compelled Murray and the CIO to link their 
own activities to the fortunes of the public in a way that the federation had not done previously.  
Chapter 3 uses the 1955 merger of the AFL and the CIO as a platform for examining the trope of 
“big labor” in a world in which large institutions and elite groups increasingly vied for control.  
It details how AFL-CIO leaders tried to showcase the positive elements of “big labor,” 
emphasizing the new federation’s respectability, responsibility, and public service as exemplified 
by union officers.  Chapter 4 shows how George Meany emphasized these same themes in his 
10 
 
messaging to the public during Congressional hearings on racketeering in organized labor from 
1957 to 1959.  As before, Meany and other AFL-CIO officers had a particular political objective 
in courting public opinion – a desire to ward off restrictive labor legislation. 
 The legacy of the choices that labor leaders made sixty years ago have had enormous 
impact on public perceptions of unions.  Direct appeals to the public and the political goals they 
were designed to attain are only one small part of a much larger story of how and why labor’s 
fortunes have turned since union membership reached its zenith in the mid-1950s.  There is much 
to say – and much has been said – about the impact of larger economic forces, policy choices, 
demographic changes, and union decisions on contracts, organizing, and political alliances. I 
hope that this study will shed a little light on one way that organized labor tried to address some 
of these shifts.  Organized labor leaders positioned themselves and the union members they 
represented as part of a larger public committed to the same political objectives.  Ultimately, this 
was a losing bet; they traded relevance for acceptability.  Still, the idea that public welfare should 
be a key determinant of union policy is one that may yet offer hope to the American labor 
movement.
11 
 
Chapter 1 
“To Paint the Sky with… Slogans”: The AFL and the CIO’s Public Relations Efforts 
against the Passage of Taft-Hartley 
 
In early June 1947, with the fate of Taft-Hartley still hanging in the balance, Victor 
Riesel, the syndicated labor columnist, offered his appraisal of the techniques used by the AFL 
and the CIO in their efforts to defeat the anti-labor legislation during the previous four months.  
Contrary to expectations, the CIO had not been able “to paint the sky with anti-Taft-Hartley 
slogans.”  Instead, it was the AFL which had been “hiring the planes and sky-writing pilots.”  
While the AFL took out dozens of full page advertisements in newspapers across the country, 
sponsored musical events, and put high-priced Hollywood A-listers on the air in solidarity with 
organized labor, “the CIO virtually resigned from the big-time propaganda drive against the 
Labor Bill,” Riesel concluded.   
According to Riesel, CIO leaders surely supported the AFL’s stance against Taft-Hartley 
and would have contributed more to the public campaign, but for one thing: “the CIO chiefs[’]… 
lean bank accounts.”  Instead of writing massive checks for paid advertising, as the AFL had 
done, the CIO’s national leaders turned toward their constituent unions, begging them to 
contribute time and funds to mount campaigns against Taft-Hartley in their own communities.  
Such local campaigns used the “canned publicity stuff” generated at the CIO’s Washington 
headquarters, but it was hard for the Washington CIO office to catalog – let alone control – the 
messages sent under its name by its local organizations.  Indeed, Riesel concluded that the CIO’s 
“grassroots drive” was resigned more to building up support for Democratic Party political 
activity in the 1948 elections, rather than securing a presidential veto and Congressional support 
for upholding that veto in the coming weeks.
1
   
                                                 
1
 Victor Riesel, column, New York Post, June 5, 1947; UAW Public Relations Clippings, Part II, Box 26, Victor 
Riesel – New York Post Fol. (2 of 3); WSU. 
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Riesel was correct that the CIO leadership was inclined to cede a battle it perceived as 
unwinnable in order to make a bid for the larger prize – the 1948 election.  But what Riesel 
missed was that AFL officials also came to join the CIO in viewing the 1948 election as a more 
important measure of labor’s strength than the passage of Taft-Hartley.  The 1947 Congress was 
stacked against labor, and neither officials in the AFL nor the CIO believed that they could twist 
enough arms to sway the vote or to push softening amendments through both chambers.  But 
both labor organizations saw outreach to the public around Taft-Hartley as a vital part of a larger 
political strategy – one that would have implications for the 1948 election and beyond.  The 
differing strengths of their respective responses were dictated by money.  But the AFL and CIO 
were on the same page in two important ways.  Both organizations recognized that legislation 
could advance or diminish labor’s ability to engage in its core activities of organizing and 
collective bargaining, and both understood that a robust public relations effort could result in a 
Congress committed to realizing labor’s aims.   
The attempt to remake labor’s image during the debate over Taft-Hartley marked a new 
way of approaching politics for both the AFL and CIO.  Leaders in both organizations began to 
view labor’s political involvement as more than partisan and electoral activities.  Instead, it was 
an effort to influence the political discourse of the day, to be a partner in cold war liberalism’s 
ascendancy, a trusted elite power in the pressure group-driven society of the postwar period.
2
  
This was a change for both the AFL and the CIO, but in different ways.  The CIO had long made 
a connection between its public relations efforts and its political program, but its political efforts 
centered on the mechanics of electoral work: electing candidates, raising funds, and lobbying 
legislators.  For its part, AFL leaders had a less-developed political organization, but were often 
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portrayed by the press as respectable in comparison with their supposedly radical CIO rivals.  In 
some ways, labor officials like AFL President William Green had already ascended to the status 
of pressure group spokesmen but had failed to capitalize on this politically.   
The crisis over Taft-Hartley marked the first time that the legendary autonomy of AFL 
unions gave way to a comprehensive and professional public relations campaign directed at the 
national level.  In many ways, the message and form of the AFL campaign represented what the 
CIO would have liked to do if resources had been more available, even if it lacked the 
sophisticated strategic imprint of the CIO’s renowned public relations director.  Indeed, the AFL 
and CIO seemed to reverse roles in the types of public relations campaigns they employed during 
the first six months of 1947.   
During the war years, the CIO secured its reputation as the more innovative of the two 
largest labor federations in its publicity strategy, even earning notice as “[t]hat wizard of public 
relations” in the Wall Street Journal as World War II came to an end.3  The organization won a 
trophy from the American Public Relations Association in 1946 in a contest against business 
heavyweights.
4
  Later in the year, the Public Relations Newsletter – a publication produced for 
publicity professionals, primarily in industry – hailed the CIO’s use of “scientific PR methods” 
as key to its success in “creating favorable public attitudes and fending off adverse public 
opinion.”5  On the other hand, one publication described the AFL as “neither as spectacular, 
colorful nor voluble as the CIO in telling its story” in 1946.6  This was about to change. 
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The AFL’s message represented a fundamental shift as labor entered the postwar period: 
labor and the public were one entity possessing the same values.  Labor and the public formed a 
unified public interest, whose perspective unions represented.  They were opposed by the special 
moneyed interests represented by business groups and the Republican Party.  Forced by limited 
funds to deploy its messages through its own unions and members, the CIO was less likely to 
make pleas directly to the public.  Instead, it used its own existing political machinery – the 
PAC, especially – to mobilize its members in response to Taft-Hartley.  The passage of Taft-
Hartley, the influence of a new generation of labor leaders, and a new urgency in contributing to 
the national political discourse at the dawn of the cold war caused the AFL to come to a similar 
conclusion about the need to link its public relations campaign and its political efforts.   
The fact that the AFL flexed its political muscle in an effort to defeat the Taft-Hartley 
Act had implications for the relationship between the AFL and CIO, unions’ engagement in 
politics, and the role of public relations in furthering labor’s legislative agenda.  It also had 
implications for popular perceptions of unions.  The 1947 campaign to defeat Taft-Hartley 
furthered the political clout of unions generally, as the AFL put significant money behind its 
political positions for the first time.
 7
  This massive labor outreach – much of it issued through 
paid media – may have helped to stem the tide of declining approval rates and furthered labor’s 
influence as a proponent of cold war liberalism, but it also furthered public perceptions of 
organized labor’s tendency toward bloated bureaucracy, giant coffers, and excessive spending.   
In addition, there were internal consequences of the Taft-Hartley campaign.  As the more 
visible labor federation, the AFL diminished the CIO’s negotiating position in merger talks.  This 
produced further mistrust between the organizations and prevented effective collaboration on 
                                                 
7
 While the CIO had established the CIO-PAC under Sidney Hillman’s direction in 1943, it didn’t become a 
particularly powerful force until 1948.  The AFL did not establish a political action group until after the passage of 
Taft-Hartley, in December 1947. 
15 
 
legislative affairs.  At the same time, it strengthened the position of national labor federations 
vis-à-vis their constituent unions and introduced a new generation of labor leaders to a national 
audience.  The autonomy so highly prized by individual unions within the AFL was challenged 
as the national organization conducted its anti Taft-Hartley campaign in the same vein as the 
highly centralized CIO.
8
   
In this chapter, I argue that the campaigns implemented by the AFL and CIO to defeat the 
Taft-Hartley Act used public relations as a political strategy – a method that would inform much 
of labor’s postwar actions.  Gradually, both the practical implementation and the larger discourse 
of politics came to replace collective bargaining as the defining influence of organized labor.  In 
1947, union membership rates were still high, but the loss of labor-friendly Congressmen in the 
1946 election forced the AFL and the CIO to reach out to a larger public.  The AFL, once 
reluctant to undertake large-scale political campaigns, was moved to action not only by the threat 
of anti-labor legislation and a hostile Congress, but also by a larger concern of being left behind 
as a broker of influence and the primary representative of labor in public discourse.  Financial 
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supremacy pushed the AFL ahead of the CIO in this public relations war, changing the balance 
of power between the two organizations.   
In the first section of this chapter, I examine the political climate at the dawn of 1947, the 
legislative trajectory of the Taft-Hartley Act and related bills, and the attitude of union leaders to 
different legislative proposals.  Both the AFL and CIO recognized the dangers of the proposed 
legislation, but the two groups could not come to consensus on specific proposals.  The result 
was an uncoordinated lobbying effort and a failure to articulate an alternative to Taft-Hartley.  
This failure had implications for public perceptions of labor.  The second section of the chapter 
examines the political and public relations history of the AFL and CIO, explaining how the 
campaign to defeat Taft-Hartley represented an enhanced public relations effort for the AFL and 
a weakened publicity program for the CIO.  This section also addresses how these differences 
caused increased tensions between the two organizations, leading to a discontinuation of merger 
talks.   
The third section of the chapter addresses press and industry group criticisms of labor, 
examining the images unions hoped to combat through their public relations programs.  And the 
fourth section addresses how the AFL and CIO responded to these depictions through their 
public relations and political activities.  The section traces the trajectory of the AFL and CIO 
campaigns against Taft-Hartley in paid and unpaid media, rallies, and political organizing.  It 
also addresses the question of why these campaigns emerged in the way they did, including 
funding discrepancies between the two organizations.  A fifth section argues that the AFL and 
CIO stressed similar messages around labor’s relationship to the public, even if the form and 
distribution channels for those messages were often quite different.  In a conclusion, I assess the 
17 
 
significance of the Taft-Hartley campaign for the future of labor’s use of public relations as a 
political strategy.   
 
The Postwar Context and the Legislative Backlash against Labor 
It was hardly surprising that anti-labor legislation was introduced in 1947.  Public 
concern about union power had been growing for some time, leading to a politically toxic 
atmosphere for organized labor in the year following World War II.  The end of the war pushed 
the country into an economic slump as production declined significantly and layoffs in the 
manufacturing sector became routine.  While still below four percent between 1946 and 1948, 
the unemployment rate represented a three-fold increase from the lows of the war years.
9
  In the 
three months between V-E Day and V-J Day, unemployment rose from half a million to one 
million.  And after the Japanese surrender, unemployment tripled.
10
  Furthermore, with the 
government’s elimination of most wartime price controls in 1946, inflation reached 
unprecedented heights.
11
  Double digit inflation rates alarmed both consumers and workers, who 
saw their wage increases decimated by the cost of goods in the summer of 1946 and into 1947.
12
  
The elimination of wartime bonuses and overtime furthered the erosion in real wages.   
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The resulting decline in purchasing power for workers prompted close to 5,000 strikes in 
1946, following the pattern of worker discontent established in the war’s immediate aftermath.13  
As unions began to negotiate new collective bargaining agreements in the postwar years, union 
officials could direct – or at least sanction – worker strike activity.  This was in contrast to the 
wildcat strikes of the war years.
14
  Together, strikes involved 14.5 percent of the total workforce 
in 1946 and 6.5 percent in 1947.
15
  By the fall of 1945, hundreds of thousands of autoworkers at 
GM were on strike after GM refused to accede to UAW contract demands.  At the beginning of 
1946, three quarters of a million steelworkers went on strike, along with meatpackers, miners, 
and public utility workers.  A strike by railroad workers in May 1946 brought the nation’s 
transportation network to a halt.  Truman’s interventions in a number of these strikes caused 
many labor leaders to question the President’s commitment to organized labor’s interests, a 
concern that resurfaced during the lead-up to the passage of Taft-Hartley.
16
   
This heavy concentration of strike activity in essential industry impacted both public 
attitudes toward labor and legislative responses to the perceived threat to American political and 
economic dominance in the postwar period.  Immediately after V-J Day, a Gallup poll found that 
fully 79 percent of Americans desired a “law guaranteeing collective bargaining” and three-
                                                 
13
 Jack Metzgar, “The 1945-1946 Strike Wave” in The Encyclopedia of Strikes in American History, ed. Aaron 
Brenner et al. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 216, 222.  Metzgar argues that the 1946 strike wave was 
unusual in that the vast majority of strikes were focused solely on achieving wage increases.  The fact that 
negotiations focused on set increases an hour, rather than on percentage increases, resulted in more benefit to lower-
paid workers.  In a continuation of wartime practices, all but 37 of these strikes involved fewer than 10,000 workers. 
Still, the small number of very large walkouts and the enthusiasm of strikers received much attention in the press. 
14
 During the war years, wildcat strikes predominated and were opposed by national union leaderships, which had 
taken no-strike pledges and encouraged their members to raise productivity levels in exchange for government 
protections for the duration of the war.  Joshua B. Freeman, Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World 
War II (New York: The New Press, 2000), 4.   
15
 The equivalent figures following World War I were 20.8 percent and 7.2 percent in 1919 and 1920, respectively. 
Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley, 14-5.   
16
 In addition, Truman annoyed CIO leaders by failing to support the entirety of the labor federation’s legislative 
agenda.  In particular, Truman refused to talk with labor leaders about increases in the minimum wage and 
demonstrated ambivalence about retaining price controls.  Philip Murray, Proceedings of Meeting of the 
International Executive Board of the CIO, July 18-19, 1946, 116; Microfilm Reel 9 of “Minutes of the Executive 
Board of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1935-1955”; NYU. 
19 
 
fourths of respondents believed unions were “a good thing for the country.”  But the public 
began to support specific measures to rein in unions as strikes interfered with ordinary 
Americans’ lives, and as industry groups pushed the idea that higher worker wages resulted in 
runaway inflation and lower standards of living.
17
  A June 1946 Gallup poll showed that 95 
percent of Americans favored a required vote of workers prior to a strike, and 90 percent 
supported regular elections of union officers.
18
  In a poll just after the 1946 election, Gallup 
found that 66 percent – including 77 percent of Republicans – believed that the new Congress 
should “pass new laws to control labor unions,” with only 22 percent opposing new controls.19   
Even so, public approval of unions in general remained high, still measuring 64 percent in the 
weeks after Taft-Hartley was passed into law.
20
   
But this figure was significantly lower than how the public perceived labor’s opponents.  
Furthermore, it did not capture public attitudes toward specific union federations.  In the summer 
of 1946, a public opinion survey held that 77 percent of Americans thought well of the American 
Legion and 65 percent thought well of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, compared to 50 percent 
who thought well of the AFL and 26 percent who thought well of the CIO, a group many 
considered radical at best, and traitorous at worst.  Meanwhile, 37 percent thought well of the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).  More alarming for labor officials than the low 
approval rate for the CIO was the disapproval rate of 56 percent, compared to just 17 percent for 
NAM.  Among those who were not union members, only 43 percent and 20 percent thought well 
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of the AFL and CIO, respectively, while the CIO’s disapproval rate was 61 percent.  Union 
members were not significantly more likely to view NAM negatively than non-members (49 
percent and 45 percent, respectively).
21
   
The public perceived labor as a more powerful – and successful – special interest group 
than either business or farmers.  In turn, this colored how Americans perceived the need for 
legislative reform.  In the wake of the 1946 election, the public believed that labor had devoted 
more energy to political lobbying than business interests and a November 1946 poll revealed that 
a plurality of Americans (43.9 percent) believed that labor unions put more pressure on Congress 
to get what it wanted than either businessmen (24.3 percent) or farmers (6.2 percent).  They also 
believed that Congress paid the most attention to the demands of labor unions (37.8 percent), as 
compared to either businessmen (28.1 percent) or farmers (7.6 percent).  In response, union 
officials complained about the biases inherent in such polls, using the work of a Columbia 
researcher to support their claim.  In addition, they argued that the public supported labor’s 
legislative policies when they were impartially presented.
22
  Labor publications also argued that 
this public opposition to Taft-Hartley could be seen in other ways, besides opinion polls.  This 
use of academic literature to challenge supposedly authoritative sources became a hallmark of 
the CIO during the postwar period and was a technique adopted by business groups during the 
merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955.
 23
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Given these public attitudes, the results of the 1946 election were hardly a surprise.  
Highlighting union strike power and running on the slogan, “Had Enough?,” Republicans won a 
246-189 majority in the House and a 51-45 majority in the Senate, taking control of both houses 
for the first time since 1930.  There was light voter turnout, especially in urban areas dominated 
by labor interests as union members and their allies stayed home.  Fed up with high prices and 
strikes, they remained unenthusiastic about labor’s Democratic supporters in Congress.  
Meanwhile, the CIO-PAC managed to raise only $170,000 out of a hoped-for $1,000,000 war 
chest, signaling union member apathy toward the labor leadership in a time of declining 
purchasing power.
24
      
The new Congress built on anti-labor legislation introduced during the previous session, 
especially a bill put forward by Rep. Francis Case (R-South Dakota) in the winter of 1946.
25
  
Among other things, the bill reduced the power of the Department of Labor by establishing a 
new mediation board; permitted injunctions to govern union-administered welfare funds; 
prohibited supervisors from joining unions; permitted unions to be sued in court; prohibited 
secondary boycotts; mandated union reporting; and established cooling off periods before a 
strike could legally take place.
26
  Strikes by mine and railroad workers – the latter prompting the 
President to call for Congress to allow for the drafting of strikers against the government – 
spurred Senate approval of the Case Bill.  An ambivalent President vetoed the legislation in June 
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1946, bowing to pressure from unions, whose support he desired in the 1946 mid-term election 
and in the 1948 presidential race. 
Truman signed a few other smaller labor reform measures in the spring of 1946, 
including the Lea Act to disallow featherbedding in the musicians’ union and the Hobbs Anti-
Racketeering Act to criminalize the interference with interstate commerce through extortion, as 
practiced by the Teamsters.  Just before the 1946 election, the possibility of another coal strike 
pushed Truman to call for emergency legislation and resulted in further public wariness toward 
union leaders.   
Truman still advocated some labor reform after the election.  He supported limits on 
secondary boycotts, but he also supported items favored by labor, including an expansion of the 
Department of Labor and a host of social legislation.  Truman called for study groups to make 
recommendations about the advisability of restricting national strikes in essential industries, how 
to improve collective bargaining procedures, and for an investigation of what caused friction 
between labor and management.   
The possibility of a series of study groups was not enough to placate a Republican 
Congress whose election was predicated on the backlash against union strikes and high prices.  
With the 1946 election results less than a week old, the Detroit News’ labor columnist stated the 
conventional wisdom that “It isn’t a question of whether the Republicans in the new Congress 
will attack New Deal labor legislation but of how far they will go to enact what they describe as 
reforms.”27       
 It didn’t take long to find out.  On the first day of the 1947 legislative session, House 
members introduced seventeen different labor bills, most along the lines of the Case bill.  Over 
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the course of the year, Congressmen introduced more than one hundred labor bills in the labor 
committees headed by Republicans, Rep. Fred A. Hartley, Jr. of New Jersey and Sen. Robert A. 
Taft of Ohio.
28
  Between early February and mid-March, both the House and Senate committees 
held hearings on the advisability of instituting modifications to the Wagner Act, particularly 
assessing the NLRB’s effectiveness and perceived bias toward organized labor.  Other provisions 
under consideration were the exclusion of foremen from union representation; the enforcement 
of violations of no-strike pledges during a cooling-off period; the assignation of certain NLRB 
powers to a new Assistant Attorney General; an evidence requirement for NLRB decisions; 
union suability; reduction or elimination of union-security systems like the checkoff; the banning 
of secondary boycotts; and the banning of industywide bargaining.   
Despite objections from the Secretary of Labor, NLRB Chairman, and Truman that the 
proposals under consideration would do little to respond to the complex web of economic factors 
that had caused labor unrest in the postwar period, the House and Senate Labor Committees 
continued to draw on a “grab-bag of provisions, many of them derived from earlier proposals,” 
according to one historian.
29
  The House bill introduced by Rep. Hartley was written prior to the 
conclusion of testimony and allowed for only six hours of debate.  This raised charges from 
House Democrats that the bill’s provisions were a foregone conclusion and that NAM had played 
an active role in drafting the legislation.
30
  On April 17, Hartley’s bill passed by a vote of 308-
107, with 93 Democrats voting for the legislation.  Taft introduced his labor omnibus bill on 
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April 17, choosing to dare a presidential veto and fight for an override in Congress rather than 
pushing piecemeal reforms through multiple bills.  A minority effort to propose an alternate 
remedy for labor unrest failed on May 13.
31
  The Taft bill sailed through the Senate on the same 
day by a vote of 68-24, including 21 Democrats.  Over the coming weeks, the House and Senate 
arranged for a joint conference to reconcile the Hartley and Taft bills, completing their work on 
May 29.
32
  After much deliberation, and extreme pressure from organized labor, the President 
vetoed the legislation on June 20.  Three days later, Congress overrode Truman’s veto.   
The final Taft-Hartley Act that labor leaders criticized as a harsh and ineffective antidote 
to the strike wave of 1946, rising inflation, and reduced purchasing power, made major changes 
to the Wagner Act.  It increased NLRB membership to five members and burdened the Board 
with high evidentiary requirements for its findings.  It outlawed the closed shop and put 
restrictions on when the union shop could be implemented.  The legislation enumerated several 
unfair labor practices by unions, including secondary boycotts, refusal to bargain, and 
jurisdictional strikes.  It excluded supervisors from organizing and created a new mediation 
service.  Taft-Hartley also created cooling-off periods for national emergency strikes and 
permitted the President expanded power to intervene in emergency strikes.  The bill made unions 
liable to suits in federal courts.  It required some financial reporting by unions and eliminated the 
checkoff, except voluntarily.  Non-communist affidavits were made mandatory.  Unions could 
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no longer contribute funds for political activity.  Federal employees could not strike.  The law 
empowered states to institute laws prohibiting compulsory membership.  It gave employees the 
power to call for new union elections, and it established a Congressional study group. 
In truth, the fact that neither the AFL nor the CIO offered any specific legislative 
alternatives to Taft-Hartley helped seal labor’s fate.  When pressed, Green paid lip service to 
union financial reporting on a voluntary basis and agreed that the AFL would be “willing that the 
Wagner Act be changed so that the employer can engage in free speech.”33  But these were 
hardly large-scale proposals and, in May 1947, Green still contended that “no new legislation is 
necessary” in a nationwide radio broadcast.34  When confronted on this position in a debate with 
the president of NAM, Green claimed that the legislation that the AFL supported – national 
health insurance, an expansion of Social Security benefits, an increase in the minimum wage, 
and improved housing – would do much to resolve the human relations problems that resulted in 
industrial chaos.
35
   
CIO officials were even less visible than Green and the AFL in producing alternate 
proposals to the Taft, Hartley, and other labor bills introduced during the eightieth Congress, 
probably because the CIO had a less centralized, less public anti-Taft-Hartley campaign than the 
AFL.  Like the AFL, CIO officials argued that the 1946 strike wave was due to artificially low, 
wartime wage rates – a standard of living problem that would not be rectified by simply making 
strikes illegal.  A CIO-produced question-and-answer booklet from February 1947 argued that 
the “solution” and “labor’s program” were “to attack the basic economic problems confronting 
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the nation through developing a sound national wage policy” in order to expand purchasing 
power and to fight for expanded government social programs.
36
  This failure among CIO and 
AFL leaders to suggest viable legislative alternatives for reducing industrial strife strengthened 
industry and press accusations that labor officials were obstructionist. 
 Even if they had proposed other options, it is unlikely that the leaders of the AFL and the 
CIO would have agreed on which legislative reforms were desirable.  Much of the disagreement 
focused on the powers of the NLRB.  CIO leaders claimed that the NLRB consistently favored 
the craft unions of the AFL by permitting union elections for small divisions of skilled laborers, 
including apprentices, when industry-wide contracts established by CIO unions expired.  In cases 
of jurisdictional disputes, they also argued that the NLRB tended to favor AFL unions over CIO 
unions.   
The AFL and the CIO also viewed the relationship between prices and wages differently.  
While Green went on record as opposing increased wage demands at a time of high prices, CIO 
leaders insisted on negotiating richer contracts across entire industries. In Green’s view, this 
would further inflation rates and increase prices.
37
  These differences, along with personal and 
political clashes between leaders of the two labor federations, created an environment of distrust 
that made a unified public relations and lobbying campaign against Taft-Hartley difficult.    
 
Devising a New Public Relations Strategy for a New Era 
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With the end of World War II and the dawn of the cold war, both the non-unionized 
public and the characteristics of union members began to shift.  3,250,000 union members had 
served in the armed forces over the course of the war, and their new identity as veterans 
threatened to undermine their identity as organized laborers.
 38
  Veterans – both unionized and 
not – became the first battleground in wartime and postwar labor public relations.  As the war 
wound down and the nation prepared for reconversion, NAM officials were optimistic about 
their chances of winning over soldiers-turned-civilians, a group NAM’s Public Relations Policy 
Committee labeled “the most important single group in the nation today.”  A key piece of this 
strategy was to demonstrate that unions were responsible for the strike wave following the war - 
and the industrial chaos, service interruptions, and shortages it produced.
39
   
Business leaders’ public pronouncements of labor’s responsibility for strikes and the 
postwar recession put union leaders on the defensive.  A 1945 CIO-produced pamphlet directed 
at veterans was typical of this defensive posture.  The text mostly concerned itself with refuting 
“propaganda” issued with the “desire to keep the veterans out of the CIO when they came back” 
from war.  It went on to assert that, with 85 percent of war materials union-made, union labor 
was responsible for American victory during the war.
40
  But even with such a strong statement of 
labor’s value to the country, the CIO pamphlet was chiefly concerned with recruiting new 
members from among the ranks of veterans returning to the nation’s workforce, rather than with 
stimulating appreciation for unions among the general public.   
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But the divide between workers and the public also eroded during the war.  High wartime 
production levels forced unionized plants to hire workers “with little interest or commitment to 
the labor movement,” according to the historian Robert H. Zieger.  This forced unions to reach 
out to workers in unprecedented ways, relying on public relations techniques to convince 
workers that the union was worthy of their support.  For example, during the war, the USWA, 
the UE, the UAW, and the CIO launched a $100,000 publicity campaign to convince workers to 
contact their elected representatives in opposition to federal wage stabilization policies.  In this 
instance, the CIO relied on the same mass, paid media – newspapers, radio, billboards – that 
would later be used to reach more general audiences.
41
 
After the war, the techniques used were often the same, but messaging was differentiated 
by audience, especially as a new and powerful constituency of war veterans emerged to become 
the new face of labor.  The use of mass media to reach a segmented market – veterans, women, 
rural voters, farmers, the middle class, southerners, and other groups – was something new for 
labor, even if mass media had earlier been used to reach workers.  Len De Caux, the CIO’s 
publicity director, was among the most innovative in pushing for the implementation of 
differentiated messaging for a variety of important postwar groups.  To ensure that servicemen 
supported organized labor upon their return home, De Caux began producing special editions of 
the CIO member newspaper, the CIO News, and shipping them to military personnel abroad, free 
of charge, during the war.
 42
  By 1946, Fortune Magazine reported that veterans had a more 
favorable attitude toward organized labor than the general population.
43
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The CIO’s implementation of a veteran-specific strategy would prove to be one of the 
most important testing grounds for union public relations work in the years leading up to Taft-
Hartley, chiefly because it did not always try to reach servicemen as potential members, but 
instead operated on the “proposition that what is good for all the people is good for labor,” 
according to De Caux.  CIO President Phil Murray routinely made the case that the CIO served 
as a “torchbearer” in representing “housewives and small businessmen and unorganized 
workers” against high prices and low wages in the postwar economy.44  The war forced unions to 
use public relations techniques and mass media to reach workers.   In the postwar era, unions 
turned these approaches from workers alone toward a larger, segmented public, increasingly 
working in the political realm. 
The first large-scale illustration of this strategy came in 1946 with union campaigns to 
protect price controls.
45
  In the summer of 1946, with high inflation rates and stagnant wages 
crippling purchasing power, the CIO undertook a political program to inform “the American 
people…[of] who has been responsible for this inflation,” and to generate support for CIO-
backed candidates on election day.
46
  The CIO blamed the weakening and ultimate dismantling 
of price controls for the country’s economic woes.   
The vast majority of the CIO’s efforts to promote price controls were not grassroots in 
nature. The CIO’s national leadership vociferously condemned wildcat strikes and unauthorized 
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work stoppages aimed at protesting high prices and low wages that reduced buying power.  Such 
actions threatened the CIO’s centralized structure on policy matters, and CIO leaders worried 
that contract violations would play into the hands of the corporate opposition.  A.O. Knight of 
the Oil Workers urged members of the CIO Board to “get price control first and then get a wage 
increase that will amount to something” – a sequence that went unrecognized by work stoppages 
focused on compensation that would affect union members’ pocketbooks alone.47  CIO General 
Counsel Lee Pressman believed that mass work stoppages would “put the entire blame at the 
doorstep of organized labor for the chaos that would necessarily follow.”48  Despite the 
opposition of some CIO leaders, these voices for a centralized public relations campaign that 
targeted workers and the public held sway.
49
  Such internal divisions about whether to emphasize 
worker strength and solidarity or to pursue a comprehensive public relations campaign using 
mass media continued during the union campaign against the Taft-Hartley Act.  But as the war 
ended, it was clear that a wide PR effort was already becoming the preferred approach. 
The CIO used a number of public relations strategies in its advocacy of price controls.  It 
supplemented paid advertising on the radio and in newspapers with expert testimony to Congress 
and the sponsorship of research by noted economist and war mobilization expert Robert Nathan. 
Union officials used the Nathan Report to provide intellectual legitimacy for the Office of Price 
Administration (OPA) campaign, as they would later use experts to advocate against Taft-
Hartley.  Murray remembered that “the hostile press” dismissed Nathan’s prediction that 
corporate profits would reach $15,000,000 in 1946, while Taft and other Republicans “defamed 
the CIO.”  Yet, when corporate profits were reported for 1946, Nathan’s prediction proved 
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conservative.
50
  In a tactic that would be repeated during the Taft-Hartley debate, the CIO 
repeatedly publicly contrasted the findings of the Nathan Report with the statements of industry 
groups in order to discredit NAM and the Chamber in the minds of the public.
51
  In response to 
industry’s accusations that the CIO was engaged in “ruthless propaganda,” De Caux wrote, “I 
feel like starting a ‘Be Kind to the Rich Week.’”52  The CIO insisted that corporations embraced 
a “‘public be damned’ attitude” and that the CIO represented the best interests of labor and the 
general public.
53
 
But not all CIO leaders believed that the labor federation’s national office should be the 
one to make this point.  Typical was a statement by Mike Quill of the Transport Workers Union 
to his fellow CIO Executive Board members.  Quill conceded that “Nathan’s report is very 
good,” but argued that the CIO must fight at the local level, “in the wards, in the districts, and on 
a block by block basis.”54 The massive defeat of the CIO-PAC in 1946 and the assumption of 
power by a Congress hostile to labor motivated Quill and others to argue that on-the-ground 
district work was vital to advancing labor’s cause. 55  In addition, the CIO’s own coffers 
dwindled, making it harder for the CIO to direct and control a national approach to defeating 
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Taft-Hartley.  Politics had become “the CIO’s crucial arena,” but the highly localized activities 
of political organizing now stood in contrast to a nationally-directed strategy of public 
relations.
56
  This divide represented the tension between a new and old vision of the meaning of 
political involvement for organized labor.  The CIO’s national leadership certainly still valued 
get-out-the-vote efforts and fundraising, but they – along with the AFL, which had traditionally 
employed a less coordinated electoral strategy – increasingly sought to shape the terms of the 
larger political discourse of the day.     
Though its leaders were also concerned about price controls, the AFL did far less than the 
CIO to publicize the issue to the general public in 1945 and 1946.  When it did, it tended to rely 
on statements from its highest ranking officials, reflecting a trend that both the AFL and the CIO 
would use to craft an image of responsible labor statesmen in the pressure group society that 
would take hold in the 1950s.
57
  The American Federationist, the AFL’s monthly magazine that 
was supplied free-of-charge to union members, ran numerous stories on price controls and 
highlighted industry group errors in their projections of little inflation following the elimination 
of price controls.  But the AFL typically directed these messages at union members and to 
Congressional committees, not the general public.   
This divide between AFL and CIO political approaches continued during the 1946 
election.  The CIO undertook a full-scale campaign to elect progressive candidates to Congress 
through its PAC.
58
  The election was a turning point for the CIO-PAC. As with the CIO’s 
outreach to wartime workers, soldiers, and veterans, the CIO-PAC’s 1946 strategy recognized a 
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growing erosion of the division between workers and the public.  As Jack Kroll, the director of 
the CIO-PAC explained in a 1946 article in the New York Times Magazine, “Today there are 
some 58 million people who have to work in order to live.  These people and their families are 
no minority in our country.  They are, in fact, the public… We of the CIO-PAC are dedicated to 
the protection of the interests of the majority of the people and to the struggle for a continued 
improvement in the standard of living for all our people.”59 
AFL leaders were far less direct in their articulation of the labor-public relationship, 
partly because the AFL’s on-the-ground political operation was far less developed than the 
CIO’s.  The AFL historically supported lobbying over partisan political involvement, citing “the 
best interests of the entire membership,” even as it endorsed candidates on an ad-hoc basis and 
sent its officers as delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions in 1944.  Unlike the 
CIO, the AFL did not develop a PAC until after the passage of Taft-Hartley and did not solicit 
funds to use in a campaign to retain price controls.  Indeed, AFL leaders refused to work with the 
CIO-PAC, which they continually dubbed “the dual organization” in the 1940, 1944, and 1946 
elections.
 60
  Murray later reported that a CIO committee charged with discussing unity with the 
AFL “was not unmindful of the fact that the historic policy of the AFL of ‘reward your friends 
and punish your enemies’, has, by and large, been a policy of do-nothing in the political field.”61  
Murray’s criticism was also a source of strength for the AFL.  Because it had little existing 
infrastructure for widespread local campaign work, the AFL was better positioned to offer a 
coordinated, nationally directed campaign that sought to reshape public attitudes toward labor 
and business; it remained relatively unhampered by internal discord of the sort offered by Quill. 
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Murray’s comment about the AFL’s political activity also highlighted a growing tension 
between the two labor federations that prevented labor not only from presenting a unified front 
during the 1946 election, but also from developing a coordinated attack to the anti-labor 
legislative onslaught that followed.  The AFL and CIO entered into protracted unity discussions 
from December 1946 through May 1947, though talks did not actually begin until the spring.  
But the two organizations could not overcome their differences.
62
  As an indication of how far 
apart the two labor federations were, the AFL formally prohibited its affiliates and state 
organizations from working with the CIO on political action, though local organizations did not 
always abide by this directive.
63
 
  Looking back, a key member of the UAW’s legislative department recalled that “If we 
had had a higher degree of unity [both among CIO unions and with the AFL] back in 1946 and 
1947… we would never have had the Taft-Hartley Act.”64  In the wake of Taft-Hartley’s 
passage, members of the rank-and-file blamed AFL and CIO leaders for their inability to develop 
a unified strategy.  One union member characterized AFL and CIO action as “sheer criminal 
negligence.”  “Had there been a united labor front, the workers would not be on the ‘chopping 
block’ today,” the unionist wrote.65 
 This failure was not for lack of trying, especially on the part of the CIO, the group with 
smaller membership and fewer resources to fight Taft-Hartley.  In February 1947, Murray argued 
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that “unity of action” – though not organizational absorption – between the AFL, the CIO, and 
the Railroad Labor Unions was “of vital importance” and suggested that representatives from the 
three labor federations meet to devise a common economic and legislative agenda to fend off the 
imminent attack.
66
  But AFL personnel had less need for the CIO.  The organization was capable 
of mounting the funds to develop its own public relations campaign and its leaders did not want 
to aid its rival unnecessarily.  Furthermore, the AFL’s leaders worried that the CIO’s reputation 
for harboring leftist and communistic elements would reflect poorly on the AFL.  Even when 
committees from the two organizations finally met in May 1947, the meeting produced nothing 
substantive about how the AFL and CIO might jointly address the legislative threat.
67
   
After the passage of Taft-Hartley, Murray renewed his call for the AFL, CIO, and the 
Railroad Brotherhoods to coordinate their political activities, especially during the 1948 
elections.
68
  In response, the AFL reiterated its requirement of “organic unity.”  In a speech 
before workers in July 1947, Green appealed to the CIO to, “Come back and live with us.  Bring 
your family of whatever it is and live with the family of the American Federation of Labor in the 
house of labor, built by the American Federation of Labor, and erected upon an enduring 
foundation.”69  As before, CIO leaders responded that this prerequisite was irrelevant to a 
coordinated strategy and accused AFL leaders of acting in bad faith.  With that, the 1946-1947 
round of AFL-CIO unity talks effectively ended, with organized labor in far worse shape than 
                                                 
66
 Philip Murray, letter to William Green, December 5, 1946; AFL Executive Council Meeting Minutes, January 29-
February 5, 1947, 23; microfilm, reel 13; U-Mich. 
67
 The only tangible result of the meeting was the release of a joint statement condemning Congress’s actions on 
labor and voicing general support for organic unity. Joint statement of the AFL and CIO unity committees, May 2, 
1947; AFL Executive Council Meeting Minutes, September 8-13, 1947, 10; microfilm, reel 13; U-Mich. 
68
 For its part, the leadership of the Railroad Brotherhoods also suggested collaboration between the three labor 
groups after the passage of Taft-Hartley.  See A.F. Whitney, letter to William Green, Philip Murray, Alvenly 
Johnston, and A.E. Lynch, June 27, 1947; AFL Executive Council Meeting Minutes, September 8-13, 1947, 68; 
microfilm, reel 13; U-Mich.     
69
 William Green, address before the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union, July 1, 1947; AFL Papers, Series XI, 
File E, Box 4, Labor Speeches, B527 to B Fol.; WHS. 
36 
 
when it had begun.  The failure of the AFL and CIO to combine forces was especially 
unfortunate for labor’s fortunes in the face of incessant criticisms by the press and industry 
groups.    
 
Press and Industry Groups Attacks on Labor 
The mainstream press and business interests expressed overwhelmingly hostility to 
organized labor in the years following World War II, blaming union strike action and wage 
demands for causing an economic slowdown and driving up prices for average consumers.  
Newspapers and radio stations – which were themselves often monopolies owned by big 
business – had wide distribution.  Industry groups were much better funded than labor interests.  
NAM’s Public Relations Department budget for 1946 totaled $3,600,000, including $1.9 million 
for national advertising.
70
  The figures were similar for 1947.
71
  By comparison, the CIO spent 
just $200,000 a year directly on public relations and another $200,000 annually on the Research 
and Education Department in the years immediately following the war, though this figure did not 
include related expenditures on lobbying by the organization’s Washington office and politicking 
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through the CIO-PAC.  AFL expenditures on public relations were even less than those of the 
CIO before the organization’s special expenditures aimed at defeating Taft-Hartley in 1947. 72   
As a result of this huge funding discrepancy between the union federations and industry 
groups, labor leaders feared that press and business attacks would influence public opinion and 
provide a mandate for the newly elected Congress to institute punitive labor legislation.  An 
independent survey of newspaper editorial positions found that 93 percent of editorial boards 
supported Taft-Hartley, including a substantial number of papers with prior records of supporting 
organized labor.
73
  In the pages of the CIO News, De Caux hammered home the idea that the 
press was “about 90% opposed to nearly everything labor advocates,” blaming it on the fact that 
the newspaper industry operated as “a big-business operation, a big employer itself… chiefly 
supported by the advertising of employing interests.”74 The AFL’s Secretary-Treasurer George 
Meany lumped the “anti-labor propaganda” of big business together with treatments of labor in 
the press.  In his 1947 Labor Day message, Meany declared, “The anti-labor fabrications of Big 
Business and the faithful servants of Big Business in newspaper offices and legislative halls must 
be exposed.”75   
Labor leaders grew concerned that these heavily financed messages would have a 
negative impact on public attitude toward unions.  Perhaps more damaging than the messaging 
funding provided by business was the sponsorship of community activities through money 
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outside of PR budgets.  Labor leaders worried that the public would come to regard business as 
acting in the interest of the general good because it sponsored community activities without an 
explicit anti-union bent.  In contrast, underfunded unions seemed to act only on behalf of their 
members or, even worse, only to enrich their leaders.  UAW President Walter Reuther articulated 
this concern in early 1947:   
“[Companies] are fooling a lot of people.  They are fooling a lot of people in our own 
union.  How do they do it? …General Motors spent $45,000,000 for propaganda.  They 
have Toscanini on Sunday afternoon and you listen to Toscanini conduct the most 
beautiful classical symphonic music.  And, brother, you are sitting there, sitting back in 
that easy chair and you are at peace with the world, and just when you aren’t on guard 
they slip you the propaganda.  And then Toscanini goes off and the Hour of Charm 
comes on.  The all-girl orchestra.  And Evelyn plays the violin.  Oh, it’s sweet and it’s 
heavenly.  And when she hits the highest note, they let you have it.  That is going on 
every day in America.  We have the job, and we don’t have $45,000,000 to spend, for 
making people realize that the magic formula that the boys in Wall Street profess to have 
a monopoly on is not some magic.”76 
 
Labor leaders like Reuther tried to change the terms of the political debate, by 
emphasizing business’s status as a special interest group, unanswerable to the general public.  
Big business contributed heavily to the Republican congressional victory in 1946, paving the 
way for labor legislation in 1947.  Labor leaders drew attention to these contributions, making 
the case that anti-labor legislation was a political favor to employers.  In contrast, they presented 
labor and the public interest as one in the same.  Shortly after the election, Murray labeled 
General Motors’ Chairman Alfred P. Sloan’s statements that unions did not operate in the public 
interest “an actual declaration of war” that would be realized through “remedial legislation.”77     
Labor was at a disadvantage in making such arguments to the public.  In addition to their 
huge financial advantage over unions, industry groups like NAM also made a deliberate effort to 
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soften their images and appeal to a public not always sympathetic to business’s aims. The New 
York Times reported that NAM leaders determined to make a “clean break with [NAM’s] past 
record, which often has been labeled reactionary.”  While significant steel and auto interests 
were reported to have favored an aggressive campaign to repeal the Wagner Act altogether, the 
majority of NAM’s Board of Directors favored a rhetorically softer approach to engaging the 
public around potential legislation designed to curtail organized labor’s activities.78  Indeed, 
NAM President Earl Bunting worked hard to paint his organization as moderate, as compared 
with the position of union officials.  Bunting argued that the NAM did not seek punitive 
legislation, but rather sought “fair play” on both sides.  “[U]nfairness can 33only be corrected by 
fairness—fair rules and fair play applied without discrimination,” he declared, before Taft-
Hartley had even been proposed explicitly.
79
   
For their part, newspaper editorialists were less interested in the negotiating power of 
business, but more inclined to believe that labor had overplayed its hand.  Newspaper editorials 
routinely condemned labor leaders for taking too much advantage of the privileges granted them 
under the Wagner Act.  In an editorial calling for legislation to prevent strikes by public 
employees, the New York Times editorial page argued that “organized labor now enjoys 
privileges which enable it to exercise what amounts for all practical purposes to monopoly 
power.”80  While admitting that organized labor was “beginning to show that it comprehends its 
obligations,” the Detroit Free Press editorial board condemned labor “Bourbons” who continued 
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to wreak havoc with Detroit’s auto production by temporarily shutting down plants in protest of 
the Hartley bill, as well as Detroit’s ongoing telephone strike.81  Rather than offering solutions to 
labor’s problems, such union officials merely exacerbated the problem. 
In some cases, the press went one step further, castigating union leaders for corruption.  
A cartoon appearing in the New York Daily Mirror during Congress’s votes on Taft-Hartley was 
typical.  In it, the future Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist Fred L. Packer shows “labor union 
dictators” in gladiator attire (Figure 1-1).  Congress has successfully felled the “dictators” with 
the cudgel of legislation.  When called upon to deliver his verdict in the affair, President Truman 
signals that the labor union boss should be condemned to death.  Packer and the editorial staff of 
the vehemently anticommunist, anti-union tabloid Daily Mirror no doubt hoped that Truman 
would strike a blow against what they regarded as unscrupulous behavior by union heads.
82
   The 
World-Telegram’s cartoonist made a similar point, labeling union leaders “labor czars” in at least 
two cartoons.  In one, a rotund man with a small head and a tiny top hat pleads with the White 
House to “save us,” his large behind facing the viewer (Figure 1-2).83  Tears or sweat pour forth 
as the man clasps his hands in prayer, begging for a presidential veto.  The implication is clear: 
His position as a czar stood to be compromised if Taft-Hartley went into effect.   
Not only did many editorial boards and cartoonists imply that union leaders benefitted 
materially from their unchecked positions of power, but many newspapers – both tabloid and 
broadsheet – ran editorials that blasted labor leaders for their irresponsible language and actions.  
A relatively measured New York Herald Tribune editorial accused Murray of “vituperation and 
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name calling” in his descriptions of management.84  Later, an opinion writer for the same paper 
described organized labor leaders as “misguided” in their “ranting.”85  Often writers linked this 
characterization to union leaders’ use of the strike.  With the country in the midst of a strike 
wave that showed no indication of subsiding, the correlation between union strikes and 
irresponsible action may have resonated for many readers. 
Indeed, editorials and cartoons in the anti-labor press often referenced the overuse of 
strikes as a reason why legislation was needed in the first place.  In a cartoon for the Hearst 
syndicate, the Journal-American, former sports page illustrator Burris Jenkins, Jr. depicted the 
president seated at his desk, deciding whether to sign Taft-Hartley into law, the recently vetoed 
tax bill already in the trash can beside his desk (Figure 1-3).
86
  A huge machete bearing the 
words “Strike threats at peak in nation’s history!” looms above his head.  The message was 
unambiguous: The president needed to provide a check to unions that had wielded the strike as a 
weapon whenever they didn’t get everything they wanted.  With “4,159 strikes notices on file in 
’47,” labor was clearly overreaching. 
 The mainstream press argued that Taft-Hartley was a minor antidote to labor’s abuses.  
The press often used the metaphor of a swinging pendulum to represent a turn toward 
moderation from the Wagner Act’s favoritism of labor over business.  A cartoon in the World-
Telegram depicted unions as a singular entity in opposing regulation (Figure 1-4).  While “the 
railroads,” “big business,” and “big industry” were purported to “thrive on [regulation],” only 
Big Labor screams, “Help! Murder! Police” at the thought of Congress attempting to “strangle 
me just like they did these other poor chaps!”  In another cartoon by Tom Carlisle appearing in 
the usually measured, center-right Herald-Tribune, the bill was also presented as a mild 
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corrective (Figure 1-5).  Congress uses the axe of labor legislation to cut off the tail of “labor 
abuses” (curiously attached to a puppy).  Meanwhile, Union Labor and the Left Wing cry like a 
couple of small children.  In all these cartoons, labor leaders were depicted as making a big stink 
over nothing.     
Organized labor faced an uphill battle against such press depictions.  An article in the 
pro-labor journal, Labor and Nation, asserted that the anti-labor press and industry groups were 
so successful that “the words ‘radical labor leaders’ have been linked together in people’s minds 
as ineradicably as the phrase, ‘damn yankees,’ is in Georgia.”87  The press consistently cited this 
public demand for Taft-Hartley as a reason for the legislation’s passage.  In a somewhat circular 
argument, editorialists even took Congressional votes as evidence of public opinion.
88
  In 
contrast, unions were assumed to be out-of-touch with the general public, and even with their 
own members.  “[M]ost Americans” wanted “legislation to correct the union excesses which so 
gravely have injured the country and so surely have imperiled the real welfare of labor,” argued 
the editorial board of the World-Telegram.  Taft-Hartley was “a response to insistent public 
demand.”89    
In the face of so much bad publicity, with limited financial resources and with significant 
time pressure, unions pushed a strategy that sought to discredit big business far more than it tried 
to rehabilitate labor’s image in the eyes of the public.  Where it did present an alternative, it 
presented its own leaders as reasonable labor statesmen, rational and responsive to the general 
public.  Labor’s argument to the public was that Americans should support labor and oppose 
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Taft-Hartley not because unions were inherently good, but because American prosperity and 
freedom depended on it.  This message was hardly consistent, and there were key differences in 
the AFL and CIO’s approach to adopting and deploying it, both structurally and in emphasis.   
 
The Structure, Funding, and Activities of the AFL and CIO Efforts to Defeat Taft-Hartley 
Though labor leaders knew that a legislative assault on unions was imminent, neither the 
AFL nor the CIO began serious discussion of public relations campaigns to defeat the measure 
until March 1947.  This late start was partly due to the fact that the exact contours of the bills 
that were ultimately consolidated under Taft-Hartley were still unclear a few months into the 
new year.  In addition, labor leaders from both federations initially approached the campaign 
with ambivalence.  They remained convinced that their efforts would do little to change 
congressional opinion, which seemed destined to support legislation hostile to unions, no matter 
the public relations efforts of organized labor.  In April 1947, Green insisted that “he did not 
think [substantive AFL-sponsored action against Taft-Hartley’s passage] would do any good 
because the members of Congress will not listen.”90  Later, AFL leaders concluded that “had the 
campaign been launched earlier success in defeating the measure would have been assured,” but 
this remark was an effort to convince unions that had invested significant resources in the 
campaign that their contributions made an impact.
91
  
Though they began their campaigns at around the same time, the structure and content of 
the AFL and CIO efforts to defeat Taft-Hartley were initially quite different, until finally 
converging on a similar strategy to secure and uphold a presidential veto.  The CIO used its 
political infrastructure – the CIO-PAC and the Legislative Department – to manage the 
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campaign, relegating its Public Relations Department to a backseat role.  The CIO effort 
concentrated on convincing its own members to oppose Taft-Hartley and take that message to 
their neighbors, rather than controlling a message in Washington and addressing the non-
unionized public.  
The CIO adopted this approach more out of circumstance than conviction.  It already had 
a political organization in place, and leaders reasoned that the short timeline did not allow for a 
radical redirection of public opinion toward labor unless local people initiated a campaign.  
Instead, they hoped that protests by workers would intimidate lawmakers concerned about 
reelection.  Because Taft-Hartley came on the heels of affiliate contributions to Operation Dixie 
and because the CIO’s per-capita tax was already high, the CIO was reluctant to increase the 
financial obligation of its affiliated unions as Taft-Hartley was introduced.  As a result, the CIO 
did not have the resources for a national, large-scale advertising campaign.  In addition, some 
staunch anti-communists within the CIO already viewed De Caux with caution and may have 
hoped to marginalize his influence during the Taft-Hartley proceedings.  For all these reasons, 
the CIO campaign was not what many in the CIO might have hoped.  Indeed, some CIO leaders 
privately acknowledged that their campaign was far less effective than the AFL’s.  Jacob 
Potofsky, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), implored the 
CIO Executive Board to develop “national advertising, such as the American Federation of 
Labor has done.”  Potofsky offered praise for the AFL’s efforts: “I don’t find any fault with it.  I 
think it has been very effective.”92     
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For its part, the AFL effort was directed from the highest levels of the organization, with 
considerable external support from Morris Novik, a labor radio consultant.
93
  Unlike the CIO, the 
AFL had underdeveloped Public Relations and Legislative Departments, and the organization 
had no Political Action Committee.
94
  And unlike the CIO’s playbook, the AFL campaign 
included a nationally-directed newspaper advertising strategy, as well as the sponsorship of radio 
plays geared toward union members and non-members alike.  The AFL engaged in little 
grassroots organizing until the end of the campaign, when the organization tried to show its 
political might by rallying union members around a presidential veto and a congressional vote to 
sustain the veto.  Before the year was out, the AFL created the Labor’s League for Political 
Education (LLPE) as a political auxiliary, acknowledging the power of combining political 
outreach to members and robust lobbying in the halls of Congress with a tightly coordinated and 
very expensive public relations campaign to stop Taft-Hartley. 
The CIO and AFL campaigns were also different in their funding mechanisms.  While the 
CIO relied on internationals to finance local campaigns guided by – but not regulated by – 
templates produced in Washington, the AFL asked internationals to turn over funds to the 
national AFL office for a coordinated national campaign.  This marked a departure from 
previous AFL policy, which had always imposed a far lower per-capita tax on the organization’s 
membership and employed many fewer AFL-paid organizers in the field and staffers in 
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Washington, D.C.
95
  In 1946, the per capita tax for AFL unions was raised to two cents per 
member per month for members up to 200,000 and 1.5 cents for every member thereafter.  The 
per capita tax for CIO unions during the same period was five cents – more than twice the rate of 
AFL unions.  Enthusiastic support from the powerful Teamsters Union for a funding scheme that 
relied on union contributions allowed the Executive Council to overcome the historic resistance 
that the AFL had displayed to a strongly centralized governance model.  Given the Teamsters’ 
reputation for strong-arm tactics, as well as the fact that the union’s membership was distributed 
across many industries in which other AFL unions had members, there were few on the 
Executive Council who wanted their opposition to Teamsters President Daniel J. Tobin’s 
financing plan recorded. 
The Executive Council agreed to a voluntary per-head assessment of fifteen cents, to be 
levied and collected by the AFL’s federated unions.  In telegrams to AFL-affiliated union heads, 
the Council “urged” unions “to make a contribution immediately” in order “to fight this evil 
threat which today hangs over the head of every American worker.”96  If all unions participated, 
the assessment was expected to generate $1,125,000, but officials believed that they could raise 
at least $1,000,000, a figure that would allow “a considerable job in the way of publicity in 
combating this legislation.” 97  By May, the American Federationist was reporting that donations 
were fast and furious.  “[C]hecks were arriving from unions large and small” before the Council 
meeting even ended, the Federationist informed readers.
98
  Indeed, Meany’s back-of-the-
envelope estimate of $1,000,000 came very close to the actual revenue raised.  Financial reports 
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indicated that member unions contributed some $1,020,000, and local unions kicked in another 
$14,000.
99
   
This money had not been fully pledged, let alone collected, when the publicity began a 
mere week following AFL Executive Council discussions of the matter in April 1947.  As a 
result – or perhaps as an effort to solicit more funding and garner bigger headlines – the AFL 
newspaper and radio campaign was reported to cost $1,500,000 in the press.
100
  The final 
financial reports for the two-month-long effort revealed that a significantly smaller amount had 
been spent than the figure projected in newspaper accounts.  Expenses totaled some $850,000, 
the bulk of it spent on newspaper advertising ($424,000) and radio time ($330,000).
101
  It is 
unclear how the national AFL disposed of the $184,000 differential between revenues and 
expenditures for the campaign.  Whatever the case, $1,000,000 represented a sizeable amount of 
money, enabling a nationally-directed AFL campaign that would grace the pages of over two 
hundred newspapers beginning in late April and the airwaves of over four hundred radio stations 
around the country beginning in early May.
102
 
 In contrast, the CIO did not place per-head assessments on its unions but, instead, relied 
on affiliates to sponsor local media campaigns when the federation couldn’t afford to do so.  In 
part, this was because the CIO adopted a political strategy and relied heavily on the CIO-PAC 
which had its own grassroots organizing strategy and which relied on worker contributions rather 
than demanding contributions from affiliated unions.  The CIO’s reluctance to tax unions also 
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came from the fact that levies were already in place for the CIO’s failing southern organizing 
campaign, Operation Dixie.  By November 1946, six months into the southern campaign, the 
CIO had already spent some $800,000 of union contributions and the campaign saw virtually no 
return on investment as only $21,000 was collected in the field.  By the time of the campaign to 
defeat Taft-Hartley the CIO was spending considerably less on the southern effort – some 
$100,000 a month – but unions were unexcited about financing another failed campaign.103  In 
addition, the CIO’s per-capita tax was much higher than the generally leaner and less centralized 
AFL.  The AFL had the luxury of being able to vote an increase in per capita taxes in 1946, 
resulting in increased revenue in 1947.
104
 
Despite their different strategies and funding mechanisms, both the AFL and the CIO 
campaigns to defeat the anti-labor bills of the Eightieth Congress began with rhetorical flourish.  
The CIO leadership – especially the CIO-PAC and the Legislative Department – acted on its 
own.  With the new Congressional session only a couple weeks old, the CIO’s Legislative 
Department Director Nathan Cowan issued a leaflet to all CIO affiliates under the heading, 
“YOUR UNION IS IN DANGER!”  Cowan warned union leaders and their charges around the 
country that proposed anti-labor bills could “cripple the activities of organized labor,” stymying 
CIO unions’ efforts to obtain higher wages for members, and thereby reducing the living 
standards of workers.
105
  In addition, the national CIO office published half a million copies of 
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the pamphlet, “Defend Your Union,” a text-heavy legal analysis of Congress’ labor agenda and a 
call for political action by union members.
106
 
More coordinated action came in the months to follow.  The CIO Executive Board did 
not schedule an emergency discussion between its regularly scheduled meetings of November 
1946 and mid-March 1947.  At the March meeting the Board approved the Legislative 
Department’s recommendation that the CIO declare April 1947 “Defend Labor Month,” an effort 
“to cut through the fog of phony propaganda, and to arouse the American people to the real 
dangers involved in the present legislative drive against labor.”107  During this month, CIO 
affiliates were encouraged to organize rallies, distribute leaflets, sponsor radio programs, and 
lobby in Washington, but such a declaration and the associated wires to locals, and materials 
distributed through the CIO News did not represent a coordinated strategy to defeat Taft-Hartley; 
indeed, numerous other causes, including action around taxes, housing, prices, and healthcare 
among others, were collapsed into Defend Labor Month.  Defeating Taft-Hartley was only one 
piece of a larger legislative effort. 
Furthermore, the official call for action during Defend Labor Month was addressed to “all 
CIO members, friends, and allies throughout the country,” not to those members of the public 
who might be convinced to ally themselves with labor in its hour of need.
108
  As Van Bittner, an 
officer of the Steelworkers and the head of the CIO’s southern organizing drive explained, “Our 
first object is to stir up labor.  That is the only team we have, the team of the CIO.  We have no 
other team, and if then when we get our own people, six million of them stirred up, they can 
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bring a lot of others with them.”109  For Bittner and other members of the CIO Executive Board, 
the public was largely beside the point, except insofar as local action might persuade shifts in the 
thinking of neighbors.  But why such an effort might succeed in 1947, when CIO union members 
and their neighbors did not push the Democrats to victory in the 1946 election – despite the best 
advice of the CIO-PAC – remained unclear.   
Murray charged De Caux’s Publicity Department with helping the Legislative and 
Research Departments, as well as the CIO-PAC observe Defend Labor Month.  Not content 
simply to report on letter writing campaigns, worker rallies and the Congressional testimony of 
CIO leaders in the CIO News, De Caux developed a thorough plan for publicizing labor’s 
objections to the Taft and Hartley bills to the general public.
110
  In it, De Caux detailed plans for 
all of the activities expected of the grassroots, member-focused programming that the CIO 
Executive Board had endorsed: the continued printing of CIO pamphlets and advertisement mats 
for placement (and payment) by international and local unions, special editions of the CIO News, 
and the use of existing CIO-sponsored radio programs to publicize Defend Labor Month 
activities.
111
   
But De Caux also pushed a set of projects designed to appeal to the non-unionized public.  
Indeed, De Caux saw no need to create separate messages for organized labor and for the public.  
For De Caux, “John Q. Public [was] labor.”112  His proposed public relations campaign reflected 
this belief.  De Caux’s proposals included a set of pre-recorded and live radio addresses by 
Murray; radio scripts on Taft-Hartley to be placed, performed and produced locally; radio spot 
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announcements; the placement of CIO officials on existing public affairs programs on radio; paid 
newspaper advertisements; the production of standardized anti Taft-Hartley campaign kits for 
use in the field; and, most impressively, a sophisticated differentiated advertising campaign 
directed at African Americans, non-English speakers, and farmers, among others.   
With a nod to the CIO leadership’s reluctance to impose additional taxes on its affiliated 
unions, De Caux emphasized that his publicity plan “ha[d] been prepared on the assumption that 
no substantial funds have been voted for an extensive advertising and publicity campaign.”  
Newspaper advertisements and radio time would require sizeable expenditures – $3,200 for a 
one-time, full-page buy in the New York Times or $730 for a page in the Washington Post, $350 
for each bought radio spot announcement, and $300 for the translation and mailing of special 
foreign language newspaper inserts, according to De Caux’s estimates.  But radio time deemed to 
be in the public interest could be had for free, and De Caux’s staff could place CIO officials on 
Washington talk shows without money changing hands.
113
     
In many ways, the distribution program that the AFL implemented was similar to the one 
that De Caux had offered to the CIO, though the content of the message was somewhat different, 
and the plan was significantly less well developed than De Caux’s polished proposal.114  Green, 
Meany and AFL Vice President Matthew Woll proposed a two-pronged strategy: special radio 
programming possibly hosted by a professional commentator; and the placement of 
advertisements in large, mainstream newspapers across the country.  While the CIO had engaged 
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in such activities in prior campaigns, this type of advertising was new to the AFL.  In its 1947 
report, the AFL’s Public Relations Department reported that the campaign against Taft-Hartley 
marked “the first time in its history [that] the American Federation of Labor was compelled to 
buy space in the newspapers and time on the air, day after day and week after week, to express 
its views in a way that would command public attention.”115  The change in policy came not only 
because of the AFL’s alarm over Taft-Hartley’s potential, but also because AFL leaders sought 
to influence the broader political discourse about labor and cold war liberalism.  A younger 
generation of AFL leaders led by George Meany grew concerned that the public would perceive 
the CIO’s left-wing as representative of all of labor, lessening the influence of AFL spokesmen 
in Washington and challenging the AFL’s legislative agenda.  Meany and other rising, younger 
AFL staff members celebrated the union bureaucracy and sophistication represented by a 
coordinated public relations campaign in the interest of political influence.   
The AFL’s newspaper advertisements appeared as full or near-full page displays in 
newspapers whose editorial boards took varied positions on Taft-Hartley and on labor issues 
more generally.
116
  This diversity of papers was seen as essential by an AFL leadership 
determined to reach a wide public.  AFL leaders did not necessarily see union members and the 
public as one-in-the-same as De Caux did, but they viewed the general public as the key to 
defeating Taft-Hartley.  This stood in marked contrast to the CIO, which primarily reached out to 
union members. 
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The AFL’s large-scale radio campaign also showed the organization’s determination to 
reach those who did not belong to unions.  The AFL’s use of the radio was both conventional 
and boundary-pushing.  The conventional elements involved appearances by the AFL’s 
leadership on networks that were accessed by a wide cross-section of the public, union members 
and not.  The AFL sponsored on-air speeches by Green and Meany, agreed to two radio debates 
featuring Green – one with Senator Taft and the other with the president of the NAM, and 
encouraged their members to listen to nationally broadcast radio speeches by sympathetic 
politicians.  In addition, the national Federation bought air time to relay the opinions of small 
employers opposed to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.  Among these was one Patrick 
McDonough, a steel plant owner in Oakland, California.  McDonough lambasted Congressional 
Republicans and the NAM for refusing his request to testify before Congress on the dangers of 
Taft-Hartley.  “I think the insult was to you, the American people,” McDonough told radio 
listeners.
117
   
In addition to these more conventional uses of radio, the AFL sponsored a variety of 
radio plays with explicit labor messages and musical performances with few direct labor 
references in order to publicize organized labor’s viewpoints, and to establish an image of the 
AFL as a community presence.  The idea was to employ “entertainment in the pursuit of 
activism.”118  In doing so, the AFL reached beyond its own membership, acting on the belief that 
a larger constituency could further the cause of defeating Taft-Hartley.  The effort drew on “star 
talent in defense of organized labor’s freedoms” recruited from the ranks of the largest 
entertainment unions, overwhelmingly affiliated with the AFL.
119
  These big names included 
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Milton Berle, Eddie Cantor, Benny Goodman, Danny Kaye, Gregory Peck, Melvyn Douglas, 
Hattie McDaniels, and Lawrence Tibbett.   
Within one week of the first meeting of representatives of the AFL’s entertainment 
unions, the AFL “started the airwaves crackling with programs the likes of which had never been 
heard before,” according to a retrospective roundup by Novik.120  This was not precisely true 
given the CIO’s previous forays into radio performances.  But the star power lent to the effort, 
the huge financial investment, and the use of national, one-time airtime buys at primetime or 
during the afternoon, instead of an existing discounted, pre-scheduled, weekly radio show at a 
time designed to coincide with shift changes were unprecedented. 
The AFL’s radio campaign used a sophisticated strategy of differentiated messaging on a 
scale previously unimagined in labor circles.  The Federation bought time for three distinct 
programs to run across four different time slots on the ABC and Mutual Networks.
121
  “The Best 
Things in Life,” a soap opera to dramatize the plight of ordinary American workers aired in daily 
installments on 239 stations and was designed to appeal to housewives.  It recalled the OPA 
fights of the previous year, legitimizing organized labor as a voice for consumers.
122
  “Lift Your 
Voices,” a variety show with no appreciable labor-specific content beyond remarks between 
musical pieces aired on Thursday evenings and again on 425 Mutual stations on Sundays at 1:30 
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pm – the latter time slot designed for family listening.123  Finally, ABC aired “Labor Must Be 
Free,” on Tuesday nights.  This program featured prominent citizens – from business, 
government and churches – speaking against Taft-Hartley.124   
For all the AFL’s outreach to the public in April and May of 1947, after Taft-Hartley’s 
passage in the House and the Senate and before the presidential veto, the AFL converged with 
the CIO in adopting a strategy to mobilize union members, rather than to appeal to the public. 
The hope was that rallies and union letter-writing campaigns, as well as intensified lobbying in 
the halls of Congress would intimidate the President and members of Congress with the threat of 
electoral retribution in 1948.  Both AFL and CIO unions sought to demonstrate to the public that 
they did not need punitive legislation, and the AFL ran a few more newspaper advertisements 
targeting non-members immediately before and after the presidential veto.  But for the most part, 
both labor federations concentrated on demonstrating worker strength and political solidarity. 
A June 4
th
 gathering at Madison Square Garden under the sponsorship of the AFL’s 
Central Trades and Labor Council of Greater New York highlighted the AFL’s new approach.125  
AFL leaders spoke to 25,000 attendees alongside such prominent politicians as William 
O’Dwyer, the mayor of New York City, and the state’s U.S. Senators.  Even as he hoped that 
listeners would bring the message of the rally back to their communities, Green acknowledged 
that he was addressing unionists.  Declaring that organized labor was “not powerful enough – not 
united enough,” Green called for the organization of millions more workers.  “Nothing will stop 
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us!” he thundered to the packed house.126  The primary message of the rally was a threat: “Those 
who were so eager to jump on the anti-labor bandwagon will find that it may well turn out to be a 
speeding vehicle on the road to political oblivion,” David Dubinsky of the International Ladies 
Garment Workers told the roaring crowd.
127
  If a Senator or Congressman failed to uphold the 
veto, “we shall have no choice but to regard him as our enemy,” Green declared.128   
The CIO’s veto rally was held six days after the AFL’s, in the same venue.  Organizers 
predicted that it would attract 100,000 between those inside, participants in a march to the 
Garden, and those gathered outside.
129
  Afterward, the CIO confirmed this figure, and claimed 
that a half a million New Yorkers had lined the parade route to watch.  The CIO News reported 
that the event was “the biggest labor demonstration that labor has ever seen.”130  Murray later 
stated that “profound opposition to this legislation has not come solely from labor but from all 
ranks of American life.”  But whatever the turnout, the rally itself was very much a labor affair 
and CIO spokesmen emphasized worker solidarity in the 1948 election.  
 In addition to this rally, the CIO continued its letter writing and petition campaigns.  
Murray confided to the UAW leadership that, “At least a million letters or wires or signatures to 
petitions are needed,” as “[e]ach [Congressional vote] may be the decisive one.”131   But the 
actual veto-related mail volume was somewhat less than Murray had anticipated and seems to 
have come from union members and not the neighbors whom the CIO believed unionists would 
persuade to attack Taft-Hartley.  The CIO leadership boasted that 175,000 letters, 575,000 
postcards and 26,000 telegrams supporting a veto had been sent at the bequest of the CIO to the 
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White House and to Capitol Hill.
132
  And while the CIO Legislative Committee did coordinate its 
petition drive with the Democratic National Committee and other liberal groups, the CIO portion 
of this effort was directed squarely at its own membership.
133
  
 
The Messages Used in AFL and CIO Campaigns 
The message of political retribution used by the AFL and CIO in order to secure a 
presidential veto and push for Congress to uphold that veto was very different than the 
arguments against Taft-Hartley used by both organizations during the spring of 1947.  Speaking 
primarily to its members and the communities in which those members lived, the CIO tended to 
emphasize economic arguments that posited that Taft-Hartley would reduce wages, increase 
prices and lower the standard of living for all Americans.  For its part, the AFL stressed the 
negative effect that the passage of Taft-Hartley would have on Americans’ Constitutional 
freedoms, sometimes tying these ideas to the economic health of the country.  Because it was 
generally directing its messages to a wider audience and because the AFL was not dogged by 
allegations of communist sympathies as the CIO was, these political arguments were far easier 
for the organization to promote than they were for the CIO.  They also served the purpose of 
differentiating the AFL from the left-wing of the CIO – a matter of considerable concern to 
Meany and other AFL leaders.  But at various times throughout the spring of 1947, both the AFL 
and the CIO resorted to both economic and political arguments. 
The CIO-PAC led the charge in defining the CIO’s economic arguments against the labor 
legislation proposed by the Eightieth Congress.  In a public letter to the President, Murray argued 
that if Taft-Hartley were to be signed into law, “it will engulf not only the labor movement but 
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the entire nation in tragic consequences,” principally a depression caused by weakening unions’ 
abilities to negotiate contract, resulting in lower wages and reduced purchasing power.
134
  
Meanwhile, industrial chaos would ensue as injunction rule reigned and unions lost the 
negotiating powers that had previously permitted them to secure adequate wages for workers.  
This stripping of labor’s rights would cause production backlogs that would negatively impact 
supply and prices to the consumer.  This would both make goods scarcer (and therefore more 
expensive), and would erode the economic strength of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world.   
The AFL tied this argument about a weakened America to a message of political 
freedom.  “Slave labor is never productive labor,” announced the first AFL anti Taft-Hartley 
newspaper advertisement to run.  The new charge of the United States as it entered the cold war 
was “to produce more and more goods to meet the dire needs of all people.”  Under the heading, 
“a 1947 appeal to reason,” the advertisement argued that sufficient levels of production could not 
occur with “dangerous experiments with totalitarian controls that will ruin the efficiency of our 
productive plants” – experiments highlighted by Taft-Hartley (Figure 1-6).  Other advertisements 
reiterated this theme.  The public, workers and employers had “identical” interests involving 
“labor-management peace and increased production” (Figure 1-7).  The advertisement contended 
that the end of industry-wide bargaining would result in chaos.  Strikes would become more 
frequent as union leaders tried to negotiate new contracts with each employer in an industry.  
The result of all of this upheaval would be lowered productivity, generating still higher prices 
and a lower standard of living.   
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The national standard of living was threatened not only by lower productivity, but also by 
the lowered wage standards that Taft-Hartley promised, in the view of AFL and CIO leaders.  
Industry-wide agreements resulted in high wage standards that benefitted everyone.  By 
negotiating on behalf of their own members across an entire industry, unions also benefitted non-
union workers who saw their wage levels rise to be competitive in industries with wide union 
representation.  CIO News editorials argued that, “When CIO unions win higher wages, they win 
them for all the workers, whether union or non-union,” resulting in a ripple effect “[l]ike the 
pebble dropped in the pond.”135  The entire nation’s economic fortunes and the living standard of 
the non-unionized public rested on big business’ attempt to “‘whip labor into line.’”136  One AFL 
advertisement argued that this “calamity” of lowered wages and purchasing power would “lead 
to a Taft-Hartley depression.”  
As Murray explained in a nationwide radio broadcast over NBC, “the Taft-Hartley bill is 
an open invitation to every chiseling employer to start wage cutting.”  This practice would 
ultimately force the country to “endure a man-made crisis, perhaps deeper and more 
threatening…than…the Great Depression.”137  Green also sounded an alarmist note.  In 
Congressional testimony, he argued that if proposed labor bills were enacted, “the working 
people of this country would be compelled by law themselves to destroy the standard of living 
achieved over the years.”138  In a subsequent speech, Green argued that Taft-Hartley would 
“undermine and destroy the American standard of living and lower the wages of every man and 
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woman who works for a living.”139  And in a national radio broadcast, Green asked listeners 
whether “the great mass of American workers….would be able to sustain the blow” of “wage 
cuts all down the line, for non-union members as well as union workers.”140  Another AFL 
official argued that all that stood between a repeat of the 1930s was the labor movement’s 
recognition of the threat that restrictive legislation and power-hungry, anti-democratic industry 
groups posed to the health of the nation’s economy.141  
CIO advertising mats produced by De Caux’s Public Relations Department and placed 
and financed locally also stressed an impending depression.  But CIO advertisements featured 
very different layouts and approaches than those of the AFL.  Fictional characters narrating their 
personal stories appeared frequently, and illustrations and tag-lines adorned the page.  In 
contrast, the AFL made the case that a depression would result from Taft-Hartley by listing facts 
about the pending legislation in tiny font.    In one CIO advertisement, a man holding an apple 
remembered his fruit peddling during the last depression (Figure 1-8).  He recalled that he could 
not afford to buy the very goods he made, the aggregated effect of which had produced the 
nationwide Depression.     
Another sample advertisement featured a girl asking, “Why is my Pop worried?” (Figure 
1-9).  The answer came in memories of “the last Big Depression” when a “lot of people were out 
of work and hungry.”  Pop worried because such a set of conditions would mean that his family 
would “be lucky to have beans on the table for dinner.”  This would occur if Pop’s union was 
destroyed under the terms of Taft-Hartley.  A fictional grocery store owner expressed similar 
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sentiments, admitting that he relied on working people to buy his goods to make ends meet 
(Figure 1-10).  Congressmen who embraced Taft-Hartley seemed to think that “working 
people—my customers—got too much money,” a view that stood to hurt the small business 
owner as much as the worker.  The economic health of the country was at stake.  If Taft-Hartley 
passed, and “unions were practically knocked cold” as they were during the 1920s, the country 
could expect another “Big Depression.”  The bottom line was that “a prosperous America 
depends on good wages, regularly paid” (Figure 1-11).  If strong labor unions were dismantled, 
wages would drop, and just as in 1929, “Everyone gets hit.”  The entire economy would suffer. 
While the CIO tended to emphasize these economic themes, the AFL concentrated on the 
threat to American freedom if Taft-Hartley became law.  One AFL advertisement claimed that 
Taft-Hartley would cancel the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declaring 
slavery and involuntary servitude illegal (Figure 1-12).  The AFL argued that by prohibiting the 
right to strike in many cases, prescribing waiting periods for strikes, and threatening the 
possibility of treating organized labor as a trust, the legislation treated labor as a commodity.  It 
represented “an unjustified invasion of an essential liberty” and violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting involuntary servitude.
142
  “[V]irtual slavery is being 
proposed,” Green wrote in statement for the Cleveland Building and Construction Trades 
Council.
143
  CIO statements also contended that anti-labor legislative proposals represented a 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and threatened “to turn the clock of history backward.”144 
Labor leaders also argued that Taft-Hartley violated Constitutional freedoms because it 
was the product of NAM – the alleged author of the legislation – not a democratically elected 
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Congress.  Through the anti-labor legislation, NAM sought “to enslave American working 
people and destroy trade unions by injunction” claimed one AFL advertisement.  The legislation 
represented a retreat backward, overturning laws that had liberated workers from the clutches of 
“autocratic court orders” (Figure 1-12).  It threatened American values, as much as American 
law.   
“The Slave Labor bill is a travesty and a mockery of our American heritage.  It is a threat 
to a free people,” argued another AFL advertisement (Figure 1-13).  Like other AFL 
advertisements, this one posited that sinister forces intent on destroying American democracy 
had pushed the anti-labor legislation through the hallowed halls of Congress.  NAM was not 
named explicitly, but a reader familiar with the AFL’s case would have understood the meaning 
behind the passivity of the statement, “[t]here have been other bills pressured through the 
Congress…but never one with more one-sided intent” (emphasis in the original).  Another 
advertisement cautioned against the “deception” of the bill and its authors (Figure 1-14).  Other 
advertisements made the case more directly.  “Since when has the National Association of 
Manufacturers become the defender of the public interest?  Can this leopard change its spots?” 
one advertisement queried (Figure 1-15).   
The result of this pressure was a slow march toward fascism or communism, according to 
the AFL.  Banners hung at the AFL-sponsored Madison Square Garden rally declared, “Taft 
Labor Law Revives Slavery in America,” and “Mein Kampf Written Into Hartley-Taft Labor 
Bill.”  Depicting the bill as “an invaluable recruiting agent for the Communists,” Dubinsky 
claimed that the legislation’s framers “couldn’t do a better job than Stalin’s own agents in 
fostering resentment and strife in our land.”145   
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Almost uniformly, CIO officials in Washington described Taft-Hartley as encouraging 
fascism.  Because the leftist De Caux and his CIO News staff designed most of the advertising 
mats circulated to oppose Taft-Hartley, and because Murray was mindful of keeping communist-
sympathizing unions in the ranks of the CIO, CIO rhetoric against Taft-Hartley did not 
concentrate on the threat of communism as AFL materials did.  Murray issued a message to CIO 
members stating that the bill was “the first real step toward the development of fascism in the 
United States of America.”146 A CIO News article, under the jarring headline, “Which Way 
America?” claimed that Taft-Hartley followed a pattern of labor repression and dictatorship 
practiced in Nazi Germany (Figure 1-16).
147
  Through their elected representatives, the American 
people could choose between a democracy or the union-busting, war-mongering dictatorship 
characterized by Nazism.  The article urged CIO members to do “everything they can, first as 
individuals…second as union members…and finally as American citizens” to defeat Taft-
Hartley.
148
   
CIO appeals to union members likened increased employer control to totalitarianism that 
could extend to America’s political system.  “Save Your Unions, Save Democracy!” blared a 
CIO News headline, linking the public message of freedom to the internal crusade to keep unions 
strong.
149
  Speaking to a 60,000-strong rally in New York, Murray was met with thunderous 
applause when he declared that Taft-Hartley converted the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts 
“into an engine for the destruction of organized labor.”150  Yet, Murray also lambasted the bill as 
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a threat to American democracy more generally, condemning it as creating “a fundamental 
change on the American form of government.”151   
In framing Taft-Hartley as an assault on freedom through the imposition of a slaveocracy, 
labor leaders responded directly to the image of labor promoted by industry groups and 
individual employers.  Industry appeals to the public presented the closed shop and industry-
wide bargaining as threatening to American freedom.  The NAM, in particular, launched a 
“massive propaganda campaign, always couched in ‘public interest’ terms.”152  Six NAM 
advertisements graced the pages of newspapers across the country during the spring of 1947, 
countering and anticipating AFL advertisements.  Appearing in 265 city newspapers and 1,876 
small-town newspapers, these were part of a larger campaign around “the four roadblocks to 
prosperity – price controls, labor relations, government spending, and taxes” that cost $1,250,000 
in the year 1947 alone.
153
   
The NAM argued that the closed shop was “contrary to the American way of life.”  The 
“new monopoly” was “labor monopoly,” elevating “a single union officer” to dictator status with 
powers to “shut down an entire industry” (Figure 1-17).  The NAM posited that it opposed all 
monopolies – both business and labor – and therefore acted in the public interest.  If it had 
pressured Congress to enact legislation favorable to employers, it had done so in order to break 
up labor monopolies that threatened American democracy.  Another newspaper spot made a 
similar claim, stating that industry-wide bargaining put “almost unlimited power into the hands 
of the few; the power to throttle the well-being of the many” (Figure 1-18).  At a moment when 
the nation was caught up in discussions about whether to support President Truman’s newly 
announced Doctrine to aid anticommunist forces in Greece and Turkey, NAM hardly needed to 
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elaborate what the consequences were if organized labor continued to have its way; the country 
was on the path toward the fascism defeated two years earlier, or toward the communism 
targeted in the postwar era 
Labor leaders presented themselves in contrast to these depictions of industry lobbyists.  
Just as they used the remarks of legislators and others outside the bound of organized labor to 
condemn NAM and other groups, CIO leaders collected positive treatments of union leaders by 
impartial experts.  For example, when the Columbia sociologist C. Wright Mills released some 
of his findings about the characteristics of labor leaders in preparation for the 1948 publication of 
his book, The New Men of Power, labor leaders were quick to hail Mills’ contention that, “The 
labor leader is not a racketeer” but rather, “a politician and an entrepreneur” and “sometimes, for 
short periods, he be much more than either.”  Mills’ suggestion that “[w]hen the president of the 
United Automobile Workers sits across the table from the president of General Motors, $10,000 
a year is facing $459,000” was further confirmation of organized labor’s position that it was 
industry elites – not labor leaders – who were both out of touch with normative, middle class 
values and uninterested in serving the larger public.
154
  Labor leaders found this relatively 
sympathetic depiction of union officials useful in countering the portrait of labor developed by 
NAM and other industry groups.  
Both AFL and CIO spokesmen contended that business elites developed and publicized 
“this weird, inconsistent and ever-changing fantasmagoria of all-powerful labor dictators, greedy 
unions holding up a meek little John Q. Public” in order to deflect attention from their own lack 
of regard for the public.
155
  They tried “to make suckers of the American people” by hiding the 
“real contents of the quack medicine they’re peddling” – legislation that threatened the larger 
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public as much as union members.
156
  As Green explained in a May 1947 radio debate with his 
counterpart at the NAM, “The transparent attempt to separate the identity of labor and the public, 
which is fostered by the NAM’s propaganda campaign, is designed to hoodwink the American 
people” which was composed of a public which worked for a living.157  Union leaders found 
verification from outside voices – including that of Mills – to be helpful in contesting business 
claims widely distributed in an expensive advertising and public relations campaign.  
While still harboring deep distrust of one another on a personal and professional level, 
the AFL and CIO thus issued similar messages about economic and political consequences for 
the country if Taft-Hartley were to pass.  Both organizations recognized the need to convince the 
public that labor was deserving of trust if the public was to accept their message.  But while the 
AFL spoke directly to the public, the CIO relied on its membership to take labor’s case to its 
members.  The AFL concentrated largely on political freedoms as a consequence of economic 
calamity to the country while the CIO emphasized economic consequences for members and the 
implications that this would have for America as a whole. 
Conclusion 
 Organized labor’s public relations offensive during the postwar period was deeply 
connected to its political ambitions, as the struggle over the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrates.  No 
longer content to rely on public messaging as a way of reaching potential members alone, the 
AFL and the CIO both began to view the larger public as worthy of courting.  The consequences 
of failing to do so were dire: the hamstringing of labor through restrictive legislation and the 
curtailment of labor’s larger legislative agenda in a variety of areas including housing, wages, 
Social Security, and health care.   
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While individuals like De Caux were influential in pushing public relations to the 
forefront, labor was also spurred to action by a changing business and media landscape.  Big 
campaigns by business lobbying groups and the rise of a more national and sophisticated media 
threatened positive public attitudes toward labor.  In addition, the nation’s economic conditions – 
especially high prices and scarce goods – and a large strike wave put labor on the defensive.  
Coupled with the election of an anti-labor Congress in 1946, these conditions caused organized 
labor to consider a new approach to the biggest legislative threat it had faced in decades.  The 
fight against Taft-Hartley was the largest campaign yet in organized labor’s new postwar 
approach to engaging the public. 
The campaign was also important because it marked attempts by both the AFL and the 
CIO to establish themselves as leading public interest groups able to shape the political discourse 
of the day.  Meany and other young leaders in the AFL saw the position of their labor federation 
as a respected and powerful voice for the general public slipping with greater attention paid to 
communists within the CIO and with more coordinated industry campaigns designed to discredit 
organized labor.  And the CIO sought to expand its political activity beyond the precinct-level 
tactics employed in elections.  This engagement with the wider political space in which different 
pressure groups vied for power was to become a dominant theme in the years that followed.
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Chapter 2 
“As American as the Hot Dog” or “As American as Apple Pie”?: Anticommunism and the 
CIO’s Image in the Age of Wallace 
 
 In a fit of fury and a loss of patience, the 1949 CIO convention in Cleveland voted to try 
ten relatively small unions whose leaderships were believed to follow a communist line dictated 
from Moscow.  The convention also voted to expel the communist-led United Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers of America (UE) – the third largest CIO affiliate – after the delegates from 
that organization saw the writing on the wall and walked out of the convention proceedings.  
Together, the unions slated for expulsion in Cleveland represented just under twenty percent of 
the CIO’s overall membership, with the bulk of that coming from the UE (Table 2-1).  But the 
smallness of this group was magnified in the public eye by ferocious press accounts, government 
investigations, and an increasingly anticommunist political environment, resulting in the CIO 
assuming a reputation as a bastion of radicalism at best, and a nerve center for treason at worst.  
As John A. Fitch, the labor relations expert and public intellectual, wrote in an article in The 
Survey a month after the convention, the actions of the communist unions “were a constant 
source of embarrassment to the CIO.”  By taking steps to remove communist elements from its 
ranks, the CIO “emerges from the battle in a stronger position before the general public, with 
increased popular confidence and respect.”1 
 This mere embarrassment was not enough to drive the purges; they were sparked more by 
organizing capacity and a desire to avoid government intervention.  But the expulsions did 
transform the way the CIO presented itself to the public.  In this chapter, I argue that, while the 
motivations behind the purges were diverse, the expulsions marked a singular change in how 
                                                 
1
 John A. Fitch, “The CIO and Its Communists,” The Survey, December 1949, 643, 647. Highlander Papers, Box 41, 
Fol. 2; WHS. 
69 
 
CIO leaders thought about the political positions of their members in relation to the public.
 2
  
This resulted in a change in how the CIO communicated with the public; the CIO tried to 
transform itself from a special interest group representing the views of the members of its 
affiliated unions – or worse, the views of unions’ leaders alone – to a public interest group 
advocating on behalf of the organized and unorganized alike.  The challenge was that 
anticommunist CIO leaders saw the general public and union members as having identical 
interests when it came to politics.  But successfully representing those anticommunist, 
progressive political positions in the halls of Congress and in state capitals required eliminating 
communists from the ranks of the CIO. 
The 1948 presidential election marked a critical turning point in how CIO leaders thought 
about unions with left-leaning leaderships, though most literature has underemphasized the 
importance of the campaign.
3
  Instead, works look to the other debates of the period – over the 
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70 
 
Marshall Plan, the Taft-Hartley Act, and membership in the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) – as creating tensions.  In addition, many historians have emphasized growing external 
pressures on the CIO to remove communist elements. These pressures include the non-
communist affidavits required by Taft-Hartley, governmental investigations of communist 
influence in labor unions, CIO hopes of competing with the AFL for members, and the lack of 
organizing potential for communist unions.
4
   
These reasons for the purges should not be discounted.  But the 1948 election and the 
Progressive Party candidacy of Henry A. Wallace marked a greater crisis for the CIO for a 
number of reasons.
5
  First, Wallace’s association with communist groups highlighted communist 
influences in CIO unions at the dawn of the cold war, amidst a climate of increasing 
anticommunist hysteria.  The recently passed Taft-Hartley Act required union leaders to take 
anticommunist oaths, causing considerable internal discussion and tension over how the CIO 
could comply with governmental regulations while permitting individual union heads to flout the 
anticommunist requirement.  Government investigations of communist elements in organized 
labor and increased scrutiny of union policy during the war years created additional pressure on 
CIO leaders, who hoped to convince workers, voters, and legislators that they acted only in the 
best interest of the country.   
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Second, unlike contrarian positions taken by left-led union leaderships on the Marshall 
Plan, organizing workers in the South, or the best strategy for repealing the hated Taft-Hartley 
legislation, the Wallace campaign threatened organized labor’s political fortunes in Washington 
at a time when CIO operatives increasingly saw political influence as necessary for enacting 
social and organizing goals.  After all, the passage of Taft-Hartley had demonstrated what could 
happen if Congressmen felt no allegiance to organized labor.  CIO’s PAC was established in 
1943, but the cold war, Republican victories in the 1946 election, and the resulting legislative 
turn against unions encouraged CIO leaders to devote more resources to the PAC and to view 
lobbying, campaigning, and politicking as an important means of ensuring labor’s strength.  
Wallace’s candidacy threatened that.  In addition, Wallace’s poor showing in the election 
exposed the political weakness of the CIO’s communist-led unions and made CIO leaders, like 
President Philip Murray, more confident in their ability to purge the communist unions without 
disastrous consequences for the federation.   
Third, as CIO leaders confronted member union dissension to their leanings toward – and 
ultimate endorsement of – Truman, they were forced to develop a new way of understanding 
union democracy.  From the 1948 election campaign through the expulsions of communist 
unions in 1949 and 1950, CIO officials contended that communist leaders were politically out-
of-step with their members, and that this was enough of a reason to topple leftist unions.
6
  This 
marked an important shift; as the CIO began to assume anticommunism as the dominant position 
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among the rank-and-file as a matter of policy, it increasingly viewed the political positions of 
union members as consistent with those of the larger, politically mainstream public of the early 
cold war era.  Anticommunist CIO leaders argued that they were removing elements that did not 
speak for the rank-and-file, choosing to ignore the fact that members had elected those 
communist leaders.  The anticommunist voting patterns of union members in the 1948 election 
helped the CIO to establish its membership as in in-step with the rest of the American public.  
This allowed CIO officials to argue that they represented the public interest and that expelling 
communist affiliates was done out of conviction, not political expediency.  The anticommunist 
stance adopted at the CIO’s national headquarters was increasingly promoted as a service to the 
wider democratic middle, including workers and non-workers.  This was particularly true of the 
CIO’s rejection of Wallace, whom the CIO PAC and federation officials routinely bashed as 
subservient to a foreign power as undemocratic as the unions who endorsed him.  Communists 
within the CIO insisted that they were democratically elected, and that they either represented 
the political viewpoints of their members, their members had empowered them – through the 
ballot – to communicate their own views to the CIO’s national leadership, or their own personal 
political views – including the question of whether to endorse Wallace – were irrelevant to how 
well they negotiated contracts or organized workers.  But in the increasingly hostile political 
atmosphere of the cold war, such objections were met with disdain by CIO officials. 
In these three ways, the Wallace campaign forced the hand of the national CIO 
leadership.  There were many other reasons for the expulsions of communist unions from the 
CIO.  Progressive, anticommunist allies of the CIO including the Association of Catholic Trade 
Unionists (ACTU) and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) applied intense pressure to 
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the CIO to rid itself of communists.
7
  Taft-Hartley’s anticommunist oath provisions diverted 
attention and money to legal efforts and made organizing difficult in regions traditionally hostile 
to union organizing – especially in the American South – and among government workers.8  This 
concern about lost organizing potential was not borne out for the most part.  In reality, there was 
not a dramatic reduction of members across the CIO’s left-led unions, even if particular 
industries suffered (Table 2-2).
9
  But Murray and others certainly expressed fears that the CIO 
would lose members and clout. 
Convincing potential members, government officials, and the general public that the CIO 
did not harbor anti-democratic, communist tendencies became paramount for CIO leaders in the 
late 1940s, particularly during the 1948 presidential election campaign.  But these efforts did not 
take the form of a formal public relations or advertising campaign in the vein of labor’s 
opposition to Taft-Hartley.  The issue of communism in the CIO persisted over a number of 
years, with the Wallace campaign serving as a key transition point.  This made a concentrated 
campaign difficult and expensive to sustain.  More importantly, CIO leaders sought to correct 
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misperceptions of communist influences, while neither appearing defensive (and thus, 
reinforcing a preexisting notion), nor introducing the allegation of communist influence to the 
public for the first time.   
In contrast to the AFL and its own anti-Taft-Hartley campaigns in 1947, the CIO’s efforts 
to counter allegations of communist leanings were ad-hoc.  They were not directed by a 
centralized public relations department but were, instead, shaped by the evolving attitudes of the 
CIO’s leaders, especially Philip Murray.  Murray was not particularly flashy in his presentation 
or strong in his anticommunist language until 1948, but, as labor columnist Victor Riesel wrote 
at the time, “When Murray stops speaking softly he moves quickly behind the scenes.  Nothing 
crude like wholesale purges.  He just makes it impossible for the pro-Commies to stick 
around.”10 
This understated style proved useful to Murray, who turned to expulsion only as a last 
resort.  As Murray initiated the trials and eventual expulsions of the CIO’s communist unions, he 
began to emphasize two interrelated themes: first, the CIO’s commitment to democracy and 
freedom of expression (in contrast to communism’s tenets); and second, the service to the nation 
provided by the CIO through its firm stance against communism.  The latter idea also 
emphasized organized labor’s ability to speak truth to power on behalf of a public whose 
anticommunist views were shared by union members.  These arguments would form the basis of 
CIO self-presentation in the 1950s and would be recycled in the AFL-CIO’s defense against 
charges of union monopoly in the lead-up to the organization’s 1955 merger, as well as in the 
AFL-CIO’s efforts to present itself as respectable and capable of self-policing amid allegations 
of racketeering among several constituent unions in the late 1950s.   
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The communist trials and expulsions of 1949 and 1950 were not conducted solely to 
court favor with the public and emerged more as a political response than a public relations one.  
With the suspected communist Len De Caux pushed out of his role as the CIO’s director of 
publicity, Murray turned to a cautious alternative.  As a result of this change, and of Murray’s 
desire to chart the message of the organization in the face of opposition from both the left and 
right, the public relations department implemented expressions of CIO policy, rather than 
developing innovative ways of reaching new groups or developing messages itself – as it had 
done during De Caux’s tenure.  The organization became more disciplined and consistent in its 
official declarations, more conservative and suspicious in its use of mainstream media, and less-
cutting edge in its outreach to the public.  The importance of the 1948 election and the left/right 
CIO divide over the Wallace campaign catapulted the CIO PAC to prominence as the key agency 
crafting anti-communist publicity, alongside Murray.   
This chapter details this shift and argues that concern about communist union influence 
and a renewed commitment to political activity in the wake of Taft-Hartley forced the CIO to 
assume a new sense of public responsibility and public – not just worker – representation, at least 
rhetorically.  The first section of the chapter details the trajectory of anticommunist sentiment 
among CIO leaders in the postwar period, culminating in the trials and expulsions of 1949 and 
1950.  It establishes the election of 1948 as the turning point in Murray’s attitude toward 
communists in the CIO’s ranks and shows how Wallace forced the CIO to address communism 
in its ranks.  Above all, the election caused Murray to move from uneasy coexistence with the 
left to forceful agitation for its expulsion.  The second section of the chapter shows how the 
Wallace campaign and the possibility of a Dewey victory over Truman threatened labor’s 
political fortunes in Washington and how the CIO responded to this threat.  The CIO attacked 
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Wallace’s progressivism, smeared Wallace’s campaign as communist-inspired, publicized the 
consequences of a Dewey victory, and ultimately endorsed Truman.  The third section of the 
chapter explores how this strategy impacted the way that union leaders spoke about union 
democracy and freedom of expression.  And the final section examines the CIO’s stated 
commitment to the public and the nation in fighting communism in its ranks.  I argue that this 
assumption that union members were anticommunist and democratic in line with the general 
public would inform CIO and AFL-CIO policy in the years to come. 
 
Kid Gloves to No Gloves  
 In March 1947, a Life article featured unflattering, mug-shot photographs of suspected 
communists and argued that communist influences were so pervasive in the CIO that “Philip 
Murray, for all his good intentions, is a victim of the paradox that if he makes any real attempt to 
free his union from the Communists he may wind up without any union at all.”11  As a result of 
such negative publicity, CIO officials found themselves denying that they harbored communists 
in their ranks.  There are “no reds in CIO unions who weren’t hired first by industry,” a defiant 
Van Bittner of the Steelworkers and the CIO’s southern organizing drive, told a Congressional 
committee in March 1947.
12
   
By the fall of 1948, Murray and other CIO leaders had changed their tune.  As Life 
reported under a series of pictures depicting cigar-smoking, tablecloth-waving CIO delegates 
celebrating Truman’s victory: “Phil Murray, having made the pleasing discovery that U.S. labor 
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can get along better without its Reds than with them, no longer felt constrained to be polite.”13  
Victor Riesel reported that Murray’s new gloves-off approach to confronting the CIO’s left-wing 
resulted in CIO leaders singing new lyrics to the old nursery-rhyme, “The Farmer in the Dell”: 
“The Commies are on the run, The Commies are on the run, Let’s give them the heave, ho, The 
Commies are on the run.”14   
Between 1947 and the fall of 1948, Murray’s approach to communist unions within the 
CIO underwent a dramatic change. Whereas the head of the CIO acknowledged and attacked the 
communist leaders on his Executive Board only behind closed doors a year earlier, by the time of 
Truman’s election victory, Murray had spearheaded the expulsion of several communist-aligned 
unions in the most public way possible.  What caused such a radical transformation in Murray’s 
thinking over the course of a year and a half?  A number of factors played a role.  These included 
pressures emanating from the enforcement of anticommunist affidavit provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act and divisions between communist and anticommunist factions on the CIO Executive 
Board over whether to support American aid to war-torn Europe in the form of the Marshall 
Plan.
15
  
But it was the election of 1948 and Murray’s frustration at communist union support for 
the third party campaign of Henry Wallace that forced his hand.  CIO officials hoped to reverse 
the political setbacks of the “disaster” election of 1946, in which union-supported candidates lost 
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by wide margins, enabling the passage of Taft-Hartley the following year.
16
 As pressure from 
Washington on the communism issue accelerated, Murray saw the political consequences of 
remaining publicly ambivalent about communists in the ranks of his organization. Left-wing 
union support for Wallace’s candidacy threatened to undermine the political capital that the CIO 
had built and to reduce its influence at the White House and in Congress.   
In the summer of 1948, the CIO went on record in support of Truman, committing PAC 
dollars to the President’s reelection campaign.  Though the resolution praised Truman’s record 
on civil rights and his veto of Taft-Hartley, it spent far more ink condemning Wallace’s 
candidacy and criticizing the Republican Congress and Dewey.  The endorsement alleged that 
the Progressive Party “created disunity and weakened the forces of liberalism in this country.”17  
Van Bittner and others questioned the loyalty of left-wing Board members who rejected the 
endorsement.  He wondered whether Board meetings were even necessary, if “some of our 
members decide, – well, whatever they do, we aren’t going to carry out the policy of the CIO 
adopted by the CIO Executive Board.”18  Board members were combative but, as the New York 
Times reported, “the outcome of this discussion was never in doubt.”  The split over the third 
party made the Truman endorsement – and the subsequent expulsion of communist-leaning 
unions in the CIO – inevitable.19       
Before things came to a head during the 1948 election, Murray moved to eliminate 
communist roadblocks to pursuing the political agenda he championed for his organization. 
Murray recalled the dysfunction of the CIO Executive Board at the 1947 convention: “I didn’t 
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know whether I could talk freely to the members of my own Board or not, I didn’t know whether 
I was talking to a Fink, a Commie, or an FBI man.”20  With Taft-Hartley on the books, a number 
of communist-leaning CIO officials were pushed out of the organization, including De Caux, 
who was replaced with the vehemently anticommunist former newspaper reporter, Allan “Pete” 
Swim, in the summer of 1947.  The liberal paper PM reported that the “cordial” parting between 
De Caux and the labor federation he had helped to found “reflects the growing tendency of 
[Murray] to isolate and replace alleged leftists in CIO headquarters.”21  Murray and De Caux 
were never close, and there is little indication that Murray lost sleep over De Caux’s departure. 
De Caux’s replacement had an impressive pedigree in the newspaper business.  Born on a 
farm in Illinois, Swim got his professional start writing for the Daily Arkansas during the 
Depression.  He followed this with a decade-long turn at the Memphis Press-Scimitar.
22
  It was 
while he was in Memphis that Swim achieved a reputation as a conservative within the labor 
movement.  While Swim came to embrace the national CIO’s position for an expansion of civil 
rights after replacing De Caux, he opposed ending segregation during his time as president of the 
Memphis Industrial Union Council and as a member of the all-white American Newspaper Guild 
local during the war.  He supported a “completely economical” approach to race, opposing CIO 
action on “the social angle” – an action that Swim claimed “would be cutting our own throats.”23  
Swim came to the top CIO news job after having served thirteen months as public relations 
director for the CIO’s southern organizing drive, where he continued his conservatism on the 
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race question.
24
  But it was also in this capacity that Swim established himself as a good soldier 
and an adequate – if not extraordinary – labor newspaperman.  And Swim’s anticommunist 
credentials were beyond a shadow of a doubt.  Indeed, so taken was Swim by the anticommunist 
cause that he left the CIO in 1951 for a career in government service, beginning in Paris and 
joining the Foreign Service four years later.  In the late 1960s, with the Vietnam War in full 
swing, Swim served as head of the publications department of the US Information Agency.  In 
these various capacities, Swim worked to promote US cold war policy.
25
   
In his first editor’s note to CIO News readers, Swim made the contrast between himself 
and De Caux clear.  “I’ll do my best to follow CIO policy—right down the middle without 
veering to right or left to satisfy some personal whim or advance some pet project,” Swim 
declared.
26
  Anticommunist elements in the CIO applauded the change.  UAW public relations 
man Frank Winn congratulated Swim on his new appointment, writing, “It is a real pleasure to 
pick up the CIO News now and know that you are going to read about what the CIO is doing 
rather than merely a rehash of the party line.”27  Under Swim’s leadership, the CIO News became 
more conservative in both opinion and style.  It contained less text, suffered a decline in writing 
quality and sophistication, removed advertisements (and their revenue), and eliminated the 
News’s award-winning, full-color serialized comic strip.     
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Other personnel transitions were more difficult for Murray to orchestrate, and to bear 
emotionally, than De Caux’s departure.  General Counsel Lee Pressman held on as long as he 
could but, by the winter of 1948, he was forced to resign at the insistence of the CIO’s right 
wingers, led by Walter P. Reuther, elected President of the UAW in 1946 over a left-backed 
ticket.  Murray was reportedly chagrined about Pressman’s departure, “so overcome with 
emotion that he could not even step outside for a news picture.”28  But Murray was also 
increasingly frustrated about the limits placed on CIO organizational growth and political 
expression due to a vocal minority of communists on the CIO’s Executive Board and within the 
CIO’s own Washington offices.  The Reuther-led right-wing may have forced his hand on 
Pressman’s firing but Murray’s own anticommunist beliefs were strong.  1948 proved a decisive 
year, as Murray took steps to eliminate communist influence from the CIO. 
In the postwar years, the CIO increasingly staked its reputation on its political successes 
and viewed the general, anticommunist public as a key force in electing pro-labor candidates at 
the polls.  By splitting the vote and linking the CIO to communist elements, Wallace’s candidacy 
threatened to undermine this strategy.  Even before Wallace entered the campaign in early 1948, 
pundits linked Wallace to the Communist Party, through both his political positions and his 
professional relationships.  The historian Norman Markowitz asserts that Wallace’s campaign 
“was probably doomed from the outset” because Wallace did not counter charges that he was “a 
dupe of the Communists” and that his party was “a Trojan horse for the Republicans and the 
Soviet Union.”29   
Murray publicly skirted the issue of communist associations with Wallace, but he laid out 
parameters for a successful third party that seemed to be at odds with Wallace’s Progressive 
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Party.  In January 1948, the CIO Executive Board formally rejected the establishment of a third 
party.
30
  According to Murray, a successful third party needed to “come from a broad base of 
representative people—from a substantial segment of labor.”  But all that Wallace’s group could 
do was “to divide labor—splinter it, split it.”31   
Over time, Murray went from simply repudiating the idea of a third party to actively 
smearing the Wallace campaign as a communist front.  In May 1948, months before the CIO’s 
official endorsement of Truman in September, Murray told the Textile Workers’ convention that 
“the Communist Party is directly responsible for the organization of the third party.”  The CIO 
News took the “anguished screams of denial from the Wallace neighborhood” and subsequent 
attacks on Murray and the CIO appearing in the Daily Worker as evidence of the close 
relationship between the Communists and the Progressive Party camp.
32
  In a typical column, 
Swim concluded that, “The party line mouthpiece, the Daily Worker, is having a wonderful time 
trying to prove that its war-time ‘hero’ Murray is a peace-time heel…. Murray didn’t change—
but the party line did.”  According to Swim, the twists and turns in the Communist position, and 
the increasing turn against Murray and the CIO in the communist press showed that Moscow was 
alarmed by the low rate of support offered by mainstream labor groups to the Wallace 
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candidacy.
33
  Swim likely hoped that such publicity would convince union members and the 
general public that the CIO was resolutely opposed to communism in its ranks, and supportive of 
Washington maintaining a hard line on communism. 
 The truth was somewhat more complicated.  Even as Swim declared the CIO’s 
incontrovertible opposition to a third party as per both the policy of the CIO PAC and the CIO 
Executive Board, a full 25 percent of the CIO’s internationals and organizing committees and ten 
percent of city and state CIO councils openly or tacitly supported Wallace’s Progressive Party, 
according to the CIO’s own estimates.34  (See Table 2-1 for my own calculations.)  CIO leaders 
also worried that workers would support Wallace’s bid.  Citing workers’ concerns over 
escalating prices, lack of housing, and attacks on civil liberties, Mike Quill of the Transport 
Workers Union worried that “Wallace will take a terrific bloc of votes” – much of it labor – from 
Truman.
35
  Harry Bridges of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) fanned 
the flames by asserting that the CIO PAC “is almost a flop when you get down below and try to 
get support.”36   James Durkin, representing the United Office and Professional Workers (OPW), 
claimed that the Wallace campaign was a “grass roots movement” built on the support of union 
members.  Wallace’s candidacy “is developing down in the rank and file – maybe millions today, 
but tens of millions in the very near future, and it will develop because the people and the 
membership want it,” Durkin said.37 
For their part, Wallace, and his running mate, Senator Glen H. Taylor of Idaho, also 
suggested that the CIO was out of step with the political orientations of many of its members.  In 
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response to the CIO’s attacks, Taylor told a rally, “Labor never has been so misled” and 
predicted that Murray and other right-wingers would be replaced by supporters of the 
Progressive Party within a few years.
38
  Wallace’s own efforts to court the votes of workers and 
the campaign talents of former CIO personnel like De Caux and Pressman threatened the CIO 
PAC.  The strategy that De Caux developed for reaching workers as Wallace’s head of publicity 
in the labor division built upon his public relations efforts at the CIO.  De Caux used his 
connections with sympathetic CIO-affiliated union officials to create a grassroots network for 
Wallace within the ranks of labor.   
The leaflets De Caux oversaw spoke directly to workers in much the same way that the 
CIO’s advertising mats against Taft-Hartley had done the previous year.  But unlike the CIO 
during the debate over Taft-Hartley, the Wallace campaign had funding for mass distribution of 
its leaflets and posters.  As a result, De Caux was able to develop Progressive Party messaging 
that spoke to the general public, not just workers.  He no longer had to rely on union members to 
make the political case to their neighbors.  Thus, the signature theme of the Wallace campaign’s 
publicity for organized labor was quite similar to the AFL’s “If you work for a Living, you’re 
Labor” articulation against Taft-Hartley.  One Wallace brochure read, “If you work for a living 
it’s as simple as A B C.  Vote for the only party that puts people ahead of profits.”39  In this 
uncharacteristically image-bereft brochure, De Caux and his staff established a divide between 
big business and the Democratic and Republican Parties on the one hand, and a people inclusive 
of labor – unionized or not – on the other (Figure 2-1).  
 Another pamphlet produced by De Caux’s publicity arm of Wallace’s labor division 
relied on historical narratives to argue for an expansive category of labor opposed to a moneyed 
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interest.  The text of the brochure dismissed attacks on Wallace as “fishy,” comparing them to 
earlier condemnation of the supposed radicalism of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abe 
Lincoln, and FDR.
40
  But the Wallace campaign took heart in the fact these earlier efforts to 
discredit the nation’s best leaders were unsuccessful.  “You can’t fool the American people!  
They know Henry Wallace is as American as apple pie or baseball.”  The pamphlet did not 
explicitly take on charges of communist influences on Wallace, but it posited that the 
Progressive Party was firmly in the mainstream, just as workers and the larger public were.
41
   
 Labor spokesmen for the Wallace campaign asserted that by allying itself against 
workers’ desire for a true progressive in the White House, the national CIO was outside of that 
mainstream and in league with big business.  In a Wallace brochure, Pressman concluded that the 
leadership of the CIO had “already surrendered” to the “owners of American industry.”  CIO 
officials resorted to “pitiful speeches” rather than mobilizing the “mass fighting energy of the 
rank and file.”42  But despite the Wallace campaign’s efforts to paint their candidate as a 
mainstream liberal in-step with the needs and politics of labor – organized and not, Wallace was 
deeply associated with communism in the press and popular imagination.   
The Wallace campaign exposed communist activity within the CIO and forced Murray to 
confront it publicly.  Murray gave notice to the leftist members of the Board that he would “wash 
out this damnable dirty linen [between communists and anticommunists] in the public prints, if 
need be.”43  By the CIO’s convention in Portland in the fall of 1949, Murray did just that.  In the 
words of one newspaper editorial, for the first time, the CIO’s “mild-mannered, Scot-born 
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president got ‘his Irish up,’” and “cut [the communists] down to size and hinted strongly that 
some of the unions still infected had better get out.”44  James. B. Carey (secretary-treasurer of the 
CIO), Bittner, Carey, Reuther, and others on the right-wing of the federation were equally 
combative in their language, but comments like Reuther’s assertion that leftists were “colonial 
agents of a foreign government” were nothing new.45  Murray’s new public assault on 
communists within the CIO was a first.     
The increased scrutiny of the CIO’s left-wing resulted in the press claiming that the 
organization did not act fast enough. When the CIO Executive Board finally made concrete plans 
to expel communist-inspired unions in the spring of 1949, the Detroit Free Press ran an editorial 
cartoon depicting Murray spanking a baby labeled “communists.”  The house of the CIO was 
dirty with paint applied by this same “baby.”  “Belated Clean Up” headlined the image (Figure 
2-2).  This understanding of the CIO as ineffectual at best, and treasonous at worst, threatened 
the CIO’s political fortunes at a moment when it could least afford to lose political clout.   
Though there were more fireworks to come, the election of 1948 had proved a decisive 
turning point.
46
  The following May, the Executive Board approved a resolution requiring Board 
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members to work for the achievement of nationally-dictated CIO political objectives.  But by 
then, United Public Workers President Abe Flaxer’s protests that Murray sought to “convert our 
trade union movement into a political organization” hardly made waves. 47  For his part, Murray 
agreed: “It is political.  Every division you have had in this Board is political.  Every division of 
major consequence affecting national policy is political.  You can’t beat around the bush about 
that.” 48  This political consciousness motivated the CIO to support Truman in the 1948 election.   
 
Politics, Progressives and Pragmatism 
 Truman vetoed Taft-Hartley, but not without significant lobbying by union interests.  He 
nationalized the railroads and nearly sent in the Army to break the railroad strike over the 
objections of organized labor.  And Truman’s Fair Deal did not go far enough for many liberals 
within the CIO’s leadership.49  While CIO officials would look back upon the Truman 
presidency with fondness during the Eisenhower years, going so far as to donate a quarter 
million dollars toward the establishment of the Truman Library in 1953 in conjunction with the 
Steelworkers, the CIO’s endorsement of the sitting president was far from a foregone conclusion 
in 1948.
50
  To be sure, the Republican ascendancy in Congress during the 1946 election, and the 
subsequent passage of the Taft-Hartley Act convinced the CIO that it needed to reinvigorate its 
PAC for the 1948 election.  But PAC leaders expected to concentrate their resources on local 
races and provide only tacit support for the Democratic Party, not Truman explicitly. 
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 Wallace’s entry into the race changed this equation.  Jack Kroll, other members of the 
CIO PAC, and anticommunist members of the Executive Board dismissed Wallace as a viable 
candidate in his own right but worried that he could play the role of spoiler.  Murray explained to 
an audience of shipbuilders, “I do not subscribe to the idea that it is better to back a losing third 
party, get a reactionary Congress and then the people will rise in 1952.”51  At a meeting of the 
CIO Vice Presidents a few months before the election, Joe Curran of the National Maritime 
Union (NMU) called Wallace “a divisive stooge for the Republicans.”52   
A PAC-produced flyer encouraging union members to register to vote included platforms 
for the Democrats and Republicans, but not those for the Progressive Party.  The pamphlet 
explained that it had only printed platforms offered by “parties having a chance to make good 
their pledges.”53  By reducing the Progressives’ standing to that of the extremely low-polling 
Communists or Prohibitionists and associating it with the likes of the anti-progressive Dixiecrats, 
the PAC hoped to discredit the Wallace candidacy.  A CIO News cartoon showed the anticipated 
consequences of this rejection of Wallace by the CIO.  A battered airplane labeled “third party” 
readied for takeoff.  However, its wings – labeled “labor support” – had been removed.  The 
cartoon bore the headline, “Going Nowhere Fast”54  (Figure 2-3).   
Throughout the election cycle, the CIO PAC and the CIO public relations department 
emphasized the dire consequences of a strong Wallace showing to its members. CIO officials 
routinely contrasted Dewey and Truman, referring to the former as “the candidate of big 
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business” and the latter as “a friend of the people.”55  One CIO News cartoon depicted Wallace 
throwing a boomerang at Dewey, but hitting the figure of “pro-labor liberals” in the head (Figure 
2-4).
56
  Another showed the Dixiecrats and the Progressives each depicted as puppies, yapping at 
a worried-looking “Democratic hopes of victory” as the GOP elephant looked on without 
disturbance (Figure 2-5).
57
  Indeed, the CIO Executive Board’s background materials for the 
endorsement of Truman dealt very little with the president’s own labor credentials, instead 
focusing on the dangers posed by the Wallace candidacy.
58
   
 The CIO’s public relations materials and its leaders’ statements accused communist 
supporters of Wallace of deliberately hoping to undermine a Democratic ascendancy and the 
CIO legislative agenda.  With the election behind him, Swim vented his frustration in the pages 
of the CIO News.  “The Reds wholeheartedly supported Henry Wallace although they knew a 
strong Wallace movement could result only in the election of Thomas E Dewey and a 
reactionary Congress,” Swim fumed.59   
For their part, left-leaning union leaders criticized the CIO’s strategy of picking a winner 
over a candidate committed to serving labor.  The UE’s newspaper charged that the CIO backed 
“administration sell-outs” in 1948 and beyond.60  Bridges argued that, while Truman made 
alliances with Wall Street bankers and neglected his labor constituency for political gain, 
“Wallace is not a politician.”61 A year after Truman’s victory, the expelled Fur and Leather 
Workers Union accused the national CIO of having “capitulated and clung pitifully to the 
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coattails of the Truman administration.”62  In the early 1950s, De Caux drafted a series for the 
left-wing magazine, March of Labor, in which he asserted that the CIO’s purges of communist 
unions and its repudiation of Wallace had transformed the organization into a “stooging labor 
front for the Truman administration.”63  But the ability to influence policy by riding the 
president’s coattails was exactly what the CIO desired. 
 CIO leaders recognized that, if they were to be successful in electing Truman, they would 
have to reach beyond their own membership to the general public.  In radio speeches and 
statements to the press, CIO officials took a much more measured tone in their criticism of 
Wallace’s candidacy, though they offered the same conclusion as in their Board meetings: 
Wallace was “a threat…to the forces of true liberalism.”64  Murray emphasized the CIO’s 
democratic processes in choosing to oppose the Progressive Party as well as the third party’s 
connections to communists.  Reuther generally used more fiery language than Murray, but he, 
too, kept to script and concentrated on Wallace’s effect on Truman’s chances.  In a nationally 
syndicated radio speech a few days before the election, Reuther offered the following to voters: 
“A vote for Wallace or any of the other splinter groups is an indirect vote for Dewey.”65 
 CIO officials were vocal in their condemnation of Wallace, but they were more reluctant 
publicly to examine and condemn the Progressive Party’s political positions.  After the election, 
the Longshoremen’s Board claimed that Wallace had both contributed to Truman’s victory (by 
deflecting charges of communist influence from the Democratic Party) and also helped to move 
the nation’s political conversation further to the left (by forcing Truman to make political 
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accommodations to Wallace supporters).
66
  Donald Henderson of the Food, Tobacco and 
Agricultural Workers Union made a similar point at the 1948 CIO convention, though his 
insistence that Wallace backers had “made their contribution through clarification of the issues” 
was met with shouts of “shut up—throw him out,” according to press reports.67   
In fact, Henderson and other left-wingers within the CIO were correct about the impact 
that Wallace’s campaign had on Truman’s policy.  Acting on a memo by the presidential advisor 
Clark Clifford, Truman embraced a variety of civil rights initiatives – including a permanent 
civil rights commission, federal legislation against lynching, the elimination of the poll tax, and 
the creation of a fair employment practices commission – in order “to undercut Wallace’s 
strength among New Dealers without giving ground on foreign policy,” according to a Wallace 
biographer.  The strategy was to refrain from direct criticism of Wallace while empowering 
newly powerful “pressure groups” – like the CIO – that had replaced the political machines of 
old.  Clifford hoped that these groups – which had great credibility with those on the left of the 
Democratic Party – would make the case against Wallace.68     
With the critical exception of the Marshall Plan, there was little divergence between the 
CIO’s political platform and that of Wallace.  Much of Wallace’s campaign – as well as disputes 
on the CIO Executive Board – centered on this divergence on the European Recovery Program.  
The leaders of communist-led unions held that the Marshall Plan was anti-peace, a measure that 
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gave former Nazis money for weapons under the guise of humanitarian aid.  For their part, the 
CIO and the Truman administration promoted the European Recovery Program as a means of 
reconstructing postwar Europe and ensuring continued security and peace in the region.  The 
CIO juxtaposed Wallace’s and the Soviet positions on the Marshall Plan to argue that the 
Progressive Party was beholden to Moscow.  The CIO News presented Wallace as an unwitting 
agent of the communists.  In September 1948, Swim wrote, “In his bumbling way [Wallace is] 
campaigning on the illusion that the European Recovery Program is a bad thing and that he’s 
making a contribution to liberalism.”69   
CIO leaders held that this position on the Marshall Plan both revealed Wallace’s 
incompetence and demonstrated the inhumanity of the communist stance.  At the 1948 CIO 
convention, Carey gave voice to this perspective.  “Perhaps the Soviet Union could give Europe 
some steel, some oil, cotton or coal for machinery, or food, and export from the Soviet Union the 
things the workers understand and need,” Carey said, contrasting the United States’ generous aid 
to Europe against the USSR’s inaction.  “But no, their single solitary export is political 
ideology,” Carey concluded.70     
But this policy divergence between Wallace and the CIO on the Marshall Plan was 
unique.  For the most part, there was little difference between the political stances of the two 
groups.  CIO officials generally criticized Wallace as inconsistent, uncommitted, and naïve.  This 
was particularly true of the CIO’s criticism and red-baiting of Wallace’s civil rights record.  
Wallace encountered violent opposition during his campaign tour through the segregated South. 
The CIO and mainstream civil rights groups worried that this would result in heavy black turnout 
for Wallace in northern cities though, in the end, Wallace garnered less than ten percent of the 
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black vote nationwide.
71
  CIO officers tried to counteract this possibility by enlisting support for 
Truman from well-respected black leaders.  A month before the election, the CIO News ran an 
article by NAACP President Walter White in which White lambasted Wallace’s record on race 
as Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of Commerce.
72
   
In addition, CIO leaders attacked Wallace’s tactics for making progress on civil rights 
and contrasted them with the successful pragmatism of both the CIO and the Truman 
administration.  Comparing Wallace to “another dreamer,” John Brown, Quill asserted that the 
most effective way of creating change in the South was through the CIO PAC and the CIO’s 
Southern Organizing Drive, “not a one man show that will die of its own weight.”73  In 
September 1948, the CIO’s vice presidents were so nervous about the impact of the civil rights 
issue on the presidential election that they issued a hyperbolic statement praising Truman’s 
record.  “[N]o President in history ha[s] taken so forthright a position on civil rights, and… 
Lincoln was the only other President who [was] so outspoken,” the statement read.74   
Even after the election was over, CIO leaders continued to worry about the impact of the 
civil rights issue on the black electorate.  In 1949, Murray railed against the Mine, Mill and 
Smelter Workers after the Daily Worker characterized southern CIO operatives and the 
Steelworkers’ leadership as Klansmen and Nazis following an inter-union conflict in Bessemer, 
Alabama.  Murray worried that a Mine, Mill pamphlet featuring a picture of a hooded Klansman 
alongside allegations that the Klan member was in league with the CIO Executive Board 
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“appeals to the prejudice of the colored people,” perhaps influencing the Steelworkers’ 
organizing capabilities in Alabama, as well as future national elections.
75
   
Murray and CIO PAC leaders believed that the distribution of such propaganda 
nationally, through the Daily Worker and the black press, threatened to turn the black electorate 
against the Democratic Party and toward future left-facing third party efforts.  At the 1949 CIO 
convention, with the organization’s left-wing unions slated for expulsion and the 1948 
presidential race behind them, the question of communist influence on the black community 
came into the open.  William Townsend of the United Transport Service Employees begged 
convention delegates to counteract left-wingers’ attempts to influence the black community 
politically.   “[W]hile you are cleaning out Communism in the CIO, please join with us in 
cleaning it out of the Negro communities,” he said.76  The CIO PAC and the CIO public relations 
department under De Caux routinely issued advertisements and announcements targeted to the 
black community, but Wallace’s campaign forced the CIO to defend its civil rights record more 
explicitly in 1948 and in the years to follow. 
The Wallace campaign – and the threat it posed to Truman’s reelection – created a direct 
link between the issue of communism and organized labor’s clout in Washington.  But in order 
for the CIO to convince union members and the general public to vote for the anticommunist 
Truman against the Progressive Party interloper, the CIO had to first confront communism and 
dissension on the presidential endorsement in its own ranks.  The Wallace campaign forced the 
issue.  But Murray’s view that Wallace’s candidacy posed a threat not only to the Democrats’ 
chances, but to the fabric of American democracy also forced the CIO to confront the question of 
what constituted a viable progressive, liberal, democratic, non-communist alternative to the likes 
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of Harry Bridges’ ILWU, Albert Fitzgerald’s UE, Ben Gold’s Fur and Leather Workers or 
Donald Henderson’s Food and Tobacco Workers.  During and in the wake of the Wallace 
candidacy, CIO leaders increasingly crafted a vision of union democracy that assumed a resolute 
commitment to anticommunism among its members. 
 
Anticommunist Union Democracy in the Age of Wallace 
CIO leaders celebrated the low percentage for Wallace as an indication that its left-wing 
unions were out of step with the political positions of their members.  Wallace-Taylor won only 
2.37 percent of the popular vote, receiving fewer ballots than Dixiecrat candidate Strom 
Thurmond and winning more than four percent of the vote only in New York and California.
77
  
The actual opinion of CIO members toward the candidates in the 1948 election is murky, though 
a majority larger than the corresponding portion of the general public favored Truman.  In April 
1948, a Green-Brodie poll of CIO members in 25 cities indicated strong support (95 percent in 
some cities) by union members for PAC-endorsed candidates.  But by October 1948, a Gallup 
poll of union members showed that only 55 percent supported Truman.  Another survey revealed 
that 10 percent of CIO members planned to vote for Wallace, while only 58 percent were in 
favor of Truman.
78
   
CIO leaders like Murray and Reuther celebrated Wallace’s poor showing in southern 
California (where CIO political operatives battled former CIO leftists), in the industrial states of 
Michigan and Indiana, in the mining stronghold of West Virginia, and in the heavy union area of 
Philadelphia as evidence that workers supported the CIO’s endorsement of Truman.  A 
subsequent study comparing election returns from counties with significant CIO membership to 
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those with low CIO memberships “indicated not only that Democratic support was stronger in 
CIO districts, but also that such Democratic support was a new phenomenon” in comparison 
with previous elections.  The bottom line was that “labor did play an important part in the 
Truman victory.”79   
The 1948 election cycle was the first time that communist-led unions spent considerable 
sums of union money to oppose a policy position taken by the national CIO – funds that came 
directly from union members.
80
  Indeed, the official charges eventually filed against the CIO’s 
left-led unions often included significant analysis of union support for the Progressive Party, in 
accordance with the communist line, and against the wishes of union members.
81
   
For their part, accused communists asserted that the CIO was undemocratic, its leaders 
tools of an uncaring Democratic Party.  In criticism that would be resurrected by corrupt union 
officials during the racketeering hearings of the late 1950s and later by the New Left, their 
refrain emphasized the American value of due process – in which “[e]ven the worst criminal gets 
a trial,” according to Harry Bridges – as well as union democracy that resulted in their lawful 
election to their posts and support for candidates approved by their members.
 82
  At his union’s 
trial in 1950, Hugh Bryson of the National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards told the 
Executive Board, “[T]he membership subscribed to the position they have taken and… they do 
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not think they have taken the position that was in support of Soviet interests.”83  Left-wingers 
argued that the CIO’s growing bureaucracy and political tilt toward the Democratic Party 
elevated the positions of elites over the values of the rank-and-file.  In short, left-wingers 
accused the CIO of being a special interest group disinterested in the views of either its members 
or the general public it claimed to serve. 
CIO leaders tried to turn such arguments on their heads, arguing that true union 
democracy resided in the anticommunist CIO, not in unions led by those on the political fringe.  
The organization’s publicity for the expulsion of its communist unions centered on the 
anticommunism, patriotism, and political diversity of its members.  In a 1949 op-ed for the New 
York Daily Mirror, Murray defended his organization against employer organization charges that 
communists were overrepresented on the Executive Board in comparison with the number of 
communist members in the CIO, resulting in an inherently undemocratic governance structure.
84
  
Murray wrote, “The CIO, which represents more than 6,000,000 workers” – a vastly inflated 
number – “is as American as the hot dog or the radio commercial.  Its membership is as mixed – 
as to race, creed, color and political opinion – as is the entire population of the country.”85 
Murray contrasted this diverse – but overwhelmingly anticommunist – membership with 
the dogmatic, dictatorial leaderships of the CIO’s communist-led unions.  A year after the 
election, Murray claimed that no more than ten percent of CIO members identified with the 
communist position, though it is unclear how he came to this calculation.  Murray lambasted 
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communist leaders like Bridges, Fitzgerald, and Henderson for attempting to impose a minority 
position on the entirety of their organizations.  Murray justified the pending expulsions in terms 
of union democracy.  “If the leaders of this 10%, often against the desires of their own 
membership, disagree and sabotage the majority on every important aspect of policy, it is clear 
that the majority has the inherent right to protect its course of action and its future stability,” 
Murray told the CIO membership.
86
  In this way, Murray allied representation of the rank-and-
file with the democratic processes of the CIO Executive Board.   
The 1948 election forced this argument about democracy.  By demonstrating that its own 
members were anticommunist and pro-Truman, the CIO hoped to retain legitimacy in the 
national press, among the general public, and within its own membership.  The organization did 
so in a number of different ways.  CIO leaders actively worked to reinforce newspaper and 
magazine accounts showing the anticommunist sentiments of the CIO’s member unions.  
Articles like a June 1948 piece for Commentary by A.H. Raskin, the New York Times’ labor 
reporter, gave indirect support for the CIO’s justification of democracy in its stance against a 
third party.  Raskin reported that worker discontent with rising prices and inflation translated into 
a growing reluctance for workers to embrace communism.  “The depth of anti-Communism 
feeling in labor’s ranks makes it plain that any support Mr. Wallace receives will come in spite 
of, and not because of, his ardor for the Soviet cause,” Raskin wrote.87   
By 1951, this notion predominated among liberal anticommunists.  In an interview with 
U.S. News and World Report, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota railed against the 
“subtlety and the viciousness of these [communist] rascals,” but reassured the public that 
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communists could never again hold sway in the American labor movement.  Humphrey argued 
that “the overwhelming majority of the workers have no sympathy whatsoever with 
Communism.”88  Such statements of the rank-and-file’s turn against communism and distaste for 
Wallace’s communist connections were helpful in validating the CIO’s position that it – not its 
communist-led unions – represented the viewpoints of its members. 
CIO officials also took their case to union members, implying that support for communist 
leaders was incompatible with support for trade unionism.  Murray and other right-wingers first 
inaugurated this line of argumentation in 1948, as Wallace threatened the CIO’s political 
influence in Washington.  CIO leaders worked to portray Wallace’s communist associations as 
antithetical to American democracy and to American trade labor unionism.  At a 1948 Board 
meeting, Murray praised the United States as “the best of all countries” because, in America, 
citizens were permitted to criticize “national shortcomings.”  Murray further contended that, 
“The trade union movement in the United States has done much to cultivate good, sound, 
democratic thinking.”89  At a June 1950 meeting, Murray stated emphatically, “I owe my 
allegiance to the United States against the Soviet Union,” and “[m]y allegiance is to this [trade 
union] movement.”90  By extension, in following the Soviet line, Progressive Party supporters as 
well as American communists not only thumbed their collective nose at American democracy, 
but they stood against the democratic values espoused by the American labor movement.   
This argument continued to gain traction in the early 1950s as the CIO’s legislative 
department worked aggressively to defeat Joseph McCarthy’s subversion bills and HUAC 
investigations.  For example, a CIO Executive Board resolution opposing loyalty oaths for 
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governmental employees and defense contractors criticized the proposed law as “undemocratic 
and unjust procedures” which gave “aid and comfort to Communist and other totalitarian 
groups.”91  By aligning itself with the forces of democracy, the CIO sought to be seen as helping 
to defeat communism at home. 
AFL officials made similar arguments about the connection between democracy and 
organized labor, worried that the exposure of communism in CIO unions would reflect poorly on 
the AFL as well.  The AFL used its sponsorship of the Frank Edwards radio program – a news 
commentary show that aired five nights a week at ten o’clock, at the cost of some $750,000 a 
year – to defend the organization’s anticommunist credentials and to explain how the communist 
system was antithetical to effective trade unions.
92
  Speaking to the general public rather than to 
workers alone, the AFL sponsorship spot read, “Like you, the eight million members of the AF 
of L love freedom and are devoted to democracy.  But in addition, AF of L members know that 
in Communist Russia, a worker has no right – a worker is ordered when to work, where to work 
and for how much.”  The advertisement concluded, “No wonder, then, that American workers 
hate Communism.  No wonder the American Federation of Labor has consistently and tirelessly 
fought Communism at home and abroad!”93  Even more explicitly than the CIO, the AFL spoke 
directly to the public and tried to connect the internal democracy of its union, and the 
anticommunist position of its rank-and-file, with a more general analysis of the incompatibility 
of communism with a strong union movement in America.   
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The CIO did not mount many explicit campaigns to reach the general public.  There were 
a number of reasons for this.  The CIO relied on its PAC instead of its public relations 
department after De Caux’s departure and during the 1948 election cycle.  The CIO’s member 
unions tended to invest in paid media to reach their own members or potential members, rather 
than the general public.  Instead, the CIO used public statements, leaked board meeting actions, 
and convention rhetoric and resolutions to cultivate the linkage between democracy, 
anticommunism, and the CIO. 
Individual unions within the CIO that harbored vehemently anticommunist positions also 
used other types of media to make this argument.  In the wake of the 1949 expulsions, the UAW 
ran a radio play entitled “CIO and Americanism” as part of its CIO history series.  In the play, 
George Baldanzi of the Textile Workers and musician Texas Bill Strength sang songs and 
discussed the latest labor news.  Baldanzi described how communists at the CIO convention had 
“stood up and screamed things at the CIO leaders which, if they had been in Russia, they would 
have been taken out and shot for doing.”  He continued, “Yes, Bill, they took advantage of the 
freedoms we have in order to take those freedoms away from us.”  But because “the CIO is a 
democratic organization,” the communists “didn’t get to first base.”94  Like Murray’s speeches to 
the Board and his convention pronouncements, this radio play equated American and union 
democracy.  But the play was targeted at radio listeners – mostly workers tuning in to the UAW 
station – rather than union officials and convention delegates. 
In the relative privacy of Board meetings – made somewhat more public by the frequent 
leaking of proceedings to the press – Murray and Reuther railed against communism, but both 
men publicly condemned undemocratic, violent means in addressing dissent from the CIO’s left.  
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When Abe Flaxer, head of the United Public Workers came to defend his union before the CIO 
Executive Board in winter of 1950, Murray and Swim disputed Flaxer’s accusation that the 
CIO’s leadership hoped to provoke a riot among communists in an effort to discredit the Public 
Workers and other accused unions.
95
  In 1950, after UAW members used violence to eliminate 
communists in local plants, Reuther took the high road by urging locals to use “legal ways of 
dealing with anyone connected with the Communists.”96  But such incidents were also useful to 
CIO leaders as they demonstrated the worker resistance to communist influence.   
CIO leaders tried to distinguish between communist domination and communists 
themselves, asserting – however unsuccessfully – that while they opposed the former, they were 
comfortable with the latter expressing themselves in a functioning democracy.  In reflecting on 
the events of 1948 in January of the following year, Carey summed up this idea.  “No one said or 
even intimated that Communists would be prohibited from being Communists…. But it was also 
made clear that no individual, Communist or non-Communist, would be permitted to impose 
outside programs on a free American trade union movement.” The CIO highlighted its 
democratic processes for ridding itself of communist influences – following “a democratic 
tradition” in existence “since the year 1776,” in Carey’s telling.97  In a widely quoted statement, 
Reuther stated that the CIO was interested in defeating communism, not depriving Communists 
of free speech.  According to Reuther, the CIO only “challenge[d], and we are going to put a stop 
to, their right to peddle the Communist Party line with a CIO label on the wrapper.”98  CIO 
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leaders continued to contrast this tolerance for dissent against Soviet communists’ crackdown on 
the freedom of the USSR’s citizens. 
The problem with this line of argumentation was that it did not address the contentions of 
leaders of communist-led unions that they were only acting on behalf of their membership, not in 
their own self-interest.  At his union’s trial in 1950, Henderson summed up this argument: “We 
just can’t see how you can take an International Union and deny it the right of its membership to 
its constitution and conventions, its council meetings, its local union meetings, to determine their 
own policy, even if that disagrees with National CIO policy.”99   
Not once did Murray or any other national officer of the CIO ask for convention balloting 
information or any other record that might confirm or disprove the idea that the rank-and-file 
took a leading role in shaping union policy.  At the trials for the accused unions, the charging 
committee did cite union newspapers that supported particular policy positions not taken by the 
national CIO – especially surrounding the 1948 election – as evidence that the leftists tried to 
brainwash their members. This attention to manipulation of the rank-and-file by the left – but not 
irregularities in elections or other examples of outright corruption – showed that the CIO’s 
national leadership viewed unionists as incapable of forming their own political positions 
without union intervention and assumed that their default position was anticommunist.   
This view of workers as vehemently opposed to the communist line – unless successfully 
manipulated by a Bridges or a Henderson or a Bryson or a Fitzgerald – was consistent with CIO 
leaders’ understandings of the general public as well.  In his 1950 Labor Day radio speech on 
ABC, Murray declared, “American workers have proven they are a bulwark of strength against 
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Communist infiltration.”  In expelling communist unions from its ranks, “the CIO has performed 
a real service to the nation,” Murray told listeners.100   
 
Anticommunism as Public Service 
 Murray expressed a similar sense of public responsibility and service in the relative 
privacy of CIO Board meetings.  After the Board had voted to expel nine unions in 1950, Murray 
praised the organization for having “rendered a distinct service not only to American workers” – 
who, Murray presumed, were vehemently opposed to communist influence in their unions – “but 
also to our country.”101  In other cases, Murray explained that the CIO not only demonstrated its 
commitment to the public through its confrontation with communists, but that it undertook those 
expulsions and supported anticommunist politicians primarily to help the public.   
Murray and other senior officials explained that the CIO was not content merely to save 
its own organization, retain its clout in politics, and strengthen the collective bargaining positions 
of its member unions.  As the CIO’s endorsement of Truman put it, the federation’s political and 
social “program does not serve the interest of labor alone but that of every section of our people.  
It is directed toward the achievement of those objectives which are shared by the overwhelming 
majority of Americans.” One of those key objectives was opposition to a Progressive Party and 
its communist cronies.
102
  Murray argued that this support for Truman made a real difference.  
He told a roaring crowd of convention delegates in the days after the election that, through its 
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election activities, the CIO “saved America, we saved men, and we saved women, we saved 
children.  And we helped save the world.”103 
By 1950, with the 1948 election behind him, and with the expulsions of communist CIO 
unions steadily progressing, Murray was even more explicit in rhetorically crowning the CIO as 
savior of the American people – indeed, the universe – from the “wickedness” of communism.  
In a meeting with his Executive Board, Murray argued that by removing communists from the 
ranks of the CIO, his organization was “rising to the defense of these people here in this country 
as it is rising to the defense of all the peoples throughout the universe.  It is singular in its 
devotion to the principles of democracy.”104   
A pamphlet produced by the CIO Department of Education and Research a year later, as 
the Korean War waged, made a similar claim to a wider audience than the Executive Board.  The 
brochure urged readers to exercise their democratic duty to vote.  In this way, ordinary people 
could help the pro-democracy forces as they waged a “struggle for the freedom of mankind.”  “In 
this great effort once more labor has taken the lead” (presumably by eliminating communists), 
the pamphlet reported.
105
  Reiterating Murray’s position from the 1948 election campaign 
forward, the pamphlet assumed the anticommunism of the American public and submitted that 
organized labor was doing much to assert democratic values on the public’s behalf.  With the 
U.S. enmeshed in a cold war, this argument about the CIO’s patriotism and ideological 
contribution to the war effort, in accordance with the views of both the general public and union 
members, was particularly salient. 
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Indeed, in the years following the expulsions, CIO leaders argued that their organization 
had done more to address the threat of communism than employers or the U.S. Congress.  In 
1953, a year into his tenure as president of the CIO, Walter P. Reuther explained to the CIO 
convention attendees that their organization had “far more effective experience with handling the 
communist problem than the demagogues in Congress” who railed against communist infiltration 
of the nation’s government and membership organizations.106  In an example of how the CIO 
used academics as legitimizing forces in arguments to the public, the CIO latched onto the noted 
labor economist and historian Philip Taft’s 1954 claim that the CIO had “sharply reduced” 
communist influence with “virtually no aid” from employers who tried to use communism as a 
wedge to divide the workforce.
107
  And, in an effort to prevent Congressional prohibitions on 
communists in the labor movement in 1951, Carey chastised the government and business for not 
“show[ing] the same zeal in resolving this problem that labor has shown.”108   
Carey and others even suggested that the CIO could develop a national political program 
to rid the country of communists, because it had successfully expunged communists from its own 
ranks.  At a 1950 CIO Executive Board meeting, George Baldanzi argued that the CIO could 
present a foreign and domestic policy for the nation that steered clear of the hysteria of excesses 
of McCarthyism on the right or “Dirkenism” on the left.  “[W]e ought to approach the Congress, 
the government, and the people of the United States with an overall program,” Baldanzi told a 
receptive Board.
109
  Representatives of the CIO used this logic to promote their foreign and 
domestic legislative agenda through much of the 1950s.  A 1954 CIO Publicity Department 
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report on the expulsions argued the CIO’s experience with communism offered a model for other 
organizations and governmental entities.  The Publicity Department published the report “as a 
public service for trade union members and for all students of labor problems and of 
democracy’s successful efforts to combat the menace of totalitarianism.”110  
This effort to present CIO actions around communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
as a public service infused by a commitment to democracy and freedom of expression came as a 
direct result of the 1948 election. In 1948, the CIO tried to motivate its own members and 
members of the general public – principally the progressive, anticommunist left – to support 
Truman over Wallace.  In the years following, the CIO sought to solidify support among these 
groups, not only in order to stave off “embarrassment,” as John A. Fitch had put it in his 1949 
Survey article, but also to build a cohesive, pragmatic coalition capable of advancing the CIO’s 
political agenda.  This could only be accomplished with support from a public that CIO officials 
presumed to be anticommunist.  The expulsions helped the CIO in this effort.  By 1953, public 
approval of labor unions surpassed its prewar high, reaching 75 percent.  By comparison, at the 
height of tensions over communism in the CIO in 1949, public approval stood at just 62 
percent.
111
   
 
Conclusion 
 In 1953, Victor Riesel claimed that American labor spent one billion dollars fighting 
communism in the United States and abroad, as well as serving the community through local 
drives, though he gave no indication of how he arrived at this staggering figure.  However, the 
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columnist believed that the average reader had not heard of these actions by the labor movement.  
“There are scores of such incidents which go unreported because labor’s public relations is as 
outmoded as a town crier,” Riesel concluded.112 
 Riesel’s analysis was somewhat exaggerated.  Contrary to Riesel’s statements, the AFL’s 
public relations program grew large and sophisticated in the years after the passage of Taft-
Hartley.  While the quality and innovation of the CIO’s public relations department declined 
substantially after De Caux’s departure from the organization, the CIO continued to produce an 
impressive array of publicity materials.  But Riesel was correct that the publicity and political 
operations of the nation’s two largest labor federations did little to publicize their own good 
work in the community, on behalf of the general public. 
Accusations of communist influence in CIO unions were a major reason why the labor 
movement’s publicity divisions failed to develop at the speed of its political machinery.  With 
the onset of the cold war, communist infiltration became a serious political liability for the CIO 
at a moment when the organization was trying to promote its political platform among both CIO 
members and the general public.  CIO officials feared that a serious public relations effort to 
convince the nation that the CIO did not support communists would have little effect on the 
political realities of 1948 – and potentially even draw new attention to the problem – especially 
before communists were forced out of the organization.   
The possibility of a strong showing by Wallace forced CIO leaders to confront 
communism forcefully, but as a political issue, not a public relations one.  Wallace threatened the 
CIO’s clout in Washington, and support for the Progressives among CIO unions gave the 
impression that the CIO did not have control over its own troops.  CIO leaders worried that if 
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they failed to take action against communism in their ranks, the government would take 
draconian measures to remove communists for them.  And Murray and others continued to worry 
that communist influences would exact a toll on CIO unions’ organizing capabilities, presuming 
that the rank-and-file would reject communist leadership for both ideological and practical 
reasons.  After all, Wallace’s poor showing in union strongholds showed that leftist unions were 
outside of the mainstream.  And the elimination of NLRB protections for unions led by those 
who refused to submit anti-communist affidavits, as required under Taft-Hartley, put communist 
unions at a significant disadvantage. 
Of course the reality was considerably murkier than Murray and other CIO leaders 
allowed.  In general, the purges did not result in higher memberships for CIO unions, and the 
CIO continued to do battle with the Truman administration on matters like the Wage 
Stabilization Board and the 1952 steel strike.  It is impossible to say how organizing and 
membership rates would have changed had the CIO not launched massive efforts to steal 
members away from expelled unions and supported government investigations of communists in 
the ranks of labor.  Within a few years, most purged unions were shells of their former selves, if 
they existed independently at all (Table 2-2).   
But the CIO’s own efforts did not fare much better.  The historian Robert Zieger explains 
that, despite boasts to the contrary, in the aftermath of the expulsions, “the CIO did little 
organizing.”113  The CIO’s newly established Government and Civic Employees Organizing 
Committee, its efforts to raid the food processing workers of the FTA (by pushing them toward 
the Packinghouse Workers, Brewery Workers, and the Gas and Chemical Workers), and its 
awarding of control of the department store and retail clerks to the Amalgamated Clothing 
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Workers over the left-leaning Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union were largely 
unsuccessful, though the CIO’s competitor to the UE built membership quickly (Table 2-3).  
Many of the gains that the CIO’s new and preexisting unions saw between 1949 and 1955 
were attained through raiding – not organizing – and few approached the potential of the labor 
market.  For example, census data show that local, state and federal employees totaled over 
seven million workers in the early 1950s – including over two million federal employees.  Yet 
the CIO’s Government and Civic Workers managed to organize just 25,000 in that period – far 
less than one percent, with many presumably raided from the United Public Workers, which 
dissolved in 1953.
114
  Even taking into account the fact that many of these employees were 
ineligible to join unions or worked in areas of the country hostile to unions, this figure is 
extraordinarily low.  This compares with a United Public Workers height of over 61,000 
members in 1946.
115
    
 The CIO’s failure to capitalize on a stated justification for the expulsions by organizing 
more workers after the purges ultimately threatened its political clout in future elections and its 
negotiating position vis-à-vis the AFL in merger talks in subsequent years.  But the strategy that 
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the CIO developed for addressing communism – insisting that it was out of step with the political 
views of a majority of its own members and that the CIO was acting on behalf of the entire 
nation – foreshadowed arguments used during the AFL-CIO merger in 1955 and union 
racketeering hearings in the late 1950s.  As during the debate over communist-led unions, union 
leaders claimed their members were simply part of the larger public in both of these instances.  
In the future, the form of public outreach shifted; organized labor used differentiated messaging 
based more on demographic, regional, racial, and gender identifications than on union 
membership or non-membership.  But the strategy on communism that tried to situate the CIO as 
a public interest group, rather than a special interest group representing labor alone, remained the 
same.  
112 
 
Chapter 3 
A Movement Becomes an Organization: Selling the AFL-CIO to the Public  
 
With a tentative agreement on a constitution for a merged labor federation drafted by 
AFL and CIO leaders, the editorial pages of the nation’s newspapers were atwitter with praise for 
the proposed organization in the spring of 1955.  The New York Times saw the new 
organization’s proposed constitution as “a striking benchmark by which to measure the profound 
change in the philosophy of organized labor” since the founding of the AFL in the 1880s.  In 
emphasizing the Federation’s responsibility “to serve the interests of all the American people,” 
the charter was proof that mainstream American unionism had abandoned an ideology of class 
warfare, and replaced it with an acknowledgement that “labor and management now share in a 
constantly growing economic pie,” of benefit to workers, businessmen and the public alike.1  The 
Detroit Free Press swooned over the way that the “proposed new constitution tacitly disavows 
the ‘class struggle’ philosophy.”2  The Detroit News hailed the abandonment of the principle of 
“class conflict,” as a confession of labor’s “absorption in the American political tradition,” 
showing that labor had, “in a word, become conservative.”3   
 What had the new AFL-CIO constitution done to inspire such high praise?  How and why 
did the merger between the AFL and CIO signal organized labor’s movement toward mainstream 
conservatism to the press?  In fact, AFL and CIO leaders meticulously crafted the constitution 
that so enthused newspaper editors around the country in order to cultivate a sense of 
moderation.  Concerned that the merger between the nation’s two largest labor federations would 
open the labor movement up to renewed attacks on monopoly unions and big labor by industry 
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groups, spokesmen for the new labor federation actively tried to spin the merger as a boon to the 
public – a powerful lobbying group committed to advancing the position of the union and non-
union member, alike.  The new AFL-CIO positioned itself as a democratic institution committed 
to free enterprise, opposed to Marxist doctrine, and “conscious of its responsibility to the people 
of this nation and the free world.”4   
 The merger represented a high point of industrial pluralism, in which the ideal of an 
industrial democracy was replaced by a pragmatic investment in building a formidable 
negotiating partner for an ever-expanding business sector.  The abandonment of the rhetoric of 
class struggle that commentators noted in the new AFL-CIO constitution was not for show.  It 
embodied liberal thinking at mid-century, a centrism born from leftist intellectuals’ swift 
abandonment of the socialist ideas of their younger years, and a fundamental distrust of large, 
powerful institutions and controlling political systems in the wake of World War II and its 
aftermath.   
For liberal public intellectuals of the 1950s, labor could provide a powerful 
counterweight to the growth of big business and its incumbent profits.  But it would do so as an 
organizational structure akin to business, not as a democratic institution capable of transforming 
the social landscape of America. The latter role smacked of the class-consciousness that underlay 
European politics; in America, classes were not so far apart, and class distinctions were far more 
permeable.  In America, modern technologies and consumerist behavior would render class 
structure obsolete.  Labor would continue to operate politically as part of the “pressure group 
society,” argued Fortune writer Daniel Bell.5  But doing so effectively required effective 
management of its members, in order to present a united front in collective bargaining and in 
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warring with other interest groups on the political front. As the historian Nelson Lichtenstein 
writes, liberal thinkers of the postwar period supported a “de facto oligarchy” governing 
America’s unions.6  They believed that bureaucracy and consistent, tight, and moderate rule by 
elites could advance the interests of union members incapable of and uninterested in representing 
their own interests at the bargaining table and in the political arena. 
AFL-CIO leaders and the intellectuals who believed in the power of labor unions to 
advance workers’ economic interests through collective bargaining and political work 
championed bigness among responsible labor elements. Big wasn’t bad when mobilized for the 
public good, they argued.  Indeed, bigness was a key feature of the postwar landscape, as the 
United States attained superpower status, legislators planned the creation of a more robust 
national highway system, federal government spending increased year-by-year, and a wave of 
business mergers swept the nation.  
In 1951, nine large manufacturing and mining firms merged with combined assets of 
$201 million.  The number of merged firms increased steadily year-by-year during the first half 
of the 1950s, standing at 67 large merged manufacturing and mining firms in 1955, with assets of 
$2,117 million.  Furthermore, the percentage of manufacturing assets held by the 200 largest 
corporations increased from 48 percent to 53 percent during the same period.
 7
  Meanwhile, 
government spending increased by more than half between 1950 and 1955, with receipts keeping 
pace.
8
  Thus, as the economy grew in the early 1950s, two key American institutions – business 
and government – grew with it. 
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Against such a backdrop, liberals saw the bigness of a merged AFL-CIO as a good thing.  
AFL President George Meany, CIO President Walter P. Reuther, and others argued that unity 
between the AFL and CIO resulted in an institution that could fight communism, protect the 
consumer, create a more efficient market, make workplaces safer, strengthen the middle class, 
and promote American values abroad.  Most of all, big labor – even in a federation model – 
could pressure big employers at the negotiating table.  As Meany put it, “We do not seek to 
recast American society in any particular doctrinaire or ideological image. We seek an ever 
rising standard of living.”9 
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, intellectual champions of industrial pluralism had 
largely changed their tune, concerned that bigness – and the bureaucracy and elitism that a 
concentration on standard of living promoted – suppressed worker democracy and shortchanged 
the potential for radical social change. But in the mid-1950s, AFL-CIO leaders and liberals 
viewed the rise of big labor optimistically.  In doing so, they reflected new shifts in the labor 
movement in the postwar period: the trend toward professionalism, increased bureaucracy, a 
growing sense of national identity, political involvement, a projected – if not actual – preference 
for tough negotiations at the bargaining table instead of picketing, and the promotion of labor as 
protector and piece of the public.  The merger between the AFL and CIO did not create these 
trends, but it exacerbated them, leading to praise of labor’s statesmanship and responsibility to 
the public on the one hand, and charges of monopoly power and a selling out of union members 
on the other hand.   
AFL and CIO leaders did not merge their organizations as a public relations gimmick.  
There were far more substantive reasons for the merger.  Meany and Reuther represented a new 
generation of leaders less personally invested than their predecessors in the original reasons for 
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the split between the AFL and CIO and less committed to keeping the two organizations 
separate.  The infighting, organizing woes, and declining resources following former CIO 
President Phillip Murray’s death and the CIO’s elimination of communist unions from its ranks 
provided an added incentive for Reuther to bring his organization into a new, stronger federation.  
Indeed, it wasn’t clear that the CIO would survive past 1955 without uniting with the AFL.  
Meanwhile, Meany’s AFL saw the merger as an opportunity to seize the upper hand against a 
rival labor federation.  Merger provided a means of dealing with the persistent problem of 
raiding between unions, a problem that cost unions a considerable amount of time and money, 
often alienating workers and the public in the process.  And merger also promised greater 
strength in two growing and intertwined areas of interest to both the AFL and CIO: public 
relations and politics.   
Labor’s spin to the public through the mainstream press and its own media channels 
emphasized some of these reasons for the merger, but not others.  The CIO’s internal civil war 
and the organizing capacity of a merged federation were matters of private concern, while labor 
leaders publicly promoted the virtues of a large labor entity that could act on behalf of the public 
in the political arena, as well as the value to the ordinary citizen of industrial peace created 
through no-raiding pacts and the use of conference rooms as opposed to picket lines.  Enthusiasts 
for the merger contemplated a huge labor organization capable of enforcing an end to labor’s 
historical abuses in corruption and racial discrimination.
10
  Big was better when it came to 
certain things, AFL-CIO leaders argued.  The AFL-CIO was a mature organization.  With its 
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new constitution eschewing the class warfare language of the AFL’s original charter, labor had 
come of age.   
In many ways, this argument surrounding the merger represented a climax of the trends 
typifying the public relations strategies of organized labor from the campaign against the passage 
of Taft-Hartley forward.  As in the campaign against that Act and the CIO’s expulsion of 
communists, AFL-CIO leaders argued that their merged organization was capable of policing 
itself and that regulatory legislation – in this case, an end to anti-trust exemptions for organized 
labor – was not necessary.  Labor leaders recycled this argument about the power of responsible 
labor to crack down on abuses in its ranks a few years after the merger during Congress’ 
investigation of union racketeering.  The merger created a large public relations and lobbying 
bureaucracy that aided in the promotion of this message, crafted from on-high. 
This chapter argues that the merger of the AFL and CIO was a defining moment for the 
new way that mainstream labor tried to present itself to the public in the postwar period – as a 
protector of the public interest against the excesses of both renegade unions and industry.  Labor 
spokesmen countered charges of union monopoly by arguing that big labor was needed to defend 
the public against big business, and that bigness could help serve the public interest with 
legislative victories and collective bargaining agreements beneficial to all.  At the same time, 
AFL and CIO officials argued that monopoly was a misnomer, with individual unions 
maintaining autonomy in many notable respects, including collective bargaining negotiations. 
The first section of this chapter details the reasons and timeline for the merger, including 
the CIO’s internal strife, changed leadership in both federations, concerns about lost resources 
and alienation resulting from raiding, and the possibility of greater influence in Washington and 
with the public through combined forces.  The second section of the chapter discusses the charge 
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of union monopoly and big labor in response to the merger, and the third section explains how 
AFL and CIO leaders counteracted this argument by differentiating themselves from other “big” 
entities of the postwar era, especially big business.  The final section of the chapter considers the 
structural elements that the new AFL-CIO put into place and publicized to try to demonstrate its 
commitment to representing the public interest - and not just union members.  
 
Coming to Merger 
 From the time of the split of the CIO from the AFL in 1935, commentators speculated on 
the likelihood of a reunification of the two labor federations.  And for their part, AFL and CIO 
leaders engaged in on-again-off-again negotiations to broker a unity agreement over the course 
of the two decades the organizations remained separate.  These “talks” were typically conducted 
through letters and telegrams with only the occasional in-person meeting. They were often tied to 
a particular crisis moment, such as World War II or the impending passage of Taft-Hartley, or to 
an area of shared interest, such as American labor’s representation on the international stage.  
Often, talks were not about merger, per se, but rather about shared interests and campaigns.  Still, 
even in these cases AFL officials often insisted that their labor federation should absorb the CIO, 
leading to a breakdown in negotiations. 
Unity talks or overtures to talks occurred in 1939 and 1940 at the request of President 
Roosevelt; in 1942 to discuss labor’s contribution to the war economy; in 1944 to discuss 
legislative unity; in 1947 to defeat anti-labor legislation; in 1949 to determine representation at 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); in 1950 to discuss labor’s 
opponents; in 1952 to resume previous talks; and in 1953 to study the prevalence and outcomes 
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of raids.  It was this latter set of talks under the direction of new AFL President Meany and new 
CIO President Reuther that led directly to the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955.
11
 
A committee of three AFL representatives and three CIO representatives compiled results 
from NLRB elections from 1951 and 1952, discovering that raids were, by and large, failures 
(Table 3-1).  Union representation changed in only about two percent of cases in which elections 
resulted from raids.
12
  As a result, the committee recommended that the AFL and CIO commit to 
a no-raiding agreement.  Despite opposition from representatives of the building and 
construction trades and from some CIO unions opposed to Reuther’s leadership and skeptical 
about AFL unions’ commitment to honoring the agreement, the no-raiding agreement was 
endorsed by both the AFL and CIO conventions in the fall of 1953.  Meany and Reuther gave the 
document teeth by twisting arms to make sure that individual unions signed and complied with 
the agreement. 
The no-raiding pact of 1953 set the stage for unity negotiations.  In October 1954, with 
the pact producing impressive results, the AFL and CIO appointed committee members to agree 
to principles for a merger (see Table 3-2 for results of the no-raiding agreement).  The committee 
composition showed the weight that each federation placed on the talks as well as the need to 
cement support from all quarters within the fast disintegrating CIO.  From the AFL were Meany, 
Secretary-Treasurer William Schnitzler, and Harry Bates of the Bricklayers Union.  The CIO 
committee was composed of Reuther, Secretary-Treasurer James B. Carey, and Reuther’s rival, 
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David J. McDonald of the Steelworkers.  This committee of six generated and signed a merger 
agreement on behalf of their organizations in February 1955.  The AFL and CIO conventions 
approved the merger agreement in December 1955, officially forming the AFL-CIO. 
Why did labor unity come in 1955 and not before?  Contemporary commentators most 
often pointed to the greatly weakened CIO in the wake of the organization’s fight against 
communists in its ranks between 1948 and 1950, and in the leadership struggle that followed the 
death of Philip Murray in 1952.  Though the CIO reported an all-time high postwar membership 
rate in 1953, it fell significantly in the years following.  With the government limiting the impact 
of collective bargaining agreements in industries engaged in wartime production during the 
Korean War, the CIO had already lost considerable clout.
13
  At the same time, the AFL saw gains 
in membership every year from 1937 to 1955.
14
   
Given the CIO’s difficulties, the U.S. News and World Report was not alone in 
concluding in early 1953 that, “The odds, as of now…seem to favor a collapse of the CIO.”15  
Industry groups agreed.  In late 1952, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Labor Relations Letter 
concluded that, the “AFL is nosing ahead of its jealous CIO rival,” and openly “wonder[ed] if the 
CIO can remain intact through a crisis it has been ill-prepared to weather.”16  The historian 
Robert Zieger concludes that, with the CIO on life support, “Within the CIO, outbursts of 
hostility toward the AFL increasingly gave way to a sense of inevitability” about the need for 
                                                 
13
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merger.
17
  For his part, Meany grew concerned that a possible CIO disintegration would “be bad 
for labor” but also recognized an opportunity to gain the upper hand in merger negotiations with 
the CIO.
18
  
The infighting at the CIO following Murray’s death led to these appraisals of the 
imminent collapse of the organization.  In defeating Allan Haywood, the CIO’s organizing 
director by a 52 to 48 margin, Reuther broke the UAW-USWA truce maintained by Murray.
19
  
Personal animosities between McDonald and Reuther further fanned the flames.  Reuther’s 
insistence that press accounts of tensions within the CIO had been manufactured by “newspaper 
men [who] obviously felt, ‘Here is a good story,’” underscored the fact that these internal 
divisions were well known.
20
    
But as much as Reuther was a lightning rod within the CIO, it was also his assumption of 
power – and the assumption of power by George Meany in the AFL – that enabled successful 
unity talks.  The public respected Meany and Reuther’s predecessors, William Green and Philip 
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Murray, respectively, citing them as their favorite labor leaders in postwar surveys.
 21
  But Green 
and Murray had little use for one another or the organizations that each served.   
For his part, Green undertook a “vindictive crusade” against the CIO fueled by his belief 
that the CIO supported radicalism and encouraged class conflict, according to Green’s 
biographer.
22
  In the immediate postwar years, the editor of the CIO News charged that Green 
delivered a “hysterical crescendo” of “attacks on the CIO” based on distrust of the personality of 
the CIO’s leadership rather than on substantive issues.23  Indeed, one top AFL official with 
Green’s ear even characterized Murray’s desire to discuss unity on legislative issues as a 
“Communist-inspired maneuver.”24  While Green claimed to support unity, his overtures, 
presuming that the CIO should “come back” into the Federation that it had left, were a non-
starter for CIO leaders, especially Murray. 
As someone who had been involved with the CIO from its founding, Murray was 
especially wary of engaging in unity talks on the older federation’s terms.25  Politics – the area of 
obvious collaboration between the two organizations in the immediate postwar era – was 
particularly fraught.  As long as communist-controlled unions remained in the ranks of the CIO, 
Green forbid AFL affiliates from working with CIO unions on legislative issues, though this 
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command was frequently ignored at the local level.  Still, suffice it to say that Murray resented 
Green’s insistence on the superiority of the AFL. 
Meany and Reuther represented a new generation of union leader, distinct from the 
“porkchoppers of the old school” who sat on the AFL Executive Board.26  They were further 
removed from both the personalities and substantive differences that had informed the original 
split between their two federations.
27
  Meany remembered that, unlike Green and Murray, “my 
contacts with the CIO in those years were not adversary contacts; they were contacts of 
cooperation” forged on the War Labor Board during World War II and through wage 
stabilization efforts during the Korean War.
28
  Neither did Meany intend to “ask [the CIO] to 
come back to the House of Labor like a group of wayward boys,” as Green had done.29   
To be sure, there were still enormous tensions between Reuther and Meany, but their 
differences were not insurmountable.  Contemporary commentators also recognized the 
importance of new leadership.  In 1951, Collier’s prophesied, “the final act of complete labor 
unity awaits only the retirement or passing of three onetime cronies, Green, Murray and [John 
L.] Lewis [of the Mine Workers]” and the “competitive civil war” in labor organizing that they 
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brought with them.
30
  With Green and Murray dead, and Lewis’ Mine Workers independent of 
the AFL in the wake of Taft-Hartley’s passage, the path was paved for unity.31 
The structure that Meany and Reuther adopted in pursuing unity also helped to facilitate 
successful merger.  Meany and Reuther understood that a major factor contributing to distrust 
between the AFL and CIO in the early 1950s was the prevalence of raiding between affiliates of 
the labor federations.  At the same time, a desire to eliminate the expensive and largely 
unsuccessful practice of raiding was a major reason that Meany and Reuther entered unity 
negotiations in the first place.  Meany wrote to Reuther in early 1953, “there is not much hope of 
obtaining any real harmony of functional relations as long as the organizations continue to fight 
one another in the organizational field.”32  
 Their initial talks centered on eliminating this thorny issue of jurisdictional disputes, 
ultimately leading to the implementation of the no-raiding agreement on a voluntary basis.
 33
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This initial effort was also vitally important in reassuring the famously independent unions of the 
AFL that their autonomy would be preserved in a new organization.  It was only after the pact 
proved successful in reducing raiding that merger negotiations began in earnest.  As Meany said 
at the time, without the approval of the no-raiding agreement, “it means the end of the unity talks 
with the CIO.”34 
Meany and Reuther and their allies recognized that the more efficient and 
organizationally strong unions resulting from the no-raiding agreement could produce the 
ultimate goal of merger – political strength.  Far more than their predecessors, both Meany and 
Reuther were committed to advancing an expansive legislative agenda, if not a radical visioning 
of social democracy.  By the mid-1950s, there was little substantive policy difference between 
the two organizations on issues as diverse as Social Security, housing, and labor law, though 
there were certainly differences in emphasis and on specific details, as well as in the culture of 
the organizations.
35
  For example, Reuther and other CIO leaders grew concerned that the AFL 
was not doing enough to advance civil rights legislation and eradicate racial discrimination in its 
ranks, and to eliminate corruption, though the AFL was on record as supporting both positions, at 
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least rhetorically.
36
  Meany remembered that Reuther “was making speeches attacking the AFL 
as having a lot of corrupt unions,” trying to save face with CIO affiliate leaders who believed 
that the AFL had the upper hand.
37
  The fact that the CIO still promoted marches and singing 
while the AFL generally eschewed such demonstrations of worker solidarity created further 
tensions.
38
 
Apart from substantive and cultural differences, the national federations sometimes 
promoted animosity between the labor organizations in the years leading up to the merger.  In 
June 1952, the national newsmagazine of the AFL ran a photograph of the Minnesota 
federation’s public relations campaign, in which the majority of poster space was devoted to 
publicity campaigns designed for “fighting the CIO raiders.”39  Such public rhetoric made 
merger more difficult, even with Meany and Reuther at the helms of the AFL and CIO, 
respectively, and even with Meany and Reuther’s shared commitment to political action. 
Negotiating the structure and personnel for a merged political unit in the new AFL-CIO 
was also made more difficult because the political function of the new organization was so 
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important to both Meany and Reuther.  And both leaders recognized that, with increased political 
clout, the new organization would have to temper critics who accused it of turning into a union 
monopoly that sponsored a ghost government. 
 
Accusations of Union Monopoly and Ghost Government 
 The new labor federation was going to be big - that much was clear to merger observers.  
A US News and World Report’s December 1955 headline questioned “How big can labor unions 
get?,” echoing an implicit concern that big was not better when it came to labor unions.  40  
Despite such concerns, most mainstream news outlets did not share industry groups’ alarmist 
cries about the dangers of a new, enlarged labor federation.  Most agreed with Newsweek’s 
contention that the AFL-CIO was “unlikely to become an all-out labor monopoly in the 
foreseeable future.”41  Even the Wall Street Journal emphasized that a combined AFL-CIO “will 
not always speak with one voice,” as affiliates’ positions would be protected within the 
federation structure.
 42
  As the historian Nelson Lichtenstein shows, a cadre of liberal 
intellectuals and academics were influential in arguing for the importance of bigness in 
equalizing the power of business and labor, therefore reducing labor to an interest group, rather 
than a transformative force for social change – a theme the press picked up.43  But the very fact 
that commentators considered the question of labor monopoly at all pointed to the success of 
industry groups’ public relations war against big labor. 
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 The theme of labor monopoly appeared repeatedly in the Congressional testimony, 
internal publications, public statements, and literature issued by the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce related to the merger.
 44
  A cadre of 
business-friendly economists from universities and think tanks produced work to lend credibility 
to industry groups’ arguments, both implicitly and explicitly countering the claims made by 
liberal commentators like Daniel Bell, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Clark Kerr.
45
  Among the most 
prolific of these academics was Leo Wolman, a Columbia University economist, whose name 
also appeared on the NAM payroll as director of NAM’s Study Group on Labor Monopoly – a 
group whose very name evoked the idea of a think tank, rather than publicity and propaganda. 
NAM staffers clearly believed that Wolman’s credentials as an Ivy League professor 
uniquely qualified him to deploy the same arguments of labor monopoly, power, and inherent 
irresponsibility that their own leadership also voiced at every opportunity.  NAM staff delighted 
in the fact that one Wolman address before a NAM convention had been “hailed as a brilliant 
and clear revelation of union tactics in the abuse of monopoly power,” and made plans to rush it 
into publication as a stand-alone NAM pamphlet.  In numerous media appearances, Wolman was 
introduced as an impartial expert, seemingly unconnected with business interests, and his 
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Columbia affiliation was always prominently displayed in NAM-distributed pamphlets he 
authored on union monopoly.  Indeed, newspaper articles and editorials on the AFL-CIO merger 
often cited Wolman as an expert, no doubt drawing on NAM-supplied press releases, pamphlets, 
fact-sheets, and conference proceedings that cited Wolman as an authority.   
Stories from disgruntled union members and labor officials helped add color and detail to 
NAM and Chamber charges.  These stories lent legitimacy to the idea that “compulsory 
unionism” threatened the freedoms of real individuals who disagreed with union policy and 
political positions or who wished not to be represented by a union at all. NAM used testimony 
from union supporters who had changed their tune to demonstrate that unions were narrow 
special interest groups representing the views of their leaders, rather than the members and 
public they purported to serve.
46
 In particular, NAM publicized the work of the lawyer Donald 
Richberg, a key architect of New Deal labor policy turned conservative commentator, in the late 
1940s and 1950s.
 47
  In 1957, Richberg authored a book that summed up his later thinking on 
unions and their potential for abuse.  The merger did not produce this line of argumentation, but 
it intensified the frequency, urgency and focus of the attack.
48
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protections for collective bargaining and employee association, further eroding the classification of union activity as 
monopolistic, as defined in the Danbury Hatters’ case nearly three decades earlier.   
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NAM’s tactics of using academics, intellectuals, and disgruntled union members to 
legitimize their views to the public took a page directly from the CIO’s playbook. The CIO often 
commissioned or publicized reports authored by sympathetic academics – notably the 1946 
Nathan Report on price and wage policies – and noted the academic credentials of key members 
of its education and research staff in press releases.  The flow of personnel from the CIO national 
staff to academia – notably Kermit Eby from the education group to the University of Chicago – 
also helped to lend credibility to CIO policy perspectives from supposedly outside, objective 
experts. And like NAM, the CIO also frequently used stories of how unions had made a 
difference in the lives of individuals to lend support to their policies, as we have seen in the case 
of the campaign against Taft-Hartley.   
While liberal intellectuals promoting industrial pluralism in the early 1950s were 
important in shaping press and public attitudes toward organized labor in general and the merger 
in particular, the AFL and the AFL-CIO did not cite such thinkers directly.  As journalists, 
sometime critics of the labor movement, and established public figures in their own right, 
individuals such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. were less inclined to tow the party line and serve as 
reliable labor spokesmen. Furthermore, the very philosophy of pluralism identified a very narrow 
area of labor activity – projects that would produce a better living standard.  As such, the 
mobilization of intellectuals, workers, and other groups in coalition smacked of the very 
revolution that such thinkers rejected.  That said, even without the explicit use of intellectuals by 
                                                                                                                                                             
The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 altered the legal designation of organized labor in relationship 
to anti-trust legislation.  Taft-Hartley did not explicitly subject organized labor to prosecution under the nation’s 
anti-trust laws, but it did prohibit the closed shop, secondary boycotts, and jurisdictional strikes.  In making these 
amendments to the NLRA, Taft-Hartley began the process of putting labor within categories developed for business, 
including that of monopoly.  In effect, the Act suggested that union-negotiated contracts were antithetical to the 
public interest because they violated individual freedoms and subjected entire industries to one set of procedures and 
wage dictates.  This was monopoly, pure and simple.  
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the labor movement, pluralism certainly gave shape to widespread acceptance of the AFL-CIO 
merger. 
Without such support from the press and intellectuals on their side, the Chamber and 
NAM increased their attacks on labor bigness. They employed public relations professionals and 
used a wide variety of media to connect the merger with other legislative priorities.  NAM 
officials recognized the importance of semantics in making an appeal to the public, taking great 
care to use language that would resonate with the public.  “‘Great public concern’ revolves 
around the fear of ‘too much power in unions’ rather than the charge of ‘labor monopoly’ as 
such,” explained NAM’s public relations director. 49   
The Chamber and NAM tried to capitalize on the merger explicitly in making these 
points.  For example, in 1956, when NAM undertook a campaign to eliminate “compulsory 
unionism,” strategists argued that the effort was particularly timely because “The merger of 
AFL-CIO projected the Bigness aspect to the public in a highly dramatic and spectacular way.”  
With public opinion polls showing that people experienced “more worry about Bigness in Labor 
than Bigness in Government or Business,” NAM staff expected the nation to be particularly 
receptive to its message of the necessity of so-called right-to-work legislation.
50
   
Industry groups’ attacks on the merger, big labor, and the prospect of union monopoly 
were fourfold.  First, business groups argued that there was an inherent danger of a private group 
becoming so big as to challenge the democratic processes of the United States.  NAM surrogates 
characterized organized labor as “the most powerful private group in this country” and worried 
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that such a concentrated power without regard for the public interest could compromise the 
United States’ position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.51  
Second, NAM and the Chamber contended that big labor had the potential to exercise its 
monopoly power to shut down industries, posing a risk to national security and to the consumer.  
This argument served a dual purpose of delegitimizing industry-wide bargaining, a plank of 
NAM’s political platform for many years, as shown earlier in its campaign in support of Taft-
Hartley. 
Third, business federations challenged the democratic qualifications of labor leaders, 
arguing that bigness enabled union corruption and thwarted union democracy.  On the eve of the 
AFL-CIO merger, one NAM surrogate argued that, without checks, unions would expand their 
“menace to the public welfare.”  Indeed, the threat was so serious, the surrogate argued, that 
unions endangered “our constitutional form of government and our constitutional liberties.”52  
Unions also challenged the democratic freedom of members.  A typical NAM pamphlet quoted 
union members – many of them “forced” into an affiliation which they did not desire and which 
did not benefit them – about how they felt about the unions that supposedly helped them and 
their families, along with the rest of the nation.   
And finally, business groups asserted that labor bigness could and did result in violence 
in local communities.  References to particularly violent strike activity also helped to bring home 
the point that union members and their communities were often at the mercy of powerful labor 
leaders who did not speak for them.  The bloody United Auto Workers (UAW)-initiated Kohler 
                                                 
51
 Leo Wolman in transcript of “It’s YOUR Business!,” NAM radio program, January 28, 1956; NAM Papers, 
Series I, Box 109, 1956 Labor Materials Fol.; Hagley. 
52
 Donald R. Richberg, “How Shall We Deal with Labor Union Monopolies?,” speech before the Economic Club of 
Detroit, September 26, 1955; NAM Papers, Series VII, Box 128, Employment Relations Division – General, July-
December 1955 Folder; Hagley. 
133 
 
and Perfect Circle strikes of the mid-1950s provided fuel for the NAM attack.
53
  Using 
quotations from local members of the working class, NAM pamphlets painted the previously 
unsullied UAW as a bastion of irresponsibility, all the more dangerous because of its bigness.   
Even in cases in which labor leaders represented their members, they did not speak for 
the public interest, business groups argued.  For example, NAM and Chamber of Commerce 
leaders frequently cited John L. Lewis’ call for a three-day work week for his Mine Workers as a 
particularly egregious example of labor leaders’ disregard for the public interest.54  “[N]o 
businessman has the coercive power over other people that even a small-time labor leader has,” a 
typical U.S. Chamber of Commerce statement of 1954 argued.  In opposing anti-trust laws, labor 
leaders put themselves above the law, went the argument.  The arrogance of such a belief 
separated labor leaders from responsible business leaders who put the community interest first.
55
 
Together, these arguments painted a portrait of the corrupting influence of the merger in 
particular, and organized labor in general, on everyday citizens’ lives.  This condemnation of 
labor’s bigness rested on the assumption that unions were inherently undemocratic and were 
opposed to the American values exemplified by the hard-working small business owners 
comprising the membership rolls of NAM and the Chamber.  NAM officials emphasized that the 
vast majority of their own members were not part of big business and opposed monopoly in any 
sector. In a 1953 radio broadcast, Charles Sligh, NAM’s president and himself the head of a 
small Michigan furniture company (and a champion water skier), asserted that “NAM…is 
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against any monopoly in business.”56  NAM curricula for grade school students showed the 
many constraints on small businesses faced by a high school entrepreneur.  These included high 
labor costs.
57
   
Making this point about their own members was particularly important for NAM and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in light of the business merger wave that the country experienced in 
the early 1950s - a phenomenon that industry groups tried to downplay in their literature and in 
public statements.  Ignoring the size of corporate mergers and the industries involved, the 
Chamber’s appeal was typical.  A newsletter from that organization contended that if one 
examined Federal Trade Commission data, it would make “the reader wonder why the hysteria 
about mergers arose.”  The so-called merger “surge” actually represented “less than half of [the 
number of mergers in] the late ‘20s.”58  According to industry groups, the problems of 
“concentration” and “competition” were highlighted not by the business conglomerations of the 
1950s, but rather by “the widespread apprehension which developed over the implications of the 
merger between the AFL and the CIO into one giant labor organization.”  Labor’s bigness 
deserved investigation as a violation of anti-trust law just as much as – if not more than – any 
newly merged corporation.
59
    
In fact, the labor monopoly was inherently different from the business monopoly, NAM 
and Chamber officials argued in the years leading up to the merger.  Whereas the public held 
“veto power” over business conglomerations by deciding if and what to buy, no such mechanism 
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existed for the public to curtail union bigness.
60
  As representatives of such businesses, the 
policies of industry groups on labor questions should not be considered “anti-labor, but rather 
pro-public.”61   
Indeed, even profits were a measure of the commitment that business leaders had to the 
public.  For example, in a 1955 booklet entitled, “So the People May Prosper,” NAM writers 
argued that profits were another kind of capital flow from the consumer back into the economy.  
Corporate profits spurred further production, encouraging greater employment levels and lower 
production costs that were then fed back to the consumer in the form of lower prices.
62
   
But the biggest differentiation that NAM and the Chamber made between business and 
labor was the relationship that each had with the government and the political power that each 
wielded.  NAM and, to a lesser extent, the Chamber, used the AFL-CIO merger to raise the 
specter of intensified political involvement by organized labor – an involvement that they 
painted as outside of both the public interest and the interest of union members.  Privately, NAM 
and Chamber officials hoped that smearing labor’s political aims would pave the way for 
business success in advancing its legislative agenda.
63
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Industry groups focused on labor’s plan to consolidate the AFL’s Labor’s League of 
Political Education (LLPE) and the CIO Political Action Committee (PAC) into COPE 
(Committee on Political Education), a single, powerful Washington lobby force – combining the 
financial resources of groups that the Republican Party claimed contributed over $400,000 each 
during the previous election cycle.
64
  The GOP believed that this amount could not possibly have 
come from voluntary contributions alone, in violation of the Taft-Hartley law of 1947.
65
   
Industry group literature focused on how this new organization would presume to speak 
for the 16 million members of AFL-CIO affiliated unions and their families, comprising a total 
of 40 or 50 million voters, many of whom did not agree with the positions of the labor bosses 
that controlled COPE funds.  Union members were going to have to “cope with COPE…whether 
they like[d] it or not.”  Union arm-twisting to assure a one-dollar COPE contribution from each 
union member would see to that, argued NAM officers.
66
  NAM officials linked the merger to 
unions’ creation of a “ghost government” with “a handful of men, not elected, not authorized by 
the American people [able to] pull strings behind the scenes to direct the destinies of the 
nation.”67 
Using the remarks of AFL and CIO leaders against them, industry groups contended that 
the merger threatened the nation’s two-party political system.  Few people believed that the 
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AFL-CIO intended to form a third party.
68
  But in giving serious consideration on air and in 
literature to the possibility that the new, powerful AFL-CIO might launch a progressive labor 
party – even if the idea was then discounted as a real possibility – or that it would serve as an 
auxiliary to the Democratic Party, industry groups furthered the idea that organized labor 
possessed power out of proportion to its membership rolls and that this power was being used for 
ends detrimental to the American public and way of life.   
NAM leaders repeated statistics indicating that two-thirds of union members believed “it 
to be improper for a union to support the Democratic party in a national election and… opposed 
to the idea of a so-called ‘labor party’” and that half of polled union members stated that their 
unions should refrain from participating in partisan politics.
69
  Conservative politicians also 
voiced this sentiment.  Writing five years after the merger, Arizona Republican Senator Barry 
Goldwater summed up this perspective, questioning, “Is it morally permissible to take the money 
of a Republican union member, for example, and spend it on behalf of a Democrat?”70  This idea 
that union leadership was out of step with its own members furthered the idea that a powerful 
labor political interest was inherently undemocratic, and should be regulated by the state.   
AFL and CIO leaders rebutted such accusations by industry groups aggressively. The 
elimination of unions’ exemption from anti-trust laws did not seem likely, but labor leaders 
recognized that a failure to combat NAM and Chamber depictions of union power unresponsive 
to member opinion and the public interest could jeopardize both their organizing and political 
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objectives in the long-term.  In doing so, they did not dispute the notion of “big labor” so much 
as they argued that “big labor” was good for the public. 
 
Defending Big Labor 
Recognizing the threat posed by business attacks, labor leaders mounted a strong defense 
of the importance of big labor to the public in the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the 
merger.  Labor’s efforts were far less coordinated than the NAM and Chamber campaigns and 
did not emanate from a central public relations unit, though the Research and Public Relations 
Departments of the merged organization did release literature to support leaders’ positions.   
Instead, Meany and Reuther served as spokesmen for the AFL-CIO offensive, leveraging 
their responsible stewardship of the AFL and CIO, respectively, to counteract attacks on union 
leadership. The AFL-CIO would embrace a similar strategy during the racketeering hearings of 
the late 1950s. Industrial pluralism suggested that responsible rule by elites was a natural and 
positive outgrowth of big labor and an important step toward the realization of labor as a special 
interest group promoting industrial peace.  The political scientist Robert Dahl’s characterization 
of “polyarchy” to describe American democracy in the 1950s showed how many individual 
leaders representing many groups negotiate and rule together.
71
  In this context, the use of Meany 
and Reuther as carriers of labor’s appeal to the public made enormous sense. 
Meany and Reuther’s defense of big labor rested on five primary arguments.  First, they 
argued that mere bigness did not constitute monopoly.  Second, they asserted that big labor was 
fundamentally different than big business; it represented the public interest against an entrenched 
business interest.  Third, the AFL-CIO campaign promoted the notion that bigger labor would 
produce industrial peace, providing benefit to the consumer.  Fourth, Meany and Reuther 
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downplayed the political reach of the new organization, while also emphasizing the benefit to the 
public of labor’s legislative agenda.  And finally, labor leaders stressed that the structure of the 
new organization would prevent the excesses of which big labor was accused by industry groups. 
From the beginning, those involved in merger negotiations grew concerned about 
accusations of monopoly, even though they knew that there was little chance that Congress 
would amend anti-trust regulations to end exemptions for labor unions.  Indeed, one of the first 
publications produced by the newly formed AFL-CIO was a pamphlet entitled, “The ‘Labor 
Monopoly’ Myth.”  In it, the Research Department condemned the “fear-ridden voices” that 
viewed the merger of the two labor federations as an unrestrained “‘monopolistic power’ which 
threatens to destroy the economic fabric of the nation.”   Instead, the booklet explained that a 
federation was not a union capable of negotiating collective bargaining agreements, thereby 
rendering the monopoly labor charge a myth.
72
  The Research Department made plans to 
distribute the pamphlet to some 40,000 community leaders, public libraries, and members of the 
press in an effort to counteract the literature that the NAM had been circulating on the issue.
73
 
The argument against labor’s inclusion as monopoly went further than merely pointing to 
the AFL-CIO’s role and structure.  It also hinged on downplaying the numeric strength of the 
labor movement.  Meany and Reuther posited that AFL-CIO affiliated unions did not claim a 
large enough percentage of the working population as members in order to be understood as a 
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monopoly.  Independent unions like the railroad brotherhoods represented a significant number 
of workers and a majority of workers were not represented by unions at all, union leaders 
argued.
74
  Labor columnist Victor Riesel cited the influence of these independent unions, “many 
of which are powerful and many of which have multi-million dollar treasuries.”  If united, these 
“independents” could “rival ‘Big Labor,’” Riesel claimed.75  Thus, despite the fact that the new 
AFL-CIO’s affiliated unions would claim more members than any other labor federation in the 
nation’s history, its 25 percent share of the labor market was still a minority stake.76 
Furthermore, labor leaders argued that the laws of monopoly could not reasonably be 
applied to unions, which was a market composed of people, not goods.  This was not an 
argument unique to the merger negotiations.   By the early 1950s, UAW public relations staff 
made this point repeatedly in correspondence with letter writers who accused the Auto Workers, 
in particular, and the CIO, in general, of constituting labor monopolies.  “[W]e do not believe 
that labor, which is done by people, is a commodity to be classed by goods,” a typical response 
read.  As “voluntary organizations… ruled by majority vote of their membership,” labor unions 
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exercised far less control over members than organizations like the American Bar Association 
and the American Medical Association.
77
   
AFL and CIO leaders raised such points when confronted with legislation that would 
place organized labor under the anti-trust legislation designed to regulate big business.
78
  Indeed, 
in 1947, with anti-labor legislative proposals not yet consolidated under Taft-Hartley, the AFL’s 
newsmagazine stressed the difference between labor and commodity in its discussion of legal 
attacks on industry-wide bargaining.
79
  AFL President William Green also emphasized this 
difference in Congressional testimony in the winter of 1947, and again, when Congress began 
discussions of applications of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to organized labor in 1950.
80
   
By the mid-1950s, all but a handful of conservatives had abandoned attempts to overturn 
anti-trust exemptions for labor unions.
81
  Congressional committees held hearings on the topic, 
but few commentators expected proposed legislation to advance.  Hearings initiated by Attorney 
General Herbert Browning, Jr. in 1954 examined the Justice Department’s anti-trust activities 
more generally, but did not seek to restrict unions significantly.  Some conservatives feared that 
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by raising the issue of monopoly, they would invite further limits on the growth of business.  In 
addition, like some liberals, many conservatives had come to embrace growth in all sectors – 
including government – as important to the nation’s strength in the world and improving quality 
of life.  But despite the fact that there were few legislative proposals for anti-trust rules to apply 
to unions, industry groups and news outlets – many of the latter the result of merged 
organizations themselves – promoted the view that unions controlled particular industries and 
were able to affect consumers negatively through their insistence on higher wages and other 
unreasonable concessions. 
In response to this charge, labor made both a legal-economic case and a moral case to 
differentiate labor from commodities and to argue that the term “monopoly” could not 
reasonably be applied to the former.  The CIO’s General Counsel Arthur Goldberg repeated the 
Clayton Anti-Trust Act’s declaration that “labor of a human being is not a commodity” in 
appearances before Congressional committees in the lead-up to the merger, and labor federation 
literature also reprinted this statement from the 1914 legislation.
82
  The Economic Review of the 
newly merged AFL-CIO visually illustrated this distinction in the winter of 1956.
83
  It was 
absurd to think that a union member – or a person, for that matter – could “store his services 
while waiting for a better offer,” could possibly “know his true market value,” “ship his services 
from place to place,” or operate effectively in a market where demand typically exceeded supply, 
went the argument.  People were not goods.  Treating them as such violated fundamental 
freedoms as well as the law.    
Labor leaders also made a moral distinction between the goods produced and traded by 
business and the workers represented by unions.  In late 1954, with merger negotiations 
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underway, Goldberg angrily attacked an Attorney General investigation of anti-trust exemptions 
for labor. Goldberg argued that regarding labor as a commodity akin to manufactured goods 
would “institute a desperate form of competition between workers” resulting in a race to the 
bottom in terms of wages, an outcome that was not only undesirable from a purchasing power 
perspective but also undermined an American social contract promising prosperity to those who 
worked hard.
84
   
Labor leaders marshaled other moral arguments against regarding labor unions as 
monopolies.  Resurrecting the old anti-Taft-Hartley argument against “slave labor,” AFL and 
CIO leaders explained that if labor was viewed legally as a good – as it would be if the labor 
market was understood as corruptible through monopoly – then workers exercised no control 
over their own bodies.  Withholding labor through a strike, a picket, a work slowdown, or other 
means would be considered a restraint of trade.
85
  Similarly, if unions constituted monopoly, the 
combination of workers for any reason – including wage demands made through collective 
bargaining, especially on an industry-wide basis – could be viewed as obstructing trade, in 
violation of the law.
86
  The labor monopoly charge threatened the ability of individuals to 
exercise their freedom of speech, their right to free association, and their claim to freedom from 
involuntary servitude.  Unlike commodities, the labor market had protections under the law, 
labor leaders argued. 
                                                 
84
 Arthur Goldberg qtd. in “CIO Registers ‘Strong Protest’ to Attorney General Against Reported Plans to Place 
Unions Under Anti-Trust Laws,” CIO press release, October 6, 1954; CIO Washington Office Papers, Box 21, Fol. 
6; WSU.  
85
 See “Applications of Monopoly Laws to Unions Assailed by Goldberg,” CIO News, June 20 1955; Periodicals, 
WSU. 
86
 This argument was a staple of the postwar period.  For example, in Congressional testimony in 1950, Green 
argued, “[T]he only true ‘monopoly’ in the employment relationship occurs when there is no union organization,” 
when workers were not permitted to have a say in the terms of their own employment.  William Green, testimony 
before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on S. 2912, exact date in 1950 unclear; 
American Federation of Labor Papers, Series XI, File E, Box 16, Fol. 2; WHS. 
144 
 
Combatting the notion that unions were monopolies fed directly into the AFL-CIO’s 
second argument – that big labor and big business operated very differently.  Rather than simply 
endorsing the view that big labor was “a natural development, historically and economically,” 
paralleling the growth of big business and big government as a New York Post op-ed piece did, 
AFL and CIO leaders argued that labor was fundamentally different from big business.
87
  With 
no profit motive, the merged labor federation would benefit – and, indeed, represent – society as 
a whole.  As George Meany explained in a spring 1955 address to the Executive Board of the 
CIO’s Steelworkers, “How can there be too much power if it is for good and is used only for 
good?  You just can’t have too much power.”88 On the one hand, this challenged pluralism’s 
insistence that labor and business were equal negotiating partners. On the other hand, it also 
highlighted liberals’ view that labor’s fundamental goal was to raise the standard of living of 
union members and non-members alike, rather than to empower workers to fight for a new brand 
of democracy. 
Whereas NAM and the Chamber had defended excessive profits as helpful in 
jumpstarting the economy and low wages as a boon to consumers rewarded with lower prices, 
labor leaders attacked industry incentives as out-of-step with the public interest, and presented 
unions as representing the little guy against a powerful business lobby.  For years, the AFL 
newsmagazine highlighted the financial resources of major corporations as compared to 
organized labor.  For instance, in 1950, an article contended that General Motors’ receipts for 
1948 – though not its profits – were six times as much as the receipts of all labor unions 
combined.  The bottom line was that “the financial resources of organized labor do not begin to 
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approach their counterparts across the bargaining table,” the article argued.  In speeches, media 
appearances, and written material, labor leaders argued that this disparity was not only unfair; it 
also meant that the public – comprising both union members, who operated as citizens and as 
consumers, and non-union members – was not as well served legislatively and financially as 
business. 
Labor leaders pointed to the benefits that big labor created for the consuming public.  
This third argument emphasized two themes: first, the production of better quality goods and the 
establishment of a healthier economy with better workplace conditions, better skilled employees, 
and increased worker purchasing power; and second, the establishment of industrial peace 
through the merger as a boon to the public interest.  In making both of these arguments, AFL and 
CIO leaders drew on a longer tradition of postwar labor rhetoric and also reflected the pluralist 
discourse of the day.   
Labor argued against business’s accusation that union strength – presumably intensified 
by merger – drove up wages, which were then passed along to the consumer in the form of 
higher prices.  Certainly criticizing large corporate profits was one piece of this; high profit 
levels indicated that businesses had enough cushion to provide high wages and maintain good 
prices simultaneously.  But labor leaders in the early 1950s also criticized the assumption that 
union representation produced excessive wage hikes.  In a typical example of this line of 
argumentation, the AFL’s Assistant Economist explained that, in the goods market, the seller 
determined when he could extract the highest price for his goods and sold at that point, whereas 
in the labor market, the seller “literally has to make a sale in order to live.”  The idea of wage 
setting in labor was an illusion; the need to eat resulted in urgent, hurried negotiations in which 
the worker – even with union protections – exacted far less than might be possible if he waited 
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interminably to sell his labor.
89
 This argument also reflected industrial pluralism’s emphasis on 
unions as helping to usher in a higher quality of life for both workers (through wage increases) 
and for consumers (through lower prices and more readily available goods).  It also 
deemphasized work conditions as important in the modern world, instead concentrating on 
compensation and consumption.  Reflecting pluralist arguments, labor leaders argued that labor 
needed to be big enough to extract reasonable demands from big business as an equal negotiating 
partner.  As Reinhold Niebuhr put it in 1960, “[T]he equilibrium of power achieved between 
management and labor… is one of the instruments used by a highly technical society, with ever 
larger aggregates of power, to achieve that tolerable justice which has rendered Western 
Civilization immune to the Communist virus.”90 
AFL and CIO officials also presented the merger as producing industrial peace – the 
ultimate goal of industrial pluralism – benefitting the general public in a way that big business 
could not.  AFL-CIO spokesmen emphasized that the merged federation would not engage in 
collective bargaining agreements itself.  But by implementing a robust no-raiding agreement and 
potentially combining rival unions, the merged organization promised to reduce the potential for 
conflict on the shop floor.  The pact promised to improve collective bargaining, increase 
production, and reduce the number of strikes - a contention that the press also promoted.
91
  This 
view was given further legitimacy by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) chairman, 
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who praised the proposed dispute resolution machinery as “reasonable,” stating that it would 
“contribute to the peaceful disposition of representation disputes.”92 
Early successes in reducing inter-union conflict helped Meany and Reuther to make their 
case for the merger’s positive impact on industrial peace.  Meany and Reuther publicized this 
success internally and to the general public, even as they privately sparred over specifics.
93
  
Forty-one percent fewer cases were filed with the NLRB in the first year of the no-raiding 
agreement in comparison with the previous year.  And over 150,000 fewer union members were 
affected by raiding in the same period, a seventy-five percent drop (Table 3-2).  While these 
figures captured the actions of signatories and non-signatories of the no-raiding agreement alike, 
union leaders agreed that such a sizeable decline in raiding activity could not be attributed to 
chance alone.
94
  The end result was fewer disruptions to production. 
 Meany and Reuther argued that the merger would benefit the public in other ways, too.  
Meany and Reuther began merger negotiations in no small part to increase labor’s political clout, 
but they argued that this political influence – always designed to increase the nation’s quality of 
life as opposed to institute a radical reimagining of societal structures – was beneficial to the 
                                                 
92
 Guy Farmer, letter to Walter P. Reuther and George Meany, March 8, 1955; CIO Washington Office Papers, Box 
22, Fol. 1; WSU.  James P. Mitchell, Eisenhower’s Secretary of Labor, was similarly optimistic about the direction 
of AFL-CIO talks with regards to ending jurisdictional disputes, though he saw the negotiations as useful principally 
because they created efficiencies of another sort.  “The Government does note with great gratification this further 
evidence that the working men and women of America can solve their own problems without governmental 
interference or intervention,” he stated.  James P. Mitchell, qtd. in “94 Unions Accept No-Raiding Pact,” New York 
Times, June 10, 1954; CIO Washington Office Papers, Box 23, Fol. 4; WSU. 
93
 A key dispute between Meany and Reuther occurred in November 1954 over an accusation of raiding by three 
AFL-affiliated unions on the UAW-CIO organized North American Aviation Company.  None of the involved AFL 
unions were party to the no-raiding agreement.  At an unrelated meeting with the impartial arbitrator designated in 
the no-raiding agreement, Reuther brought up the North American Aviation Company dispute.  In a letter after the 
meeting, Meany described Reuther’s action as “completely improper.”  Meany continued, “I can not escape the 
conclusion but that you deliberately brought this matter up in the presence of Mr. Cole [the arbitrator] for the 
purpose of conveying to him an unfavorable impression of a lack of sincerity and good faith on the part of the 
American Federation of Labor.”  Thus, despite the ongoing talks on merger between the AFL and CIO, internal 
distrust and tension persisted.  See Letter from George Meany to Walter P. Reuther, November 17, 1954; Walter P. 
Reuther Papers, Box 298, Fol. 18; WSU. 
94
 George Brown, memorandum to George Meany, October 21, 1955; George Meany Papers, Box 62, Fol. 27; 
GMMA. 
148 
 
larger public.  Meany contended that “the Congress is dominated by big financial interests” and 
proposed an AFL-CIO lobbying interest as a counterweight to this influence.
95
  As in its 
argument about the value of opposing business in collective bargaining, labor leaders painted the 
merger as leveling the playing field in politics, rather than giving unions more power than other 
groups.  In an August 1955 debate, AFL Machinists’ President Al Hayes countered a NAM 
speaker’s accusation that the AFL-CIO merger would pave the way for organized labor to 
“control the Government,” by wryly insisting that “We in organized labor only hope we become 
as strong and influential as the NAM or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.”96 
 Furthermore, labor spokesmen insisted that their influence in politics only went so far, a 
viewpoint that the press generally validated.
97
  They countered claims that COPE would “deliver 
the labor vote” and coerce union members to support the AFL-CIO’s political agenda and 
endorsed candidates by turning to historical example.  The results of the previous presidential 
election in 1952, in which Eisenhower had won in a landslide, and the election of 1950, in which 
labor’s massive effort to defeat Senator Robert Taft had failed miserably, demonstrated that labor 
union endorsements only went so far.  In 1952, though Adlai Stevenson had received the backing 
of both the CIO and the AFL – the latter issuing its first official presidential endorsement since 
1924 – union members had not uniformly turned out to the polls, nor heeded the advice of their 
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labor representatives.
98
  Furthermore, not all unions within the AFL and CIO endorsed 
Stevenson.  The AFL’s Carpenters and Teamsters both went out for Eisenhower.  Labor leaders 
argued that such divisions would continue even within the merged labor federation; individual 
affiliates could make their own decisions about whom to support. 
AFL and CIO surrogates emphasized their interest in working within the existing party 
system.  Even so, division in the ranks of labor over the question of whether to pursue a third 
party fueled newspaper editorials and news reporting on the merger.
99
  Mike Quill, the 
charismatic and colorful head of the Transport Workers Union consistently voiced the concern 
that “we are tying ourselves too tight to the Democratic machine,” though he did not explicitly 
endorse the formation of a labor third party.
100
  Both AFL and CIO leaders argued strenuously 
against Quill’s assertion that organized labor was in the “vest pocket” of the Democratic Party.101  
In a closed-door session of the CIO Executive Board, Reuther bitterly claimed that Quill only 
insisted on candidates whose viewpoints exactly aligned with the CIO’s when he thought he 
could get press attention for his principled stand.  “Mike didn’t give a damn until he thought he 
could get some cheap headlines,” Reuther declared.102  But however often Meany and Reuther 
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offered denials that they aimed to form a labor party, lingering suspicion of the political 
influence of the new, merged organization, and the possibility of a third party did not disappear 
from the headlines.
103
 
Protesting that a merged AFL-CIO would have anemic political influence was a losing 
argument, especially because AFL and CIO officials both publicly stated a desire for more 
influence in the halls of Congress.  It was hard to turn back from a statement such as Meany 
made in the lead-up to the merger: “This is not going to be any milk toast movement…No little 
men with loud voices in either political or industrial life are going to turn us aside.”104  Far more 
compelling was the fifth argument that labor leaders used to defend the concept of big labor – 
that a federation enabled each union to retain autonomy. 
 
The Federation Structure 
Labor leaders and those sympathetic to unions used the planned structure of the AFL-
CIO to show that an umbrella organization could not be accused of controlling the constituent 
unions within the larger whole.   The AFL-CIO might include upward of 16 million people, but 
those people were not members of the AFL-CIO and the AFL-CIO exercised no control over the 
policies of the international unions that belonged to the larger whole, Meany, Reuther and other 
national leaders argued.  Though strong-arming by internationals and union federations on 
political issues was the norm, power in collective bargaining – the bread-and-butter of the labor 
movement – was significantly more decentralized.  The historian Nelson Lichtenstein has 
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characterized industrial relations during this period as “positively baroque” because of the 
enormous fragmentation of collective bargaining agreements and local union organizations – 
thousands of each in contrast to a dozen or two in other industrial nations.
105
  Furthermore, there 
were often very serious – and well publicized – disagreements between union leaders, further 
eroding the power that big labor could hold.
106
  Labor officials argued that the federation 
structure proved accusations of big labor false, even as Meany and Reuther tried to establish 
structures and constitutional safeguards to strengthen the federation’s authority over its 
constituent unions in certain areas. 
The autonomy of affiliated unions remained a sticking point throughout merger 
negotiations.  By 1955, the historical distinction between a decentralized AFL where union 
autonomy was privileged and a centralized CIO where national federation policy held sway was 
largely a thing of the past.  Both Reuther and Meany exercised strong control over their 
organizations, demonstrating their willingness to let errant organizations walk away from their 
federations.  Even so, the CIO’s top leaders remained fearful that the merged organization would 
be unable to crack down on corruption and institutionalized racial discrimination – both viewed 
as problems unique to the AFL – and to coordinate large-scale organization campaigns.  As 
negotiations with the AFL got underway, Reuther privately worried that the AFL leadership was 
“hid[ing] behind the word ‘autonomy’” and “looking the other way” by “permit[ing] racketeers 
and gangsters to have positions of power and leadership.”107  Reuther worried that the national 
leadership of the AFL-CIO would have its hands tied, diluting the impact of the enlarged labor 
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movement.  And for his part, Meany agreed.  “We have got to have some machinery to keep 
order in our own house,” Meany thundered in what even a U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
newsletter termed a “devastating rebuttal” to union leaders who desired little oversight from the 
merged organization.
108
  
Still, from the beginning, Reuther and, especially, Meany, understood that union heads 
needed to be reassured that the AFL-CIO would not exercise too much control over internal 
union affairs.  Such arguments also had the added benefit of reassuring the public of the modest 
ambitions of the merged organization.  In their very first public statement after hammering out a 
merger agreement, the AFL and CIO presidents stressed the document’s intent to “preserve the 
identity and integrity of the more than 140 trade unions now affiliated with the CIO and the 
AFL,” even as the statement confirmed that efforts to eliminate raiding and jurisdictional 
disputes would continue.  Meany and Reuther were clear that constituent unions of the merged 
AFL-CIO would “continue, under this plan, to conduct their own individual collective bargaining 
with employers, as in the past.”  Some unions operating in the same field might merge, but this 
would be voluntary, not compulsory.
109
 
The proposed AFL-CIO structure protected the right of unions to decide voluntarily 
whether to join the new federation and if to enter any of the AFL-CIO’s trade and industrial 
departments.
110
  Meany pointed out that the constitution allowed small unions to decide whether 
to join larger unions in the same jurisdiction.  This contention was further supported by the 
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literature and broadcasts released by the public relations departments of both the AFL and CIO.  
A UAW-CIO broadcast from early 1955 was typical.  In it, regular commentator Guy Nunn 
reported that “the key elements in the merger agreement are this: the integrity of the existing 
unions would be preserved,” with combination to eliminate jurisdictional overlap only in cases 
where consent was given.
111
 
Indeed, Reuther stated that the only areas in which the new labor federation was 
determined to centralize its operations were in regard to communism and corruption.  “This is 
essential to preserve the dignity and decency of the labor movement.  In everything else there is 
absolute autonomy,” he declared.112  The AFL-CIO constitution set up an ethical review board 
and took a firm rhetorical stance against corruption.  Still, there was only vague language on 
racketeering in the constitution.  It gave the convention of the new organization the power to 
expel – through a two-thirds majority vote – any union that undermined democratic principles.113  
But a similar expulsion process was possible in both the old AFL and CIO.  And on the issue of 
civil rights and racial discrimination, the constitution privileged autonomy above federation 
power.
114
   
In addition to constitutional provisions allowing for AFL-CIO intervention in a few 
particular areas of union affairs, the AFL-CIO exercised wider influence through a large 
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bureaucracy and treasury.
115
  As we will see, merged departments and more concentrated 
spending in legislative affairs and publicity allowed the AFL-CIO to assume greater visibility on 
the national stage.  AFL-CIO leaders may have used their federation status to argue against the 
idea that their organization constituted big labor or advocated for class struggle.  But the 
bureaucratic growth of the AFL-CIO demonstrated its strength as an organization.   
 
Conclusion 
Throughout late 1954 and much of 1955, AFL and CIO leaders fought over what name 
the merged labor federation should bear, garnering much speculation in the press.
116
  The name 
issue, characterized as “one of the minor but difficult obstacles to unity” by a U.S. Information 
Service pamphlet about the merger, was largely symbolic.
117
  If the new organization was called 
the AFL, it would signal that the larger organization was simply absorbing the CIO into its ranks, 
abandoning industrial unionism and Reuther’s unity “principles” along the way, CIO leaders 
argued.
 
 Such an organization would hardly be new.  For their part, AFL leaders rejected other 
combinations of the two labor federation names proposed by CIO officials – American Congress 
of Labor, chief among them – as indicating a merger on equal footing and as denying the long 
and rich history of the AFL by removing its name from the masthead.  So concerned were AFL 
and CIO leaders with preserving elements of their old federation names that they did not 
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consider any entirely new names.  Instead, the debate over names was largely a case of the two 
labor federations jockeying for a symbolic indication of their place in the new labor organization. 
In the end, the name “AFL-CIO” and the creation of an “Industrial Union Department” 
within that organization represented a compromise and satisfied few, despite Meany’s public 
characterization of it as “a very happy solution,” and Reuther’s comment that it “embodies the 
names of both organizations, on an equal basis.”118  “[I]t is too damn long – as bad as the name 
of my International Union,” commented Karl Feller, President of the International Union of 
United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America.
119
  The Worcester 
Evening Gazette characterized the name as “a cumbersome monstrosity.”120  To such complaints 
by members of the press, Meany used humor.  “You mean it will be tough for the headline 
writers on the Washington Post and Times-Herald?  Or the New York World-Telegram and 
Sun?” Meany joked.121  
But the name of the new organization was hardly a joke.  The question of what the 
merged labor federation ought to call itself represented a larger question about how the AFL-CIO 
intended to present itself to the public in the years after the merger.  And it indicated a 
transformation in how the labor movement conceived of itself.  Mid-nineteenth century trade 
associations like the Sons of Vulcan (named for the Roman god of fire and representing puddlers 
in the steel industry) or the Order of the Knights of St. Crispin (named for the patron saint of 
cobblers) took their naming cues from medieval guilds and referenced icons of old.  Such 
references to the past proudly highlighted skills of members and condemned the modern rise of 
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machinery that threatened the positions of those skilled workers.  In the late nineteenth century, 
many of these early labor organizations dissolved or were absorbed by more powerful 
combinations of skilled workers (the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers in the 
case of the Sons of Vulcan), capable of standing up to the large companies of the Gilded Age.  
The names of such organizations – frequently headed by Amalgamated – reflected a new notion 
of how skilled workers jointly operated within a new economy.   
The formation of the CIO in the 1930s introduced a new tendency in naming – the use of 
the term “united,” as well as the term “organizing committee,” to indicate that workers of all 
levels were involved, to show the breadth and strength, rather than the exclusivity of the venture, 
and to emphasize the distributed power and growth of affiliated unions. Thus, the United 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) received the first charter of the CIO, 
and the CIO sponsored the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC).   
The decision to hyphenate the AFL and CIO into a long collection of letters signifying 
their merger reflected the place of the labor movement in the mid-twentieth century and the 
influence of pluralism.  It was, first and foremost, an organization of members with siloed 
jurisdictions, an entity made strong because of the many members and unions it encapsulated, 
not because it portended a new way of thinking or because those many members and unions were 
especially committed to its vision.  The merger itself made the organization strong and the name 
reflected a pride in becoming Big Labor, an organization with a name akin to the names of 
merged corporations and law firms.  In naming itself the AFL-CIO, organized labor signaled its 
place in postwar America.  
Increasingly, the AFL-CIO was an organizational force rather than a movement.  Reuther 
continued to champion unions “not as a narrow economic pressure group, but as a labor 
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movement that understands its historic responsibilities and its social responsibilities and moral 
responsibilities.”122  But with merger talks in full swing, Henry Fleisher, the CIO’s public 
relations man worried that the long-term consequences of the public perception of “big labor” 
would convince the public otherwise.  “Public attitudes that labor is merely one tremendous 
pressure group, no more humane or humanitarian than big corporations like General Motors or 
U.S. Steel, can lead, quickly, to a deterioration of organized labor’s status in a society and 
resultant anti-labor legislation of a probably drastic sort,” Fleisher wrote.123   
This concern over the political consequences of public perception of labor as a special 
interest group, unresponsive to those who did not belong to unions, reached a crisis point during 
the racketeering hearings of the late 1950s.  The discourse of industrial pluralism that helped to 
reassure the public of the value of the AFL-CIO merger was premised on the notion that elite 
stewards could act responsibly on behalf of union members incapable of and disinterested in 
forming their own social democracy.  It was this optimism that labor could be made strong 
through bigness and bureaucratization that also proved to be one piece of labor’s undoing.          
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Chapter 4 
“Labor Still Has Clean Hands”: The AFL-CIO’s Public Relations War in the Era of 
Landrum-Griffin 
 
In December 1957, as the nationally televised and heavily reported Congressional 
investigations into union corruption concluded their first year, AFL-CIO leaders worried about 
the long-term consequences of the adverse publicity.  Newspapers and magazines, television and 
radio newscasts daily reported on the McClellan Committee’s revelations of bribes and violence, 
runaway spending and the Teamsters’ threats of muscling entire industries into submission.  
AFL-CIO President George Meany feared that just as Taft-Hartley provided no “solution” for the 
problems underlying the 1946 strike wave, the legislative proposals bandied about by labor’s 
opponents in Congress in 1957 would seek to use the cover of McClellan Committee-revealed 
abuses to implement “restrictive and punitive legislation.”  According to Meany, the problem 
was that, in 1957, “the trade union movement is confronted by a widespread, adverse publicity 
and the threat of hostile legislation as a consequence.”1  The AFL-CIO sought out a way to 
prevent this possibility.   
This fear of destructive legislation drove AFL-CIO leaders to confront corrupt 
individuals and unions aggressively between 1957 and 1959.  The AFL-CIO was largely 
unconcerned with the attitude of the public for its own sake.  But AFL-CIO staffers were deeply 
worried over the public’s influence in pushing potentially repressive labor legislation in response 
to the Congressional investigations.
2
  It was this fear and subsequent fury at the Teamsters and 
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other corrupt entities for “the black eye” that they had given labor in the public imagination that 
forced the AFL-CIO to take drastic steps to demonstrate its commitment to eliminating corrupt 
elements from its ranks and to voice concern about public attitudes toward organized labor.
3
  It 
was also the threat of being tarnished as corrupt that encouraged the AFL-CIO to reach out 
directly to the public to make the case that it was a responsible, honest body acting in the public 
interest.
4
  This strategy was no secret.  As the Congressional hearings began in February 1957, a 
New York Herald Tribune editorial explained that Meany’s determination to clean the ranks of 
labor was dictated by an understanding of the public as decisive in legislative battles.  Meany 
“knows that where right and wrong are concerned the public will exert an irresistible pressure for 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Chicago hurt certain organizing drives, it also sometimes helped to establish a basis for evaluating other unions.  
Corruption could help to distinguish the good from the bad unions in the eyes of potential members, and corruption 
was seen as involving employers and labor unions alike.  This could ultimately help increase membership in clean 
unions if the case was made effectively that only illegal behavior – and not all labor union activity – was corrupt. 
3
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Review: Labor on the Spot,” New York Times, March 31, 1957; UAW Public Relations Department – Clippings, 
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reform,” the Herald Tribune concluded.5   This fear of political repercussions fueled the AFL-
CIO’s publicity efforts during the McClellan hearings. 
Meany routinely issued denials that his organization planned to implement a formal 
public relations campaign to combat the images of corruption conjured daily in Congress’ 
racketeering committee hearings.
6
  The Public Relations Department’s response to the McClellan 
Committee investigations was largely limited to the production of pamphlets and the voices of 
radio and television commentators already sponsored by the AFL-CIO.  But the actions taken 
and rhetoric used by the AFL-CIO to expel corrupt unions and leaders, to develop new 
infrastructure to maintain ethical behavior, to support moderate labor legislation, and to publicize 
the ways in which unions acted for the general good constituted a public relations effort, in and 
of themselves.  Far from being the mere “public relations window dressing” that the media 
sometimes imagined, the varied AFL-CIO responses to allegations of unethical behavior 
represented the culmination of a movement toward engagement with the public that emphasized 
politics above collective bargaining or organizing.
7
  Between 1957 and 1959, Meany and his 
staff explicitly reached out to the public, formalizing previously-made arguments about 
organized labor’s economic, social and political value to the nation as a whole, and connecting 
these to organized labor’s larger legislative mission.   
In this chapter, I argue that the publicly unfolding crisis caused by the McClellan 
hearings forced the AFL-CIO to view public relations not as a goal in itself, or even as 
something that could be orchestrated by a single department, but rather, as a means to advancing 
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a primary mission of the organization – the achievement of a progressive legislative agenda.  The 
first section of this chapter presents the legislative and political context in which the AFL-CIO 
mounted its response to charges of corruption.  The second section examines how the intensive 
media coverage of the McClellan hearings presented a crisis within an AFL-CIO leadership that 
recognized the importance of public opinion in shaping legislative outcomes.  The third section 
explores how the AFL-CIO leadership responded to that threat, bypassing its own public 
relations department as the central decision-maker in formulating a strategy for developing a 
public response to allegations of corruption, and using a variety of media and forms to reach the 
public.  And the fourth section investigates the arguments that the AFL-CIO used to counteract 
media images of corrupt unions during the McClellan hearings, and to forestall the possibility of 
anti-labor legislation.  These messages promoting the honesty of the overwhelming majority of 
union leaders, the AFL-CIO’s advocacy of the public interest, and labor’s willingness to embrace 
some – but not all – legislative reform had implications for the future of labor’s political 
involvement and public relations strategy.  The structure and form of the AFL-CIO’s outreach to 
the public during the McClellan hearings was not a departure from the past, but it marked an 
intensification of unions’ efforts to embrace the public ally in advancing a political agenda.  It 
also marked a key moment in unions’ steady movement from clout in collective bargaining to 
clout in political organizing. 
 
The Legislative Context 
The Senate’s Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management under 
the leadership of Senator John McClellan (D-AR) and staff chief counsel Robert F. Kennedy 
began its investigations on February 1, 1957 and released its final report in March 1960.  The 
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Committee had an equal number of Democrats and Republicans, but northern Democrats 
routinely criticized Kennedy’s interrogations of witnesses as promoting the impression that all of 
labor was suspect, as well as McClellan’s sensationalist rendering of hearings conducted behind 
closed doors.  Indeed, Pat McNamara, the Democratic Senator from Michigan, himself a former 
union member and a political ally of the AFL-CIO, resigned from the Committee in 1958 in 
protest of the Committee’s handling of labor investigations and failure to investigate business to 
any considerable degree.   
The McClellan Committee began its investigations by playing damning recorded tapes of 
discussions of illegal activity between Teamsters’ official Jimmy Hoffa and mobsters.  Dave 
Beck, the Teamsters President testified in March 1957, repeatedly pleading the Fifth Amendment 
and implicitly drawing attention to the AFL-CIO’s poor oversight of his organization.  Live 
television coverage of the Beck’s testimony, coupled with closed door hearings for the UAW and 
other less-sensationalist, more-politically motivated investigations gave wide public exposure to 
union abuses, fueling the impression that all unions were corrupt.  Kennedy’s badgering of 
witnesses without careful attention to the legal details of the case led some commentators to 
compare the episode to Joseph McCarthy’s (himself a member of the Committee until his death 
in May 1957) politically motivated investigations of communists half a decade earlier.  But the 
investigations also showed that a number of unions – most notably the Teamsters, the Bakery 
Workers, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union – engaged in corrupt behavior that extended 
to the highest levels of their respective organizations. 
In 1958 and 1959, the McClellan Committee changed its tack.  The ultra-conservative 
Arizona Republican Barry Goldwater set the tone as the Committee began to concentrate on 
union political activity and handling of strikes, implicitly condemning these legal union 
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functions as tainted by corruption.
8
  In addition to this investigation into political activity, the 
Committee looked into mobsters’ connections with a handful of unions, leaving the impression 
that union connections to organized crime were routine, and that business bore no responsibility 
for such abuses.  This shift was particularly true in the Committee’s focus on the UAW’s 
handling of the ongoing and violent Kohler strike in early 1958 and the fall of 1959.   
Neither investigation revealed high-level abuse, though the decentralized governance 
model of the Autoworkers (in contrast to other large unions, like the Steelworkers) allowed 
abuses in individual locals.  Despite the lack of evidence that the Autoworkers were engaged in 
systematic corruption, the appearance of UAW officials before the Committee cast a cloud of 
suspicion over the UAW in the public arena.  The UAW hearings also had the effect of 
correlating union involvement in politics with illegal behavior, reinforcing depictions of unions 
as out-of-step with the viewpoints of their members, and as large special interest groups 
requiring severe governmental regulations, in contrast to businesses – like Kohler – that were 
never investigated at all.   
The political nature of the hearings, and the ways in which they bruised even clean 
unions was shown in a 1959 cartoon in the politically idiosyncratic Detroit News (Figure 4-1).
9
  
It depicted a badminton game between Committee Democrats and Republicans in which the 
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UAW hearings were the birdie.  The cartoon argued that both Democrats and Republicans on the 
Committee tried to use the UAW hearings to show their commitment to eliminating labor abuses, 
with the UAW and responsible unionism the victim in the public eye.  But this cartoon was the 
exception.  The mainstream press generally offered little distinction between legitimate but 
potentially problematic union activity like that undertaken by the UAW, and criminal activity by 
the likes of the Teamsters.  Officials from both corrupt and clean unions were subjected to 
intense questioning before a Congressional investigatory committee on national television.  
Many television viewers made little distinction between corrupt leaders like Beck and clean 
leaders like the UAW President Walter Reuther. 
 The McClellan revelations spurred Congressional legislative action.  In the spring of 
1957, Congressmen introduced various bills to place unions under antitrust regulations, but these 
did not go very far.  In the late spring of 1958, a bill to curtail abuses in welfare and pensions 
passed the Senate with no votes opposed; a variation on this bill was implemented in July of 
1958.  In June 1958, the Kennedy-Ives bill to impose more reporting requirements on unions 
passed the Senate with only one dissenting vote.  But Kennedy-Ives failed after an unsuccessful 
attempt to pass the legislation without a committee hearing.  Time reported that neither 
Democrats nor Republicans liked the bill; the former group believed it to be too harsh, while the 
latter felt it was not harsh enough.  In the end, the magazine believed that “the loser” was “the 
U.S.”10  Most commentators saw the failure of Kennedy-Ives as a lost opportunity to address the 
criminal behavior revealed by the McClellan Committee.
11
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 John F. Kennedy introduced a new bill, Kennedy-Ervin, in January 1959, but 
Republicans attached amendments to the legislation that caused division within the Democratic-
labor coalition, even as these additions led to passage of the bill in the Senate.  Meanwhile, the 
Eisenhower-backed Landrum-Griffin bill made its way through the House of Representatives.  
That bill imposed new financial reporting requirements on labor unions, and set new guidelines 
regarding secondary boycotts and organizing – the former specifically designed to counteract a 
tactic used by the Teamsters as an organizing tool.  However, in the process of regulating basic 
union functions as opposed to cracking down on previously illegal activities, Landrum-Griffin 
had the effect of marking all union activity appear criminal.   
Reconciliation between the Senate’s Kennedy-Ervin bill and the House’s Landrum-
Griffin bill resulted in a slightly altered version of Landrum-Griffin as the final version.  
Eisenhower signed the bill in September 1959, establishing a clear legislative victory for the 
McClellan Committee and a clear end to the bulk of the Committee’s activity.  
This seeming criminalization of normal union behaviors through the Committee’s 
investigation of the UAW, and Landrum-Griffin’s regulation of strikes and political spending 
also drove the introduction of right-to-work legislation, including Goldwater’s introduction of a 
national bill in January 1958.  Such proposals did not get far, and an onslaught of state right-to-
work proposals in 1958 generated only one victory (in Kansas) for right-to-work supporters.  But 
these efforts diverted union resources toward fending off such legislative attacks, and established 
the justifications and stage for more right-to-work drives in the years to come.   
                                                                                                                                                             
interest.”  But the close connection between Kennedy and organized labor gave the impression that organized labor 
was willing to support moderate reforms only as a way to stave off more monumental, punitive regulations.  See 
John F. Kennedy, transcript, Meet the Press, NBC-TV, November 9, 1958; Box 12, Fol. 13, UAW Political Action 
and Citizenship Department – Roy Reuther Papers; WSU. 
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The AFL-CIO responded to the negative spotlight cast on both clean and corrupt 
elements of organized labor by developing new and enforcing already-existing machinery for 
eliminating corruption among its affiliated unions.   Drawing on AFL-CIO constitutional 
language prohibiting racketeering and permitting limited interventions into the autonomy of its 
member unions, the labor federation approved a Code of Ethical Practices in February 1957 and 
a code of ethical practices for the management of union funds in May of the same year.  A 
January 1957 Executive Council decision to expel union officials pleading the Fifth Amendment 
for personal protection or to avoid legitimate investigation by authorities further empowered the 
Council.   
In addition, individual unions adopted their own ethical codes of conduct, and the 
Industrial Union Department (IUD - the remnant of the generally clean CIO), also headed by 
Reuther, developed procedures for eliminating abuses.  For its part, Reuther’s UAW established 
a public review board of respected citizens to judge possible violations of the union’s ethical 
code in binding decisions in 1957.  At its May 1957 meeting, the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council 
began the process of removing affiliates whose leaders had transgressed the organization’s ethics 
code.  The fact that the Executive Board could not mandate new leadership but, instead, had to 
hope that members would elect new officials on their own through clean elections demonstrated 
the inadequacy of the AFL-CIO’s procedures for policing unions.   
It also mirrored the limited choices possessed by the national CIO leadership when it 
tried to eliminate communists from its ranks nearly a decade earlier.  In both cases, union 
democracy – in which members could not be counted upon to reelect non-communist or non-
corrupt leaders – represented a problem for the national federation.  Both cases illustrated a 
tension and distance between labor’s growing bureaucracy in Washington and the wishes of its 
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rank-and-file – a tension that would explode into hostility and significantly weaken the labor 
movement in the decades to come. 
In December 1957, the only credible action that the AFL-CIO could mount to stave off 
corruption in its ranks was to expel the Bakery Workers, the Laundry Workers, the Teamsters, 
and their leaders.
12
  In the summer of 1958, the Executive Council moved to isolate the 
Teamsters further by requiring its affiliates to end their relationship with the union.  Neither 
decision was taken lightly; without Meany’s behind-the-scenes arm-twisting of reluctant Council 
and convention members, the AFL-CIO would likely not have taken such decisive action, 
eliminating a significant stream of revenue and reducing AFL-CIO influence in important 
sectors. 
Meany publicly insisted that this host of anti-corruption measures was based on the fact 
that racketeering was wrong, and was not driven by the possibility of eroding public opinion 
during the hearings.
13
  On its surface, this was true.  The AFL-CIO was scarcely a year old when 
Congressional hearings began, and Meany was still struggling to keep elements of the old and 
new federations from warring with one another in the new organization.  He likely envisioned a 
full cleanup of the organization after proving his effectiveness to all parties, but was forced to act 
sooner by the McClellan Committee hearings.  The AFL-CIO’s 1957 convention proceedings 
emphasized that investigations of four unions had already begun before the McClellan hearings 
opened, though it did not begin to examine the mighty Teamsters union until Beck became a 
target of the Congressional inquiry.
14
  But the firestorm created by the hearings demanded that 
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Meany and the AFL-CIO mount a more robust public response to what was rapidly becoming a 
public relations crisis for organized labor.  Meany and his colleagues worried that this crisis 
would result in legislation from which unions would never recover. 
 
The Crisis of the McClellan Revelations 
The McClellan hearings threatened labor’s progressive legislative agenda very directly, 
precisely because they were so visible.  That legislative agenda encapsulated a progressive 
economic and social agenda that envisioned a prominent role for the federal government in 
domestic issues, economic policy and foreign affairs.  The policies that the AFL-CIO promoted 
did not always concern union members directly.  The labor organization agitated for a number of 
labor-related policies including a higher minimum wage, greater workplace protections, and a 
loosening of Taft-Hartley’s rules on organizing.  Indeed, amending Taft-Hartley became the 
major legislative concern of the AFL-CIO in the 1950s, a fact that made corruption hearings 
particularly damaging; charges of racketeering put the AFL-CIO on the defensive and seemed to 
suggest that Taft-Hartley did not go far enough.  But the AFL-CIO’s legislative affairs office was 
not just concerned with labor and economic issues.  It also lobbied for government-sponsored 
health care, rent control and an end to racial segregation.  In addition, the AFL-CIO stood firmly 
behind the cold war policies of the day, even as it argued for protection of free speech and 
government transparency.  The McClellan hearings threatened labor’s ability to lobby for this 
progressive agenda effectively. 
Between 1957 and 1959, the unfolding drama of the McClellan committee hearings 
captivated the nation, even as some commentators criticized the committee’s handling of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Allied Industrial Workers, the Distillery Workers, the Laundry Workers, and the Bakery and Confectionary 
Workers.  The investigation of the United Textile Workers and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
commenced after the McClellan hearings had already begun. 
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witnesses.  There was a new, dramatic revelation nearly every week.  The press traced the fall of 
Beck from a man Life described as “Seattle’s most distinguished citizen”  in 195415 to a target of 
Senatorial chastisement for demonstrating “utter and flagrant contempt” for Congress through 
his repeated invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
16
  Commentators gasped at how the head of the 
Bakers’ Union sold out his own membership by negotiating contracts with substandard wages in 
exchange for kickbacks from business associates.
17
  And the public expressed shock at the 
routine extortion of “protection money” from small businessmen by New York union gangster 
Johnny Dio, as evidenced by obscenity-laden recordings played before the Committee.
18
   
From the beginning, these revelations stunned even veteran reporters and fed the 
impression that unions were either unwilling or unable to police themselves.  Fewer than two 
months into the investigations, the Muncie Star reported that, “The AFL-CIO leaders can be 
honestly worried at the prospect of strangling anti-union legislation,” and editorialized that 
“some [legal controls] are necessary.”19  The St. Petersburg Times concurred, calling upon “big 
and statesmanlike leaders of labor” to “cooperate with Congress in drafting remedial legislation” 
to protect union democracy and establish strict disclosure requirements for union funds.
20
  And 
the Morristown Record warned that “the public has just about had it.”21  The implication was 
clear: If responsible labor leaders did not step in to prevent abuses from within their ranks, 
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Congress would have to do the job for them.  The Record commended the UAW’s establishment 
of a public review board in the spring of 1957 as a step in the right direction.  “Labor is on the 
defensive and the best defense is an offense,” the paper commented.  But Business Week’s 
reporters believed that the timing of the announcement was “revealing,” occurring “right at the 
height of the McClellan committee’s revelations of Teamsters scandals.”22   
Other papers were harsher in their calls for immediate governmental action based on 
public demand.  The Chicago American argued that the AFL-CIO Council “leaped too late” in 
suspending the Teamsters in October 1957, pursuing such action only when the movement was 
already under fire.
23
  “It is to Congress, not to the AFL-CIO, that the public is looking for action 
to bring the operations of labor union bosses under the control of law,” the American argued.  A 
1959 cartoon for the Chicago Tribune was one among many claiming that AFL-CIO leaders 
were uninterested in pursuing real legislative reform (Figure 4-2).
24
  In it, the labor lobby of 
Reuther and Meany – dressed as Indians – attempt to kill an unsuspecting little girl representing 
minor legislation.  Editorialists like Ed Holland, the Tribune’s cartoonist, routinely depicted 
labor as unwilling to reform itself. 
Even if they did not think that higher-ups in the AFL-CIO could be effective in 
eliminating union corruption, most newspapers distinguished between the mainstream unionism 
represented by AFL-CIO officers and the corrupt outliers hauled before the McClellan 
committee, subpoenaed, arrested and ultimately convicted for their egregious behavior.  In 
November 1957, Fortune praised Meany for recognizing that the “rewards of leadership are 
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found not in the salary but in the calling,” in contrast to the corrupt leaders hauled before the 
McClellan committee.
25
  After the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council voted 25-4 to forgo an 
$85,000-a-month per capita tax contribution by suspending the Teamsters, Time praised Meany’s 
“tough hand” in spearheading the vote.26  Such coverage allowed that Meany and others at the 
AFL-CIO’s national office had the public interest and not a desire for immediate gain at heart.  
“[A] powerful majority had shown that the AFL-CIO would risk its own future to protect unions 
from creeping corruption,” Time concluded.   
Smaller news sources promoted a similar image of the AFL-CIO as a force for good, and 
Meany as a powerful, but benevolent labor statesman, in contrast to some other actors within the 
ranks of organized labor.  A November 1958 editorial appearing in the Fort Wayne News-
Sentinel was typical.  The piece lauded Meany’s “high concept of patriotism and personal 
honesty,” but it wondered if those qualities would be enough to counteract the effect that Hoffa 
and Beck’s tarnished reputations had on the public’s perception of organized labor.27  There were 
some outliers, especially among newspapers with highly conservative editorial pages and those 
from the Deep South.  Such publications condemned all unions as corrupt or led by dangerous 
socialists, often linking anti-civil rights, pro-states’ rights, and pro-right-to-work positions 
together.  But the vast majority of news publications viewed the leadership of the IBT, the 
Bakery Workers, the ILA, the Carpenters and other unions that Congressional hearings revealed 
as harboring corrupt elements, as out of the mainstream. 
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Henry Fleisher, the head of the AFL-CIO’s Public Relations Department, believed that 
this favorable coverage of his organization was pervasive.  Fleisher, a college-educated Army 
and Office of Strategic Services veteran from World War II and the former Director of Publicity 
for the CIO later went on to found his own public relations firm, a group that became Maurer, 
Fleisher, Zon and Anderson. With his education, lack of blue-collar work experience, and 
connections in the press and public relations worlds, Fleisher represented a novel brand of labor 
bureaucrat and spearheaded a new emphasis on marketing labor to the public.
28
 In the fall of 
1957, Fleisher used newspaper editorials as a proxy for public opinion.  He reported, 
“Paradoxical as it may seem, the AFL-CIO stands higher and stronger in public esteem today 
than ever before,” as a result of its “prompt and forthright stand against wrongdoing.”29  Many 
news outlets did acknowledge the good intentions of the national AFL-CIO’s office in 
eliminating corruption.  But Fleisher’s insistence that the McClellan Committee revelations had 
little impact on public perception of the AFL-CIO revealed the extent to which the Public 
Relations Department was marginalized in formulating policy during the crisis caused by 
credible charges of corruption in labor unions.  For however favorable editorialists were in their 
coverage of Meany and the AFL-CIO, most national leaders worried that the labor federation’s 
reputation would be compromised – even if only by association – by the unfolding drama in 
Washington. 
The media’s belief in the good intentions of AFL-CIO leaders did not mean that 
editorialists believed that the responsible leadership of the AFL-CIO could handle the enormous 
problem of corruption on its own – or even that it would follow-through on its promised reforms.  
At the beginning of the hearings, the Bridgeport Post recalled that Reuther’s declaration that 
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“American labor had…better get the stiffest broom and brush it can find” in order to “take on the 
job of cleaning its own house from top to bottom,” sounded very much like Beck’s three-year-
old statement that he would “crucify anyone guilty of racketeering.”30  The editorial called on 
labor leaders to “do more acting on this grave matter, and less shouting.”   
The New York Times praised the UAW’s decision to set up a public review board as an 
internal mechanism for evaluating potential abuses, but it also had reservations about the board’s 
ability to prevent abuse.
31
  “[T]o punish the culprits is not guarantee against future misdeeds,” 
the Times editorialized.  The Rochester Times Union raised similar concerns about the capacity 
of AFL-CIO unions to police themselves.
32
  “Cleaning up their own house is essential…But the 
question remains whether that will or can go far enough to safeguard the public interest,” the 
paper cautioned.   
The media generally recognized AFL-CIO leaders as well-intentioned labor statesmen 
desirous of cleaning house, but questioned their ability to do so effectively, without government 
intervention.  A 1958 Philadelphia Bulletin cartoon was typical of this viewpoint (Figure 4-3).
33
  
It showed a fancy black car labeled “labor racketeers” hightailing it out of town - an image that 
was often used in cartoons depicting labor racketeers, especially because the corrupt Teamsters 
controlled much of the trucking industry in the United States.
34
  In the Bulletin cartoon, a figure 
representing “reputable organized labor” was left in its dust, the Senate probe in its pocket and 
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its hat knocked to the ground by the force of the racketeers’ exit.  The cartoon ran under the 
headline, “Cleanup Needed.” 
Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time as media outlets questioned the AFL-CIO’s 
effectiveness in combating corruption, they also drew a direct link between labor’s turn toward 
national-scale bureaucracy and the spectacles arising from the McClellan Committee hearings.  
Media commentators viewed the AFL-CIO as both impotent to change the behavior of its 
decentralized member unions, and as an example of the unparalleled strength that unions had 
acquired in the decades since the passage of the Wagner Act.  Critics argued organized labor’s 
political and economic clout made abuse easier.  In a televised press conference in the fall of 
1957, the poet Carl Sandberg said, “When I was young, there used to be in every town a two-
story building and the words upon it said ‘Labor Temple.’  Now there are offices and statistics.”  
Sandberg explained that the temple of old had morphed into a palace.  This allowed labor leaders 
to forget that they should be in service to union members, not themselves.
35
   
“Nothing could look less than an under dog than today’s big union” lamented the Detroit 
Free Press in 1959.
36
 Newspaper editorial boards recorded similar thoughts from the beginning 
of the hearings.  According to the Boston Globe, the bottom line was that “big labor has become 
big business.”37  The Newark News concurred.  “[B]igness can be a defect of labor no less than 
of corporate interests,” the News commented in explaining the union abuses uncovered by 
Congress and the need for legislation.
38
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Editorial cartoons routinely used the image of an octopus to depict organized labor, 
asserting that unions behaved as monopoly businesses.  Since the early twentieth century, 
commentators had used the octopus as a stand-in for railroads and other monopoly businesses, 
most famously in Frank Norris’ 1901 novel.39  The use of the octopus to represent organized 
labor rather than big business showed the success of American Plan backers in promoting the 
idea of a “labor trust.” 40   
A 1959 cartoon in the Los Angeles Times demonstrated the reach of “Hoffa’s tentacles” 
(Figure 4-4).
41
  The image showed the strangulation capabilities of labor; the “octopus” had the 
potential to shut down entire industries without regard for the wishes of the rank-and-file.  
Editorialists at the Chicago American expressed similar alarms over Hoffa’s calls for a general 
strike in reaction to any Congressional action in the spring of 1959.  They urged Congress to 
“apply anti-trust laws to unions, and do it fast.”  In their minds, only Congress – not the AFL-
CIO – could strip Hoffa of his “vast power” that posed “a clear danger to the United States.”42          
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The St. Petersburg Times saw an even greater threat in “our era of Bigness – Big Labor, 
Big Business, Big Government” – all on equal footing.43  The newspaper reported that this type 
of “perversion of power, corrupt and immoral, led to Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in 
Germany.”  The paper warned that “the survival of our society” depended on big special interests 
recognizing the rights of their individual constituents – workers, customers and citizens.   
Labor supporters protested that these media attacks were misguided at best, hypocritical 
and cynical at worst.  In the summer of 1957, John Dunlop, the Harvard labor economist 
responded to media criticisms that unions had become too big, behaved like businesses, and used 
their bureaucracies to agitate for legislation and candidates outside of a strict collective 
bargaining mission.
44
  On one hand, “the community expects labor to be economic celibates,” 
Dunlop wrote.  On the other, the press praised unions that “most fully adopted the latest types of 
business techniques,” including increased bureaucracy.  “The American community having 
created a labor movement in its own image now seems to be finding fault with the design,” 
Dunlop concluded.  Dunlop defended the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Code as reflecting the 
values of public service, rather than a commitment to union members alone.  For labor observers 
such as Dunlop, the media’s insistence that unions be free of the context that conceived and 
sustained them was unrealistic.    
 In some ways, though, accusations that the structure of big labor allowed racketeers to 
run amuck derived from a weakness in the AFL-CIO’s public relations strategy during the 
merger, as well as a larger rethinking of industrial pluralism following the recession of 1957-58. 
When the AFL and CIO combined their organizations in 1955, labor leaders promoted big labor 
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as strong enough to police its member unions on matters like racketeering, but also loose enough 
of a federation so as not to constitute a monopoly. With the McClellan Committee hearings, it 
became clear that both assertions could not simultaneously be true, short of the AFL-CIO’s 
ability to expel unions that did not comply with the AFL-CIO constitution. Thus, the AFL-CIO 
was revealed as possessing none of the positive powers associated with big labor at the same 
time as it was slammed in the press for all of the negative connotations. The merger was a lost 
opportunity for the AFL-CIO to offer a different vision of its power, rather than to defend its 
status as big labor. 
Instead, criticisms of labor as too big, too bureaucratic, and too much like business 
persisted as revelations of corruption piled up.  This was particularly true as the McClellan 
Committee’s investigations shifted from scrutiny of the violent and illegal activities of the 
Teamsters to the legally-sanctioned union-related programs of the UAW during the Kohler 
strike, or the political contributions made by AFL-CIO-affiliated unions to Democratic 
candidates.  With this shift in the Committee’s emphasis after 1957, it became more difficult for 
the AFL-CIO to frame the rogue activities of Dave Beck or Jimmy Hoffa as outliers.  The shift in 
committee emphasis forced the AFL-CIO to defend its size as a virtue in eliminating corruption, 
and compelled the organization to defend the everyday activities of its member unions – 
organizing, political involvement, and strikes – as benefitting the public, not criminal activities 
deserving of regulation. 
AFL-CIO leaders were deeply concerned that media portrayals of organized labor – and 
the McClellan hearings themselves – could produce a public backlash, giving impetus for 
conservative lawmakers to push both national legislation that restricted labor’s organizing 
abilities and political reach and so-called “right-to-work” legislation at the state level.  The 
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hearings threatened the AFL-CIO’s push to amend or repeal Taft-Hartley and placed the AFL-
CIO on the defensive.  At the 1957 AFL-CIO convention, Meany admitted, “Sometimes I think 
some of these fellows [in the press] get great enjoyment out of playing this up to make us look 
bad.”45  Though he was careful to say that he supported the investigations, Meany routinely 
criticized the Committee’s interim reports as “disgraceful example[s] of the use of 
sensationalism in an attempt to smear the labor movement.”46  In Meany’s view, McClellan’s 
emphasis on wrongdoing in unions threatened to tarnish the entire movement.  A 1957 AFL-CIO 
resolution made this point by questioning the Committee’s “objectivity and fairness.” 47    
AFL-CIO leaders claimed that the McClellan Committee’s procedures benefitted labor’s 
critics, by allowing committee members to harangue witnesses and televising descriptions of 
particularly egregious abuses while holding closed hearings for testimony by clean labor’s 
champions.  Meany protested that business was equally responsible for abuses.  He also claimed 
that the Committee refused to sufficiently recognize the safeguards that the AFL-CIO had 
voluntarily put into place to protect the public from corruption, at considerable financial and 
emotional cost to the organization.  For example, the 64-page report released in September 1957 
by the AFL-CIO’s Ethical Practices Committee, detailing corruption in the Teamsters, rivaled 
the McClellan Committee’s report for its condemnation of Hoffa’s associates’ convictions for 
“everything from highway robbery to murder.”48  Meany worried that, without recognition that 
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the AFL-CIO was as committed as McClellan Committee members to exposing and eliminating 
these instances of corruption, the public would be convinced that “restrictive labor legislation” 
was needed, punishing the entirety of the labor movement for the abuses of a small minority.   
For similar reasons, representatives of “clean” labor were equally critical of the press’s 
coverage of the proceedings.  After the passage of Landrum-Griffin, Meany blamed the media’s 
effort “to whip up public hysteria for punitive action against unions,” condemning it alongside 
the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the Chamber of Commerce.
49
  Union 
leaders complained that only corrupt unions received attention from the press.
50
  On the AFL-
CIO-sponsored radio series, “Labor Answers Your Questions,” Meany protested that the fact that 
most union welfare funds were well-run “doesn’t make news.”  “Let one be improperly 
conducted and have some scandal, and of course, it makes news,” Meany continued.51  On the 
same radio program, Albert Hayes, the president of the Machinists Union and the head of the 
AFL-CIO’s Ethical Practices Committee made a similar point in the summer of 1957.52  
Speaking on behalf of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Hayes revealed that “the investigation 
thus far has been of material assistance to us,” but expressed concern about the negative publicity 
generated by the reporting of the hearings in the press.  Hayes accused the media of having 
“misled…the public who have no other source of knowledge to believe that most of the trade-
union movement is corrupt.”   
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Labor’s allies made similar claims about the media’s unbalanced and sensationalist 
rendering of the committee hearings.  In a speech before journalism students at Wayne State 
University, Senator McNamara disparaged newspapers for granting “relatively immaterial 
matter” top billing, giving the impression that all unions were corrupt.53  The liberal press 
sometimes also supported such contentions of media bias in editorial comments.  After Beck was 
hauled before the McClellan Committee, the New York Post charged that the mainstream media 
was hypocritical in condemning Beck’s behavior.54  “For years he has been immortalized in 
numerous conservative journals as the very model of the ‘new’ labor statesmen… It is time for a 
lot of word-swallowing,” the Post told its readers.   
Labor leaders and their allies were deeply concerned about the media portrait of the 
McClellan Committee hearings because they believed that the public could be swayed by such 
portrayals.  Even before hearings began in early 1957, the UAW released its Board’s resolution 
against corrupt activity in labor unions to the press.  In a letter to Meany, Reuther explained that 
his union decided to make the resolution public because the Board “was greatly concerned and 
disturbed by the extremely unfavorable stories appearing in the newspapers which the Board felt 
was doing great damage to the good name of the whole labor movement.”55  This fear among 
labor leaders that the public would adopt negative attitudes toward unions because of the adverse 
publicity surrounding the Congressional hearings continued for the duration of the proceedings.  
AFL-CIO officials continually worried that “the sins of the few” would jeopardize 
opinions of the entirety of the labor movement, bringing down public opinion rates for organized 
labor that, at the start of 1957, matched the highest levels ever recorded since polling began in 
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1936.
56
  Though union approval rates had slipped by 10 percentage points from their January 
levels by August and September 1957, it is noteworthy that they were not even lower, given all 
the negative publicity organized labor had received in the intervening months.  Public approval 
of unions hovered at this level of around 65 percent through 1958, with disapproval rates 
creeping slowly upwards as the McClellan proceedings continued.  Approval rates would recover 
by August 1959 at 73 percent as the passage of labor reform seemed assured in the form of 
Landrum-Griffin.  Favorable views of unions never again reached their January 1957 levels. 
Commentators and union officials attributed the relatively high poll numbers to George 
Meany’s responsible leadership of the AFL-CIO, the legitimacy extended to Meany through his 
associations with President Eisenhower and others, and the distaste that Meany expressed 
publicly toward corrupt elements within the American labor movement.  Though the AFL-CIO 
Executive Council never endorsed Eisenhower, Meany forged a close personal relationship with 
the President, and the press reported on this relationship.  Reflecting on Eisenhower’s tenure 
fifteen years later, Meany’s attitude was shaped by his positive personal associations with the 
General.  “I think you get in down deep enough on a personal basis, he was a pretty liberal 
guy…I think considering all the circumstances, he made a pretty good President,” Meany told a 
biographer.
57
   
Meany was also helped by his public distance from Beck, Hoffa and other labor 
racketeers.  Hoffa played his part in highlighting the contrast between responsible and corrupt 
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labor unions by publicly assailing Meany, telling Life that “Meany’s forgotten he’s a labor man.  
But what the hell, he’s never conducted a strike in his life.”58  And for his part, Meany received 
press and public accolades for remaining firm in disallowing the Teamsters from reentering the 
AFL-CIO, so long as Hoffa remained President.  “Jimmy Hoffa is not a trade unionist.  He has 
his roots somewhere else.  And frankly, we can’t afford him.  He’s too rich for our blood,” 
Meany contended.
59
  Such public exchanges helped establish the AFL-CIO leadership as 
responsible, perhaps accounting for the relatively high public approval rates for organized labor 
throughout the McClellan Committee hearings. 
Still, Meany and his staff continued to worry about public opinion.  Meany later recalled, 
“And, then, very, very frankly, we were concerned on the question of public opinion—what the 
public might think of us if this corruption were to become some sort of a creeping paralysis 
fastening itself on the trade union movement.”60  Labor leaders did not view favorable public 
opinion as a goal in and of itself, but rather as an essential tool in staving off repressive labor 
legislation. As Meany put it to Beck in Executive Council proceedings against the Teamsters’ 
leader, “If the AFL-CIO follows the proposal of your organization and equivocates on this 
question [of whether to expel union officials who invoked the Fifth Amendment], we will get 
legislation that will hurt every one of our members and hurt every one of our unions.”61  Meany 
continued, “The big question is what we must do at this particular point from the standpoint of 
public relations.”62  Throughout the proceedings, AFL-CIO officials walked a fine line in 
supporting “some federal legislation to help unions eradicate the last vestiges of corruption from 
                                                 
58
 Qtd. in Goulden, Meany, 253. 
59
 Qtd. in Goulden, Meany, 253-4. 
60
 Qtd. in Goulden, Meany, 235. 
61
 Qtd. in Goulden, Meany, 236. 
62
 Qtd. in Goulden, Meany, 243. 
183 
 
the labor movement,”63 while remaining firm that their organization opposed proposals that 
would serve as “a truncheon to break the union movement.”64   
They quickly recognized that the public could be either an ally or an opponent in this 
effort.  The AFL-CIO’s radio spots on shows that it sponsored urged listeners – both union 
members and members of the general public – to tell their Senators and Congressmen to vote for 
legislation supported by organized labor and to oppose legislation that the organization did not 
support.
65
  The group’s leadership recognized that most members of the Republican-Southern 
Democratic alliance would oppose provisions championed by unions, but they hoped that they 
could convince those on the fence through the use of constituent pressure.  This was part of a 
larger expansion of labor’s political education and political action program in the 1950s.  A 1957 
report on the AFL-CIO’s political activity explained that this growth had become “a matter of 
necessity” as labor’s critics tried to use the cover of negative media attention to limit labor’s 
political influence and to prevent unions from organizing effectively.
66
  
 
The Shape of the Public Campaign 
The Public Relations Departments of both the AFL and the CIO produced radio and 
television programming before the merger, but the post-merger labor programming conceived in 
reaction to the labor racketeering hearings was fundamentally different from that from the past.  
Most of these earlier programs featured the voice of an independent, respected liberal news 
commentator, despite several projects by AFL and CIO constituents, like the UAW, that 
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simulated news conferences.  In contrast, the programs developed by the new AFL-CIO were 
much more likely to place Meany and other AFL-CIO officials directly before the public.  These 
appearances provided a counterpoint to the Dave Becks and the Jimmy Hoffas hauled before 
Congressional committees and reinforced media depictions of Meany as a labor statesman.  This 
illustrated the lack of influence the PR department had in shaping the AFL-CIO’s public 
message.  Though programs like “Labor Answers Your Questions,” were technically crafted and 
funded by Fleisher’s department, they were really ways of promoting Meany and his vision of 
responsible labor statesmanship.  The bulk of the Department’s programming and budget were 
devoted to projects conceived before the McClellan hearings began, even if the hearings forced 
new discussion of corruption in the ranks of organized labor. 
This continued reliance on preexisting programs reflected the Public Relations 
Department’s marginalization in directing the public strategy against the charges aired at the 
McClellan hearings.  Instead, the AFL-CIO relied on its officers to promote labor’s value to the 
country and the need for moderate labor legislation reform in the public arena.  This was 
partially because the Public Relations Department’s budget was mostly tied up in the 
sponsorship of radio programs whose commentators the AFL-CIO did not explicitly control.  But 
it also reflected three other facts.  First, when the AFL and CIO merged in December 1955, their 
respective Public Relations Departments were combined rather awkwardly.  Fleisher, the CIO’s 
PR director assumed the top job in the combined organization in 1957 after Philip Pearl, the 
former AFL PR director, left to start his own firm.  But the group came to assume a lower 
prominence than it had in the CIO, reflecting the dominance of the AFL perspective in the 
merged organization.  Meany and other AFL leaders viewed Fleisher as a loyalist to Reuther and 
the IUD and were reluctant to let him direct the organization’s response to racketeering – 
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especially because it involved the delicate matter of handling the Teamsters, a union the CIO had 
routinely criticized from the beginning.   
Second, AFL-CIO leaders did not regard their efforts to reach the public during the 
McClellan Committee hearings as public relations; they understood it largely as political activity 
– a domain overseen as an organizational priority by AFL-CIO officers and COPE, the AFL-
CIO’s political action committee.  This view highlighted organized labor’s relationship to the 
public in the postwar period, as well as Meany’s own commitment to legislative action and faith 
in Andrew J. Biemiller, the AFL-CIO’s chief lobbyist.  A former Congressman from Wisconsin 
who drafted the 1948 Democratic convention plank on civil rights that resulted in the walkout of 
Southern Democrats, Biemiller became the AFL-CIO’s man on Capitol Hill at age 49 in 1956. A 
colorful figure, Biemiller was known for his “casual” relations with lawmakers – a distinction 
obtained over many drinks.
67
  Biemiller and Meany’s close relationship was one factor in the 
decision to rely more heavily on the Legislation Department than on the Public Relations 
Department.  But Meany and other AFL-CIO leaders were also deeply concerned about the 
public’s reaction to allegations of corrupt behavior within organized labor because they 
perceived the public as a kingmaker in advancing or derailing labor’s immediate political 
agenda, or in forcing further legislative restrictions on organized labor.   
Third, as Meany assumed greater prominence in the media as the face for labor statesmen 
and clean unionism, he came to displace the Public Relations Department as the primary 
messaging vehicle.  Increasingly, AFL-CIO leaders saw their own organizational actions in 
reaction to corruption – not the activities of the Public Relations Department – as the primary 
mechanism for combating negative publicity.   
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The personnel of the Public Relations Department did not have enough heft within the 
merged AFL-CIO to manage the fallout of the McClellan Committee revelations.  In poor health, 
and with declining influence with incoming officers from the CIO, Philip Pearl, the AFL-CIO 
Public Relations Director left the organization in 1957.  He left Henry Fleisher of the CIO and 
head of Publications for the AFL-CIO in charge of the Public Relations Department as the 
Congressional inquiry intensified.  The leadership transition, as well as Fleisher’s unfamiliarity 
to an AFL-CIO officer corps composed mostly of former AFL officials, weakened the position 
of the group.  At the same time, reporters and industry group staffers speculated that Meany 
believed Reuther’s combative tendencies threatened the AFL-CIO’s attempt to create a portrait 
of the AFL-CIO as a force for good, with clear-thinking and measured leadership.
68
  Meany may 
have been reluctant to have a CIO loyalist at the helm in structuring the AFL-CIO’s outreach to 
the public during the racketeering crisis.   
The Public Relations Department continued to wield enormous budgets, but these were 
deceptive.  The AFL-CIO’s radio programming consumed the bulk of PR spending even before 
the McClellan Committee hearings got underway, and radio and television programming rapidly 
expanded as the Congressional investigations intensified.  Technically under the PR domain, the 
content of these shows was typically dictated by the priorities of the AFL-CIO leadership, 
principally Meany.  Pearl, Fleisher and their staffs were marginalized.  In its first year and a half 
of operation, the AFL-CIO continued to broadcast most of the radio programs that the AFL and 
the CIO had sponsored before the merger, resulting in huge expenditures.  Between July 1956 
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and June 1957, the AFL-CIO’s Public Relations Department spent over $750,000, with all but 
$100,000 of that figure applied toward radio programs.
69
   
While there was some internal debate about whether radio was the most effective 
allocation of the Public Relations Department’s funding, the consensus of those within the 
department and the consultant M.S. Novik was that radio reached more members of the public 
than most other media at a fraction of the price.  In July 1959, the AFL-CIO’s Public Relations 
Director Albert J. Zack responded to grumbling among Executive Council members about the 
large radio budget by arguing that neither television nor newspaper advertising reached as many 
people as radio, and that radio was “clearly the cheapest medium of communication.”70  Zack 
continued, “Countless surveys prove that radio reaches more people on a per-dollar-per-person 
basis than newspapers or television,” a point that was borne out by the AFL-CIO’s own 
calculations.  For the cost of its 1959 radio programming, the AFL-CIO could purchase only 
twelve nights of television a year or four full-page advertisements in 40 major newspapers a 
year, Zack concluded.  In addition, Zack showed the importance of the link between public 
relations and the AFL-CIO’s legislative agenda by arguing that radio news programming helped 
to “create a liberal and progressive political climate” by attracting consistent audiences receptive 
to the AFL-CIO’s position.  More limited television appearances or newspaper advertising would 
not generate such a reliable and receptive ongoing audience.  This view of radio showed the 
extent to which the AFL-CIO was committed to paid mass media as a strategy for reaching the 
public, rather than a grassroots, worker-directed approach. It also reflected the considerable 
budget that the AFL-CIO had, even if it was not enough for ongoing television spending. 
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As indicated by Zack’s comments on audience, most of the AFL-CIO’s radio programs 
were news commentaries with a liberal bent, like those featuring John Vandercook and Edward 
Morgan, or were entertainment programs sponsored but not produced by the AFL-CIO.  But as 
the McClellan Committee hearings heated up, the AFL-CIO began to invest in radio programs, 
literature, media kits and informational packets for schools and churches that allowed its 
leadership to set the record straight specifically on the corruption issue.  Still, radio and 
television programming – media that were not well controlled directly by the PR department – 
continued to occupy the largest line items in the Public Relations budget, even as the overall 
publicity budget expanded. 
This fact did not escape notice in the press, though reporters and editorialists generally 
assumed that the Public Relations Department was in full control of the spending.  In the fall of 
1957, as the AFL-CIO bi-annual convention approached, the press reported that the 
organization’s Executive Council had committed to expand its public relations expenditures by 
over 50% in the coming year – a move that commentators criticized as a smokescreen.  The New 
York Daily News editorialized that the AFL-CIO could save itself the $1.2 million by removing 
corrupt unions and staying out of politics.  These “actions should do more to improve the outfit’s 
public standing than any number of words from any number of press agents,” the Daily News 
concluded.
71
   Both newspapers and industry groups drew a direct connection between the 
budgetary bump and the revelations in Congress.  The conservative Phoenix Republic charged 
that the fund was designed “to counteract the unfavorable news that has come out of Senate 
investigations.”72  Staffers at NAM privately expressed the view that “the revelations of the 
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McClellan Committee have cost the AFL-CIO substantial public prestige and support,” resulting 
in slowed union organizing and the possibility of restrictive labor legislation.
73
  NAM feared that 
the AFL-CIO’s increased public relations spending would “result in a barrage of skillful 
propaganda” to combat labor legislation of any type.   
AFL-CIO staff viewed the increased expenditure for public relations as necessary “to 
counteract the harm done to decent unionism” by corrupt individuals within the labor movement 
and by the propaganda campaigns undertaken by industry groups and employers as collective 
bargaining negotiations for 1958 began.
74
  Fleisher envisioned the new funding as enabling the 
organization to develop “a major public relations campaign” consisting of three pieces: a 
“thorough pamphlet” explaining the AFL-CIO’s commitment to enforcing ethical behavior 
among its affiliated unions and making the case against “bad legislation”; a 28-minute film 
presenting the pamphlet information through another medium; and advertisements, leaflets and 
posters.  Fleisher’s program promoted a singular message to both union members and non-
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members through multiple media channels, including a new emphasis on television spending and 
a reduction in radio spending.
75
 
In tandem with the AFL-CIO’s existing radio programming, pamphlets and kits for 
“opinion makers,” Fleisher hoped that the new materials would convince the public that the 
AFL-CIO would successfully clean up corruption, eliminating the need for repressive labor 
legislation.  In reality, though, the increased PR spending by the AFL-CIO was relatively limited 
compared to the significant negative publicity created by the Congressional hearings.  And, 
much of that budget was still consumed with radio programming both unscripted by the AFL-
CIO and only marginally concerned with the McClellan hearings.  Radio programs like “Labor 
Answers Your Questions” and other programs, such as AFL-CIO-sponsored kits to prepare 
college debaters to oppose right-to-work, were directly responsive to allegations of corruption.  
While the latter was conceived and executed by the PR Department, the far more visible radio 
program, “Labor Answers Your Questions,” featured AFL-CIO officers in unscripted 
appearances before sympathetic reporters over thirteen weeks.
76
   
A few PR Department-sponsored programs bucked the trend of promoting the AFL-
CIO’s officers.  In 1959 the Department began to run a series of fifteen minute “telefilms” 
documenting the important work that unionized men and women did.  These films did not 
respond to the McClellan hearings directly, but the timing of their development and release was 
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not accidental.  In presenting the rank-and-file as noble, patriotic Americans whose work formed 
the foundation of the country’s prosperity, the films provided an implicit counter to the corrupt 
union officers appearing in Congressional hearings.  In its communication with television station 
managers, the AFL-CIO presented the series as fulfilling two functions: “to instill in workers an 
even greater pride in their jobs,” thus increasing productivity and aiding the consuming general 
public, and to encourage “our fellow Americans to take pride in our nation’s workers and their 
contributions to the free enterprise system in a democracy.”77  Programming that emphasized 
workers rather than union leaders and that demonstrated the AFL-CIO’s commitment to 
democracy (as opposed to corruption) and free enterprise (as opposed to communism) challenged 
the conventional wisdom about unions that the McClellan hearings had reinforced. 
The “Americans at Work” segments were produced by an independent company, 
Norwood Studios, at considerable expense – some $243,000 – but AFL-CIO leaders hoped that 
television stations would show the segments as public service programming, eliminating a huge 
television buy, which was much more expensive than radio.
78
  In a letter to the 495 commercial 
television stations to which the AFL-CIO offered the series, Meany emphasized that one-third of 
television audiences were AFL-CIO members, and that this population would likely tune into the 
series.  Meany argued that the program was both “entertainment” and had “real educational 
value” for everyone, but the AFL-CIO’s pitch concentrated on the “pre-inserted audience” of 
union members, along with “their families, their friends, their dozens of good neighbors with 
whom they do business.”79  The series was not intended solely for union members, but the Public 
Relations Department – like the political units of the AFL-CIO – still concentrated on using 
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members as the linchpin for reaching out to a wider public, even as late as 1959.  As union 
membership declined to a much smaller percentage of the American public in the decades to 
follow, the Public Relations Department would be forced to change its approach. 
Despite the significant resources that the AFL-CIO committed to the project, television 
critics were not as enthusiastic as Meany about “Americans at Work.”  Variety panned “Fabric to 
Fashion,” the first installment of the series highlighting the work performed by ILGWU 
members as “a film of decidedly inferior quality” whose “net effect was dullness.”  Reflecting 
the conventional wisdom about union inefficiencies, Variety also complained that the “clichéd 
musical background” required the use of twenty unionized musicians, when “canned music” 
would have served the film much better.
80
  Still, the “Americans at Work” series gave the AFL-
CIO a relatively low-cost way of drawing a new image of unionism in the very same medium co-
opted by McClellan and his colleagues. 
 The work-themed AFL-CIO films were unusual as elements of the AFL-CIO’s public 
response to the threat of corruption charges.  As the McClellan Committee hearings progressed, 
COPE, the Legislative Department and the President’s Office overtook the Public Relations 
Department as the primary spaces through which AFL-CIO publicity was shaped, sometimes 
unintentionally.  None of these groups commanded budgets as large as Public Relations, but the 
President’s Office was far more visible in crafting the organization’s public response, and COPE 
and the Legislative Department were tasked with the immediately more important projects of 
fending off objectionable labor legislation and electing a new Congress and President who would 
promote labor’s aims.  All three groups used the public to advance their aims, but public 
relations were not explicitly a part of their missions.  Indeed, Meany was reluctant to 
characterize his organization’s public reaction to the racketeering hearings as a publicity 
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campaign.  In the spring of 1957, a reporter asked Meany whether his organization was planning 
a campaign “to convince the public that…the great mass of the [labor] movement is basically 
honest.”  Meany clarified that the reporter was asking about a “publicity campaign,” and 
acknowledged the value of favorable public opinion.  But he replied that, “there isn’t any such 
campaign contemplated or in the works at the present time.”81  
Instead, the organization largely focused on counteracting the charges made by industry 
groups and overzealous Senators, and disputing the impression that all of labor was corrupt.  In 
the midst of the Congressional investigation, the AFL-CIO’s Sub-Committee on Public Relations 
reported that organized labor required “no public relations ‘gimmicks’; we need only honest and 
adequate presentation of the facts.”  The committee acknowledged that “the best public 
relations” were not pamphlets or radio programs produced in response to crisis but, rather, the 
“record of the AFL-CIO and its affiliated unions and their day-to-day contributions to the whole 
of society.”82  This included the active citizenship of members and the community service 
initiatives of affiliated unions, but it also suggested that the daily remarks of the AFL-CIO’s top 
leaders to the press, the testimony provided by AFL-CIO officials before Congressional 
committees, and the fundraising and information produced by COPE were all key pieces of the 
AFL-CIO’s public relations program.  The Public Relations Department declined in importance 
as AFL-CIO leaders perceived the political implications of adverse publicity.  
Meany routinely stated that he feared that anti-labor Congressmen would use the 
McClellan revelations as a pretext for implementing repressive labor legislation.  In comments to 
the IUD convention in the fall of 1957, Meany pledged “no surrender to anti-labor legislation 
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that is proposed in the guise of eliminating corruption.”83  This fear of such dire legislative 
outcomes as prohibitions on secondary boycotts, further restrictions on the political involvement 
of unions, and the application of anti-trust laws to unions shaped the AFL-CIO’s public response 
to the hearings.  It also derived from the McClellan Committee’s own confounding of criminal 
and political activities as it investigated crimes committed by the likes of Dave Beck, alongside 
the supposed abuses perpetrated by the UAW’s political operations.   
COPE and the Legislative Department both engaged in behind-the-scenes maneuverings 
to apply pressure to union-supported lawmakers and to provide research assistance, position 
papers, and information to Congressmen.  The Legislative Department did a small amount of 
direct outreach to union members, urging support for labor reform legislation backed by the 
AFL-CIO – including the production of a pamphlet entitled, “Get Crooks – Not Unions,” that 
was distributed at plant gates and union meetings in 1959 – but its outreach to the general public 
was minimal.
84
   
COPE implemented a far larger public campaign – rare for an “off” year and 
demonstrative of the extent to which AFL-CIO leaders perceived the racketeering allegations as 
a political problem.  In August 1957, the head of COPE reported that his organization had sent 
out 5,000,000 pieces of literature since the beginning of the year.  Judged by this measure, “it 
would be hard to tell that this is an ‘off’ year in politics,” the COPE director told AFL-CIO 
higher-ups.
85
  This large volume was also responsive to labor’s defeat in the 1956 presidential 
election, as well as the complete transition to an AFL-CIO political arm following the 1955 
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merger of the AFL and CIO.  But the corruption hearings created a new sense of urgency during 
a year that had no electoral significance. 
Still, COPE emphasized outreach to union members much more than outreach to the 
general public.  In 1957, COPE instituted a voter registration and PAC contribution drive among 
AFL-CIO union members, publicized through the labor press and at local and state union 
conventions.  While the COPE’s Director remained concerned about the political implications of 
adverse public opinion toward the McClellan hearings, as late as August 1957, he emphasized 
two longer-term “political problems” for labor: a belief among minorities that the AFL-CIO had 
dragged its feet in supporting civil rights and the strength of conservative voting patterns among 
rapidly expanding suburbs.
86
  The Congressional hearings on racketeering were important in 
determining how the public viewed labor at the moment, but COPE did not believe that they 
would play a major role in shaping future electoral outcomes.  This view may have been correct, 
as evidenced by labor’s electoral success in the 1958 elections. 
Even so, the AFL-CIO’s political arm also distributed material to the mainstream press 
through its biweekly “Political Memo.”  Items like McClellan Committee member and AFL-CIO 
opponent Senator Barry Goldwater’s $60,000 testimonial dinner made their way from COPE’s 
newsletter into Associated Press articles.
87
  COPE leaders hoped that such news tidbits would 
help to discredit the proceedings of the McClellan Committee in the public mind and advance 
labor’s reputation as a public interest group opposed to special interests in Congress.  Like 
Meany and other AFL-CIO officers, COPE materials tended to leave thorough discussion of the 
revelations themselves to the side.  Instead, they tried to damage the reputations of the 
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Committee’s participants, representing them as hacks serving their big business supporters at the 
expense of the American people.  
In addition to pursuing this type of indirect outreach to the public, COPE encouraged 
union members to spread labor’s message to the general public.  The department developed a 
series of film strips and pamphlets that could be shown and distributed to progressive audiences 
beyond organized labor, in conjunction with a local speaker armed with a series of illustrative 
charts.  A PAC-produced 1958 film strip entitled “Everyone Gives to Political Action,” 
distributed by union officers on the local level, was typical.  It contrasted the business lobby with 
that of labor, claiming that Americans were forced to “pay high prices and high taxes at Big 
Business’s behest.”88  In the film strip’s telling, organized labor stood against such interests, 
representing both workers and a general public hurt by Big Business’s assault on the American 
standard of living.  In one frame, the narration manual instructed the speaker to emphasize 
organized labor’s program for “mass purchasing power and full employment” against “the big 
business program of lower taxes for business, trickle-down benefits, and unemployment.”89   
A 1959 film voiced similar themes.  It quoted a Fortune Magazine article charging that 
the “hottest extracurricular activity of many corporate managements today is not golf, but a more 
complex game – politics.”  In contrast to corporate campaigns to extract money from the public 
in the form of high taxes and high prices, the film claimed that COPE is “nobody’s Trojan 
horse.”  The organization “works to no purpose which does not serve the welfare of all the 
people,” the film argued.90  Such PAC material did not explicitly mention revelations of 
corruption in the ranks of labor.  However, by suggesting that labor was on the side of the 
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ordinary consumer and taxpayer and opposed to a unified and self-interested Big Business lobby, 
these COPE films fought the image of the selfish labor mogul that the McClellan hearings 
promoted. 
Just how effective this AFL-CIO campaign was in influencing public attitudes toward 
unions remained a question of debate.  COPE was vastly outspent by industry groups trying to 
influence voting behavior and public attitudes on labor.  In 1956, COPE raised and spent just 
under $1,000,000, contributing to a total of around $2,000,000 spent by labor groups.  The top 
one hundred military contractors alone outspent COPE, while the DuPont family gave more to 
the Republican Party in 1956 than the UAW received in political contributions from all of its 
members in the same year.
91
 In the weeks leading up to the 1958 Congressional elections and 
right-to-work state ballot initiatives, Business Week reported that COPE spent just $450,000 and 
had trouble collecting voluntary contributions of $1 per union member.  Meanwhile, NAM and 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce mounted their “most intensive political campaign ever.”92  
Despite these discrepancies in funding, the AFL-CIO did quite well in the 1958 election.
93
  This 
fact perhaps demonstrated that funding was less important than public opinion toward unions 
(which still was overwhelmingly favorable in 1958) or other factors, such as effective get-out-
the-vote strategies.   
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The success of COPE leadership’s decision to reach out to a larger public, as opposed to 
union members alone, is difficult to assess.  On the one hand, it was precisely unions’ greater 
foray into politics that drove the confounding of criminal behavior and ordinary union activity 
during the McClellan Committee’s hearings.  This prompted Goldwater to speak of a conspiracy 
of unfettered union monopoly power.  But on the other hand, some critics charged that this 
perceived power was a mirage.  Dick Bruner, a former Packinghouse Workers’ official in Iowa, 
penned a Harper’s Magazine article in 1958 arguing that Goldwater’s perceptions of union 
political strength were “just plain laughable.”94  Bruner saw COPE’s growing turn toward 
literature and film production, as well as supplier of information to the mainstream media, as 
detracting from the agency’s central mission of developing an effective political operation in the 
field.  But it was also this turn that COPE leaders believed would allow the organization to 
influence the attitudes of ordinary Americans, not just its own membership.  The McClellan 
Committee revelations were one of a number of factors (including the merger and the results of 
the 1956 election) influencing COPE’s turn toward implementing a more robust public relations 
effort.   
COPE’s attempts to reach the general public showed the reason that the AFL-CIO’s 
leadership was so concerned about the McClellan hearings’ influence on public attitudes toward 
unions; they had the power to produce disastrous legislative outcomes for organized labor.  This 
was a message that the AFL-CIO’s top leaders drove home throughout the hearings.  After 
Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin bill, AFL-CIO Vice-President James B. Carey chastised 
lawmakers who had supported the legislation.  In individualized letters, Carey condemned 
Landrum-Griffin supporters for showing that they were “less interested in individual rights and 
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democracy than in property rights and the concentration of power in the hands of big business.”95  
Carey acknowledged that union members’ presence in many Congressional districts was weak, 
but pledged to unite all “working men and women” to “take appropriate action at the ballot box.”   
The release of Carey’s letter was a major public relations blunder for the AFL-CIO.  It 
had the effect of making organized labor appear to be an undemocratic and threatening group - 
too big, too powerful, and interested in promoting its own interest above that of the general 
public.  For example, in a NAM-publicized quotation, an Idaho Representative called Carey’s 
letter “a cheap effort at intimidation.”  He wrote to Carey, “I have no intention of taking orders 
from you or anybody else.”96  NAM’s Chief Administrative Officer, Charles R. Sligh, Jr., 
contrasted NAM with the AFL-CIO in public appearances.  On the ABC radio program, “The 
Voice of NAM,” Sligh claimed that his organization “made no threats, pounded no desks, 
exerted no pressure” of the type exercised by union lobbyists.97  “We don’t publish black lists of 
Congressmen who fail to vote the way we think we should,” Sligh continued.  The press also had 
a field day critiquing Carey’s letter.  An editorial in the Burlington, Vermont Free Press was 
typical.  It compared Carey and Hoffa under the headline, “Carey Also Thinks with Muscles.”98   
This type of treatment of organized labor in the nation’s newspapers diminished the AFL-
CIO’s efforts to portray itself as a force for the public good and undermined media descriptions 
of AFL-CIO officers as unlike the corrupt union bosses of the Teamsters. But however poorly 
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conceived was Carey’s letter, the basic idea that organized labor would make its presence felt 
through a combination of worker and public support for labor in politics was the defining AFL-
CIO message during the McClellan hearings.   
This message was best delivered by Meany and other AFL-CIO officers regarded as 
“labor statesmen” in the press, alongside the institutional machinery of COPE and the Legislative 
Department, not through the marginalized Public Relations Department.  Many newspapers 
echoed the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel’s praise of Meany’s “high concept of patriotism and 
personal honesty,” even as it worried that not all union leaders shared Meany’s unassailable 
character.
99
  The AFL-CIO tried to capitalize on such views by deploying Meany as the primary 
spokesman for the labor federation.   
Meany was uniquely suited for this role.  The plain-spoken plumber from the Bronx had 
been away from his trade for decades before assuming the AFL-CIO presidency with the merger 
in 1955, and, unlike his rival, Walter Reuther, he had never led an international union or assumed 
responsibility for collective bargaining.  But Meany’s lack of formal education, New York 
accent, blunt comments to the media and conservatism around anticommunism established him 
as a no-nonsense, practical, reasonable and sharp labor spokesperson.  As a former labor lobbyist 
in New York State, Meany saw the potential of political action and recognized that favorable 
public opinion was key to labor achieving its legislative goals.
100
  In later years, Meany 
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explained that his intolerance for the Teamsters’ corruption derived from a fear that the public 
would equate inaction as support for criminal activity.  “It would be a bad situation inside the 
movement and in the view of public opinion generally.  If that happened, I felt we would get 
really stringent legislation,” he told an admiring biographer.101  
As head of the AFL-CIO, Meany saw an opportunity to reshape the image of American 
labor in the eyes of the public.  That involved using his position to force the Executive Council 
to oust corrupt entities from the AFL-CIO’s ranks, sometimes threatening other Council 
members in the process.  It also involved positioning himself as the spokesmen of American 
labor in legislative sessions and in statements to the press.  By the time Congressional inquiries 
began in 1957, George Meany had only served as chief executive of a major labor federation for 
less than five years, but he had nearly a decade of experience managing the AFL’s day-to-day 
affairs under William Green—a man described by his own biographer as “a weak, 
unimaginative, and ineffectual peacemaker within the labor movement,” who became a mere 
“figurehead” in the last years of his life.102   
As such, Meany knew how to quietly contain and control personalities within the ranks of 
the AFL-CIO’s leadership, as well as how to use the AFL-CIO presidency as a bully pulpit in 
selling labor to the public in the interest of legislative change. As one scholar explained, “Meany, 
better than anyone else, appreciated both the limits and possibilities inherent in executive office 
in the world of American labor.”  He was, at heart, an “organization man.”103   
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A Time obituary was more direct: “Meany was, in fact, a crafty manipulator of the 
strong-willed men who fought for influence in labor's biggest house.”104  Unable to achieve the 
upper hand against Meany, personalities as big as John Lewis and Walter Reuther took their 
unions out of the labor federations that Meany managed.  The famous characterizations of 
Meany as “crusty” and “dour” concealed the AFL-CIO President’s remarkable ability to impose 
his will on some of the looming figures of the American labor movement.  As a remembrance 
put it, Meany was, quite simply, “American labor’s most dominant and durable leader.”105  He 
was, “labor’s iron man,” outlasting and outsmarting his competition.106  
There were also structural elements at work in Meany’s dominance, though.  With the 
exact tally of the Executive Council’s votes kept secret, Meany was able to provide cover to 
wavering Council members on the question of expulsion and the resulting loss of per capita taxes 
to the Federation.  Furthermore, the original fault lines between the old AFL and CIO unions 
never fully healed, creating hardened factions on the Executive Council, despite the presence of a 
separate Industrial Union Department.  As someone who originally hailed from the building 
trades and who was not always aligned with the Democratic Party, Meany was able to 
commandeer sometimes grudging support from the Council’s more conservative factions.  His 
commitment to anticommunism was beyond reproach, and Meany’s reluctance to embrace a full 
civil rights program endeared him to conservatives.   
Furthermore, Meany’s personal demeanor – “a burly man and an inveterate smoker of big 
cigars” who “at times [wore] the pearl gray vest associated in the public mind with businessmen 
of the 1890’s,” as a contemporary article put it – allowed Meany to be taken seriously by union 
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presidents older than he.
107
  While a fierce combatant of the Teamsters’ number two man, Jimmy 
Hoffa, Meany presented a similar image to the infamous Hoffa in one notable respect.
108
 Like 
Meany, Hoffa was seen as a no-nonsense throwback who told it like it was. Even as he admitted 
egregious behaviors, “which might not exactly read like Sunday school stuff,” before Congress, 
old-time labor union leaders could not help but respect Hoffa’s “open-faced, sugar-coated 
candor” and open defiance – qualities that made him a “TV star” in the McClellan hearings.109  
But unlike Meany, Hoffa positioned himself as an authentic folk hero of the rank-and-file, 
representing their interests against an entrenched Washington bureaucracy.  Hoffa frequently 
drew on his status as a beloved leader of the Teamsters’ rank and file to oppose AFL-CIO policy 
on corruption, which he characterized as “creat[ing] a substantial threat to liberty and the 
strength of the union.”110 In contrast to Meany and Hoffa’s appeal to union old-timers and 
penchant for backroom deals, or Hoffa’s insistence that he represented union democracy, 
Reuther’s persistent and public calls for restraint in the AFL-CIO’s gatherings in Palm Beach, 
for example, were resented by older members of the Council.  Even if they remained distrustful 
of Meany, Council members often backed him as a lesser evil. 
The federation structure could also sometimes work against Meany in his effort to control 
the behaviors of those who operated the member unions that comprised the AFL-CIO.
111
  The 
liberal radio and television commentator, Jack Jurey was not alone in highlighting the strong 
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leadership Meany displayed, even in the face of structural impediments.  In a 1958 broadcast, 
Jurey argued that while Meany “has done a good deal to discipline and discredit Hoffa, Dave 
Beck and a number of other leaders of similar misguided talents,” the AFL-CIO’s structural 
“weaknesses” left Meany “with nothing much more than moral authority.”112  Meany, too, 
emphasized his organization’s “moral responsibility,” even as he insisted that “the AFL-CIO has 
no legal responsibility to curb corruption.”113  But the fact remained that in both Jurey’s telling 
and Meany’s own presence in reporting the AFL-CIO’s position, Meany, not the Executive 
Council or other AFL-CIO officers, was the face of the organization.  He remained credible, 
even in the midst of Congress’ corruption probe. 
The way that leadership positions were assigned in the merged AFL-CIO demonstrated 
the old AFL’s retention of power in the new organization and gave Meany more authority than 
Reuther or Carey.  During the crisis of the McClellan hearings, Meany made it clear that he 
planned to exercise as much control over the direction of the labor federation as the AFL-CIO 
constitution would allow.  At the 1957 AFL-CIO convention, Meany fought back against union 
officials who believed that the organization should either treat corruption as an internal matter or 
did not have the authority to police its affiliated unions.  He defended his approach, telling 
delegates, “A great deal of stress has been placed on the terrible crime of allowing this matter to 
become public.  If that is a crime, then I to some extent am responsible for that.”114  Meany also 
pledged to continue this tack as the hearings progressed.  The phrasing of Meany’s convention 
remarks was unusual.  Meany tended to describe his positions as official AFL-CIO policy.  He 
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most often used the term “we” in conversations with reporters and in written speeches, 
smoothing over disagreements within the Executive Council and larger convention.  But this 
very fact of Meany’s tendency to speak for all of the organization showed Meany’s power within 
the AFL-CIO.   
Contemporary observers commented that Meany was unlike his predecessors in either the 
AFL or the CIO.  In a 1959 speech before the NAM’s Congress of American Industry, famed 
labor columnist Victor Riesel contrasted Meany with Phil Murray, who learned he had issued a 
statement only after it was released by his staff, or William Green, who fell asleep in War Labor 
Advisory sessions with the President of the United States.  “This does not happen in the AFL-
CIO today,” Riesel contended.  “In the AFL-CIO, George Meany is the leader.”115   
Union leaders also acknowledged Meany’s power within the AFL-CIO.  At the 1957 
convention, the Plumbers’ Union president praised Meany’s “bold and courageous leadership” in 
quelling disputes between Reuther’s IUD and the Building and Trades Department, as well as in 
responding to the threat of the McClellan hearings, and called Meany “our architect”.116  Union 
members sometimes offered this kind of hyperbolic praise to Green and Murray during their 
tenures at the AFL and CIO, respectively, but it was unusual for either to be cited for something 
like Meany’s stance during the McClellan hearings – a political position taken or political victory 
achieved by a labor federation; during Green and Murray’s time as union leaders, union 
members’ convention remarks presented such interaction with Congressmen as the responsibility 
and achievement of COPE, CIO-PAC, or individual union heads.  This recognition of the 
changed leadership model in the merged AFL-CIO, as well as Meany’s strong hand internally 
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allowed Meany to assume a role as the primary shaper and messenger of AFL-CIO outreach to 
the public during the Congressional hearings of the late 1950s. 
This reliance on Meany as the key communicator to the general public was also a 
function of the structure of the Congressional proceedings.  The AFL-CIO tried to counteract 
images of unscrupulous labor “bosses” like Beck and Hoffa with Meany – a man never accused 
of presiding over a corrupt union and without Reuther’s baggage of personal leftist politics and 
overreach in union negotiations and political involvement.
117
  Meany voluntarily appeared before 
the McClellan Committee on a number of occasions.  He also delivered speeches to the general 
public over network radio on paid airtime, appeared on AFL-CIO sponsored roundtable radio 
discussions like “Labor Answers Your Questions,” and was often quoted in the press.   
Meany’s availability to the press furthered his stellar reputation among reporters.  This 
accessibility was one factor that fed the perception, held by the Baltimore Archdiocese’s paper, 
the Catholic Review, that even though racketeers sometimes led unions, “there are also the 
George Meanys – the dedicated servants of the unions who have grown with the labor movement 
and will see it through this current crisis.”118  Meany’s pull-no-punches attitude, willingness to 
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criticize those within his own organization publicly, and Bronx accent endeared him to a press 
corps that disparaged organized labor’s trend toward bureaucratic Public Relations Departments, 
college-educated leaders seemingly out-of-touch with the rank-and-file, and robust political 
operations. The Montgomery Advertiser highlighted Walter Reuther as representative of a “new 
type labor union magnate” who had much in common with a “$50,000 corporation executive,” 
but the editorial was notably silent on how Meany fit into this analysis of union leadership.
119
   
The press’s willingness to embrace Meany, as well as the personality and strategic 
differences between Meany and his CIO counterparts, Reuther and Carey, caused internal 
division about whom to deploy for press engagements.  NAM’s “spies” reported that M.S. 
Novik, the AFL-CIO’s chief radio consultant, urged Meany to discourage press appearances by 
Carey and Reuther in the summer of 1957.
120
  Meany reportedly did “not press too hard” against 
others’ appearances on television and radio.  But the fact that Washington broadcasters and 
industry group officials perceived such tension over who was to control the AFL-CIO’s message 
– and that Meany was viewed as the best conduit for delivering this message – showed the high 
political stakes of media appearances by labor officials as well as the rise of Meany’s star as a 
communicator to the public via the press.   
Higher-ups in the AFL-CIO came to view public relations as too important to be left in 
the hands of the Public Relations Department.  Meany – and other AFL-CIO officials – 
controlled the organization’s outreach to the public during the McClellan Committee hearings.  
They felt that the price of leaving this task to the Public Relations Department was the further 
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tarnishing of labor’s reputation in the eyes of the public and, more importantly, the passage of 
punitive labor legislation as a result of this sullied image. 
 
The Message to the Public 
 Once Meany began to recognize the seriousness of the allegations against the leaders of 
the Teamsters and other unions plagued by corruption and the prominence these revelations 
would receive in the media, he embraced two primary messages.  Like the Public Relations 
Department-developed pamphlets enumerating the Ethical Practices Code, Meany emphasized 
labor’s effectiveness in cleaning up corruption within its own ranks and appealed to the public’s 
sense of fairness in not imposing punitive rules on a group that was overwhelmingly honest.  
Meany also demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the McClellan Committee and embrace 
some legislative reform, making himself appear reasonable in the public eye.     
 At nearly every juncture throughout the McClellan hearings, Meany promoted his 
organization’s efforts to rid itself of racketeers, and to promote clean unionism, even at 
considerable organizational risk.  At the 1957 AFL-CIO convention that expelled the Teamsters, 
Meany’s speech concentrated on the vast machinery the labor federation had developed to 
combat abuses.  He spoke of the “high principles” set forth in the AFL-CIO constitution, the 
development of the Ethical Practices Code, and the work of the Ethical Practices Committee.
121
  
He also emphasized the AFL-CIO’s power to police its affiliates.  In a June 1957 speech before 
the IUD, Meany asserted that the AFL-CIO constitution “invaded, to some extent at least, the 
autonomy of affiliated unions,” allowing the national organization to exercise control when 
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international unions were delinquent in their duties to crack down on abuses.
122
  Meany argued 
that, buttressed by constitutional directives, the AFL-CIO’s decision to remove the powerful 
Teamsters was the logical outcome of the AFL-CIO’s original commitment to clean unionism, 
not a knee-jerk reaction to the crisis presented by Congress’ investigation of labor racketeering.  
Of course the fact that the Executive Council did not take steps to break with the Teamsters until 
the McClellan hearings were well underway belied Meany’s logic.   
Still, the fact that the AFL-CIO had developed some of the infrastructure for cracking 
down on corruption before the crisis made Meany’s argument easier.  It also helped that, even 
with the removal of the Teamsters and other unions judged to be led by corrupt officials, an 
overwhelming majority of unions remained in the AFL-CIO.  In his 1957 convention speech, 
Meany pledged to turn the “99 percent” of upstanding AFL-CIO-affiliated union members and 
leaders into 100 percent.  Meany and his colleagues hoped that this appeal to fairness would 
ward off the possibility of repressive labor legislation indiscriminately applied to the honest 
whole. 
 Meany and other AFL-CIO officials also began to voice support for some legislative 
reforms as the racketeering revelations mounted and it became clear that some labor legislation 
was inevitable. David Dubinsky, the long-term president of the ILGWU – routinely praised as 
one of the AFL-CIO’s cleanest unions – publicly announced the importance of Congressional 
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committee hearings in exposing illegal behavior in the labor movement.
123
  In a June 1957 
speech before the UAW convention, Dubinsky explained that labor had been unable “to detect, 
to expose and eliminate this evil” on its own.  “It is only when the attack was made by the 
government and the government conducted the investigation that we were able to learn of it,” 
Dubinsky told convention delegates and reporters.
124
  Meany also publicly stated that “What is 
going on [at the McClellan hearings] is good for labor.”125  
This support for modest reforms furthered the media’s coverage of Meany as a labor 
statesman and was designed to make the AFL-CIO appear reasonable, even working against its 
personal interest for the greater good.  But this embrace of legislative reform took time.  In the 
first few months of the Congressional investigation, Meany and other top AFL-CIO leaders 
hesitated to embrace government action to prevent future abuses.  Meany continued to push the 
welfare and pension disclosure acts that his organization had promoted for years, but he insisted 
that additional legislation was unneeded.  “We are able to clean up what’s found,” Meany told 
reporters in August 1957.  “[W]e will resist any attempts to enact restrictive labor legislation that 
would affect the whole labor movement because of the sins of the few.”126  By using the qualifier 
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“restrictive,” Meany allowed the possibility that his organization was willing to support some 
legislation.  But the qualifier also gave Meany a way to oppose any labor bill that came before 
Congress in 1957.  In 1958, Meany stated that the AFL-CIO would give “thoughtful 
consideration” to every proposed labor reform measure, but he warned that he had “serious 
objections” to many of the bills Congressmen were preparing to introduce.127  Meany tried to 
walk the fine line between seeming open to labor reform but opposing the specific measures 
included in proposed remedies for union racketeering. 
Meany argued that the government should play a role, but as an enforcer of already-
existing laws against bribery, theft, intimidation, obstruction and violence, not in developing new 
laws specifically designed to target unions.
128
  Meany worried that such legislation would give 
an outsized role to a government that was potentially hostile to unions.  Labor’s opponents could 
use the “big brother” capabilities of government to deprive citizens of their right to organize 
democratically.
129
  In fact, the AFL-CIO argued that the country did not need repressive labor 
legislation in the first place.  In 1958, Meany complained to the American Bar Association that, 
“There doesn’t seem to be a district attorney in the country interested in these instances of trade 
union corruption.”130  Meany and his colleagues – including those in the AFL-CIO’s public 
relations group – suggested that Congress could pass all the restrictive legislation it wanted, but 
it would do little to deter the elements of organized labor that already exhibited illegal behavior.  
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If they were passed, such laws had the potential to “become a mockery if district attorneys and 
grand juries [did] not fortify [their] meaning with indictments and prosecutions for wrong-
doing,” an AFL-CIO radio commentator told listeners in 1959.131  Indeed, if Congress were to 
pass repressive legislation making it more difficult to organize workers, curtailing political 
strength, and undermining union security, the Dave Becks, Jimmy Hoffas and Johnny Dios might 
rise to the top, at the expense of law-abiding union officials like those that dominated the AFL-
CIO.  In his public statements, Meany was adamant that “the real problem of corruption is the 
failure of the law enforcement authorities to act.”132   
Despite their hope that the McClellan Committee would play the role of fact-finding 
commission rather than legislator of reform measures, over the course of 1957 and 1958, Meany 
and other AFL-CIO officials came to accept that some government legislative action was 
inevitable, and – if developed in accordance with the wishes of organized labor – even desirable.  
As the AFL-CIO lobbyist, Andrew J. Biemiller, explained, “Meany thought McClellan was an 
antilabor nut…But he had a hell of a lot of nasty material, so we had to walk carefully with him.  
You don’t mess around with people who can kill you.”133  One way of treading lightly was to 
embrace modest reform.  This shift was partially a response to media pressure for government 
action.  But it was also caused by a number of other factors.   
As the hearings progressed, AFL-CIO leaders recognized that they could change the 
frame of reference for the legislative debate by advocating for reform inclusive of business, as 
well as unions.  The Congressional investigatory committee was charged with examining 
management abuses, but nearly all of their efforts focused on labor’s wrongs.  AFL-CIO officials 
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elected to publicize this discrepancy in the Committee’s attentions, while urging that fair rules be 
applied to both labor and business.  Labor leaders hoped that this strategy could lessen the 
severity of the proposals and win the AFL-CIO points with the public.  Publicly, William 
Schnitzler, the AFL-CIO’s Secretary Treasurer, upheld an image of the unbiased labor statesman 
acting in the public interest.  Schnitzler dismissed the liberal columnist Murray Kempton’s 
suggestion that “the sins of labor leaders were as nothing besides the sins of corporations.”  “I 
don’t give a damn what a corporation does.  That doesn’t justify a union representative taking a 
three-cent stamp,” Schnitzler declared.134  Meany also acknowledged the sins of many of his 
fellow trade unionists, but he was direct in telling the Senate Labor Subcommittee that, “For 
every crooked trade union leader engaged in the unsavory task of ‘selling out’ the workers, there 
is a crooked businessman.”135  Meany told Senators that if they were to implement any new 
reporting requirements for unions, businesses must also be compelled to participate.   
Many commentators also highlighted this message.  In a 1957 cartoon for the Washington 
Post, famed liberal cartoonist Herblock raised the possibility of the Committee’s investigation of 
business alongside labor (Figure 4-5).
136
  In a nod to the prevalence of cold war weaponry in the 
1950s, the cartoon featured two missiles directed at two different windows.  The cartoonist 
labeled the lower level window, “Racketeering in Labor,” and showed the destruction caused by 
the initial missile.  The second missile was aimed directly at the upper tier window, 
“Connivances in Business,” but had not yet hit the two overweight, bald, cigar-smoking 
businessmen housed inside.  “You think it’s really one of those two-stage jobs?,” one 
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businessman nervously asked the other.  By arranging the business corruption window above the 
labor corruption window and in depicting business elements in a human form resembling Dave 
Beck, Herblock implied that business was more responsible than unions for criminal behavior in 
labor-business dealings.   
In 1957, Herblock, other liberal editorialists, and labor officials were still optimistic that 
the McClellan Committee would launch a full-scale inquiry into business abuses.  But the 
Committee dragged the Teamsters investigation over much of the year, winning high television 
ratings and public support in the process.  Industry groups also applied great pressure to the 
members of the Committee to concentrate solely on the actions of business-labor middlemen, not 
on business abuses directly.   
Furthermore, the Little Rock school integration crisis of the fall of 1957 pushed 
McClellan, an Arkansas Democrat, further into the fold of the Southern Democrat-Republican 
coalition in Congress.  McClellan vehemently opposed federal intervention in Little Rock, 
alongside Committee colleague Barry Goldwater, among others.  Herblock lamented 
McClellan’s inconsistency in a fall 1957 cartoon (Figure 4-6).137  It depicted McClellan holding 
a sign reading, “We must uphold law and order – in labor unions, that is,” while fleeing the 
dispute between Uncle Sam and Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus.  By the time Eisenhower sent 
federal troops to Little Rock, liberals and labor officials recognized that the McClellan 
Committee was not going to pursue offenders in business as aggressively as those in unions.  
This resulted in Meany and other AFL-CIO leaders highlighting the discrepancy in public 
forums, rather than simply calling for reform measures that could be applied to both labor and 
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business.  Labor ally Senator McNamara’s decision to resign from the Committee in 1958 in 
protest of the unbalanced nature of the investigation furthered labor’s case. 
At the same time, the AFL-CIO could not so easily dismiss the Committee’s exposure of 
the Teamsters as corrupt, even if it questioned Congress’ lack of balance.  Support for moderate 
labor legislation kept the AFL-CIO involved in the process and prevented it from appearing 
obstructionist to a public that had avidly watched the McClellan proceedings unfold on 
television.  Meany was also spurred to call for some labor reform publicly as it became clear that 
the AFL-CIO’s own internal housecleaning was not enough to eliminate corruption in the labor 
movement.   
Editorialists like Herblock initially believed that the AFL-CIO had succeeded in isolating 
corrupt elements.  A fall 1957 cartoon showed a Teamsters’ truck driven by Jimmy Hoffa 
perched on an AFL-CIO controlled tree trunk (Figure 4-7).
138
  Unable to move, the passenger 
asked the driver, “Sure you got everything under control, Jimmy?”  Earlier that year, the AFL-
CIO strengthened its ethical practices codes, instituted a prohibition on union officials using the 
Fifth Amendment to cover up bad behavior, and, most impressively, expelled the powerful 
Teamsters union.  But though Dave Beck had been pushed out, Jimmy Hoffa’s Teamsters 
remained both powerful and corrupt as 1958 began, despite Herblock’s earlier belief that the 
AFL-CIO dictated the fortunes of the IBT.   
Many press commentators supported the AFL-CIO’s decision to expel the Teamsters, but 
grew concerned that more than a half a year after the ouster, Life could still fill “two solid pages 
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of small ‘mug shots’ of police characters and hoodlums high in the Hoffa hierarchy.”139  By early 
1959, the New York Times reported that there was “a growing conviction in the upper echelons of 
labor that the ouster method of correction used against James R. Hoffa and the Teamsters ha[d] 
proved a failure.”140  Union membership statistics confirmed the strength of the Teamsters even 
after their removal from the AFL-CIO.  While the UAW and the Steelworkers – two of the 
largest unions in the AFL-CIO – lost members during the 1958 recession, the Teamsters steadily 
gained new members.
141
  The Teamsters’ strength challenged the supremacy of the AFL-CIO.  
As a result, AFL-CIO leaders began to view moderate Congressional action as a solution to the 
organizing success and continued control maintained by the Teamsters after their removal.   
Calling for legislative reform publicly was both a public relations maneuver and a way of 
shoring up strength in the field.  Meany’s speeches, testimony and comments to the press about 
racketeering were designed to promote a favorable impression of the AFL-CIO and organized 
labor, more generally, in the public imagination as a means to encouraging legislative reform on 
labor’s terms.  Public relations were not the end game, but a means to an end. 
 
Conclusion 
The AFL-CIO’s expansive vision of public relations and its promotion of unions as a 
force for the public good during the McClellan hearings had unanticipated long-term 
consequences for the federation and the fortunes of organized labor, more generally.  On the one 
hand, Meany was successful in promoting himself as a trusted labor statesman representative of 
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union members and the AFL-CIO as a responsible organization, in contrast to the criminal 
elements on parade before Congress – an image that lasted through much of the next decade and 
was challenged by Meany’s political stances on black power and the Vietnam War, not by the 
AFL-CIO’s stance on corruption.   
On the other hand, AFL-CIO officials’ insistence that they could effectively control all 
their affiliates without government intervention furthered the perception that labor unions had 
grown too big, too fast and were now merely bureaucratic machines. By 1958, even a previous 
winner of the Sidney Hillman Prize offered this critique of “big labor.”  In a cartoon for the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, Daniel R. Fitzpatrick portrayed Big Labor and Big Business as possessing 
even strength (Figure 4-8).
142
  Their tug-of-war resulted in the carnage of buildings presumably 
representing the great middle – the general public whose interest was neither represented by 
labor nor by business.  The AFL-CIO’s officers had successfully distanced themselves from 
corruption in the eyes of the press and the public, but they had lost the public as a champion.  
 Instead, the AFL-CIO’s public response to the Congressional inquiry showed the 
organization’s political muscle.  In the political realm, the AFL-CIO was somewhat successful 
between 1957 and 1959, especially given the severity of the substantiated allegations leveled 
against unions.  Labor did well in the Congressional and state elections in 1958.  And for all of 
Meany’s objections that Landrum-Griffin was “a blunderbuss that would inflict grievous harm 
on all unions,” the reality was that Landrum-Griffin was hardly a second Taft-Hartley.143   
Unions had other legislative successes as well.  Organized labor was able to stop all but 
one attempt to implement right-to-work legislation in the states in 1958.  At the national level, 
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the AFL-CIO successfully fended off more extreme labor reforms – including the full force of 
Goldwater and Knowland’s so-called “Bill of Rights” for union members and a proposal for a 
national right-to-work law.  In 1960, John F. Kennedy, the Massachusetts Senator who had 
championed the AFL-CIO’s interests in the form of the Kennedy-Ives and Kennedy-Ervin bills, 
assumed the presidency, putting a friend of labor in the White House.  With union membership 
rates still strong, the AFL-CIO had much reason for optimism as the 1960s began.  In the coming 
decades, membership rolls would decline and labor would increase its political outreach to an 
expansive public – a process that became more sophisticated and established during the labor 
racketeering hearings of the late 1950s. 
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Conclusion 
  
So far, the twenty-first century has not been kind to organized labor.  As of 2012, one in 
nine American workers belongs to a union, and less than seven percent of those employed in the 
private sector are unionized.
1
  At their height in the mid-1950s, unions counted nearly one in 
three workers as members.
2
  Today a handful of states are home to the vast majority of the 
nation’s 14.4 million unionized workers, but even states with historically strong union 
movements – Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio and Indiana among them – have seen a legislative tide 
against organized labor in the form of right-to-work laws and assaults on public sector workers.  
Even where such laws have been repealed or blocked and supportive legislators recalled, labor 
remains on the defensive.  Its few attempts to enshrine labor’s rights – a proposal to prevent 
right-to-work legislation in Michigan, for example – have been unsuccessful.  At the federal 
level, the card-check bill whose passage labor leaders hoped that President Barack Obama’s 
election would hasten, failed.  And without a party change in Congress, it seems destined to 
remain on the backburner.  Though the President’s recess appointments to the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) at first made that body more sympathetic to labor, these gains were 
threatened by court rulings that the appointments were unconstitutional.  And while the Supreme 
Court ruling in the Citizens United case at first seemed to empower unions in political spending, 
businesses and their allies quickly took the upper hand in the political contributions arms race. 
What accounts for this decline in the fortunes of unorganized labor?  Was the turn 
inevitable?  And when did it take place?  These questions have consumed historians for decades.  
Some cite unions’ failure to organize workers in growing sectors, inadequate leadership, 
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inattention or hostility to new types of workers, and a turn toward accommodation with 
employers as the primary culprits.
3
  Others credit external pressures – the offshoring of 
American union manufacturing jobs, the movement of jobs from areas of union strength to right-
to-work states, governmental fiscal policy, suburbanization and atomization of society, the rise 
of conservatism, gerrymandering and a loss of union influence in politics, the turn toward a 
“sharing” economy, and the failure of liberal groups to ally in meaningful ways – as responsible 
for unions’ loss of influence in the twenty-first century.4  Some argue that, even at the height of 
its membership in the mid-1950s, the writing was already on the wall for the American labor 
movement.  Most works see a constellation of these factors as responsible for labor’s decline.5 
These are important questions and the answers are complex.  Yet focusing on what killed 
the unions or whether and how they might rise again obscures another important narrative.  This 
dissertation shows that unions in the postwar period did not suffer a slow decline, complacent in 
their negotiations with business.  Instead, they actively sought out the public and attempted to 
shape the political discourse of the day, using public opinion as a bargaining chip in their efforts 
to establish influence beyond collective bargaining and voter turnout.  This lens suggests that 
New Left-inspired criticism of the American labor movement may be misguided.  That union 
leaders’ political vision reflected the cold war liberalism of the day should not be seen as a sign 
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of failure, but rather as a strategic, pragmatic and authentic effort to represent organized labor 
and the public alike.  Public outreach was not a consequence of deradicalization so much as a 
reflection of union leaders’ desire to remain relevant and influential.  Labor’s outreach to the 
non-unionized public in the 1940s and 1950s was a political and legislative strategy, a bet on the 
future of organized labor not only as a collective bargaining agent, but as a voice for all workers 
and their families, regardless of union affiliation.   
The late 1940s and 1950s saw significant changes for American labor unions.  Major 
American institutions – government, business and labor – became much bigger as consolidations, 
large-scale projects, and increased responsibility became the norm.  Professionalization and 
bureaucracy accompanied this shift, as did a growing sense of the public as customer and 
consumer of institutions’ wares.  Government expanded its role in the lives of ordinary 
Americans through the GI Bill, a new, vastly expanded highway system, and other projects.  
Business and labor increased their public presence through lobbying initiatives, press 
appearances and direct advertising to the public.  With an expanded media landscape – including 
the advent of television – and new public relations techniques, unions and business fought over 
the public with the aim of influencing governmental policy.   
The legacy of labor’s turn toward the public is still with us today.  Labor leaders no 
longer have the same name recognition that they did during the period covered in this study, and 
labor unions are more likely to promote workers over officials as spokespeople.  Weaker than 
they once were, unions are more willing to present themselves as members of diverse coalitions.  
But labor’s public relations efforts continue.  As in the past, these projects reflect labor’s quest to 
serve members and non-members as the most significant liberal force in America.  The range of 
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union-supported policies – immigration reform, higher minimum wages, and voters’ rights, to 
name a few – reflect this goal.   
As many unions increasingly operate from a position of weakness at the negotiating table, 
unions’ clout remains tied to politics – an area where support from the public is key.  And 
gaining that support hinges on unions convincing the liberal public that unions make their world 
a better place in numerous ways.  The industrial peace argument of the postwar period has 
largely disappeared.  But as in the past, organized labor’s arguments center on the ability of 
unions to improve the quality of life for all Americans.  In their efforts to defeat right-to-work 
legislation in recent years, unions have emphasized their ability to set better working conditions 
and higher wage standards for all workers, regardless of union affiliation, for example.  As in the 
past, labor unions present unionized workers as neighbors, friends and valued members of the 
community in contrast to impersonal and monied business interests.  In particular, recent 
campaigns to support public sector workers – especially female teachers and nurses – have 
emphasized these themes.  As in the past, unions see themselves as public interest groups with an 
ever enlarging natural constituency, albeit with a declining membership.  On issues such as the 
extension of unemployment insurance and health care, unions present themselves as a voice of 
morality, championing the little guy.  
To be sure, at times, labor unions still make their presence felt as deciding forces in 
elections in places where labor is strong, delivering the 2008 Nevada primary victory to 
President Obama, for example.  These sorts of successful voter turnout efforts harken back to an 
earlier era of political organizing, even as phone banks and social media campaigns are new.  But 
today unions’ efforts to sway public opinion and generate liberal support are far  more powerful 
than union member shows of strength that often do not result in significant legislative change.  
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Thus, the spectacle of fast food workers demanding a living wage and the right to organize, or 
President Obama’s embrace of a minimum wage increase as a signature issue represent the 
legacy of unions’ outreach to the public in the late 1940s and 1950s far more than the union 
political machine capable of committing an ever-dwindling number of union votes to political 
candidates with dubious commitments to labor.   
Like their predecessors from more than a half century ago, today’s union leaders see 
public relations as a means to a political end: achieving legislative victories favorable to unions 
and their larger social agenda.  Whether unions are able to do so without a larger base of 
committed members willing to evangelize on their behalf is an open question.  If we are to judge 
by the lack of legislative, political, and judicial success that unions have had in recent years, 
prospects seem gloomy.  But perhaps the fallout from the Great Recession will encourage a 
stronger connection between the working public, union members, and the labor movement.  
Organized labor’s public relations efforts may well prove to be the basis for its relevance in the 
political arena in years to come. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
Table 2-1: Expelled Union Membership (Absolute and Percentage of CIO Membership) 
Date of 
Expulsion 
Union Membership at Time 
of Expulsion (Previous 
Year) 
11/1949 United Electrical Workers 499,800 
11/1949 Farm Equipment Union 43,000 
2/1950 Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers 74,000 
2/1950 Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers 22,500 
2/1950 United Public Workers 14,000 
2/1950 Office and Professional Workers 31,500 
6/1950 American Communications Association 10,000 
6/1950 Fur and Leather Workers 55,300 
8/1950 Longshoremen Union 62,100 
8/1950 Fishermen and Allied Workers 10,000 
8/1950 Marine Cooks and Stewards 6,500 
Total 
Total CIO Membership (1949) 
Percentage of CIO Members in Expelled Unions 
828,700 
4,314,000 
19.2% 
Percentages calculated based on figures from Leo Troy, Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965), Table 5 (p. 8) and Table A-2 (pp. A-
20 to A-27). 
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Table 2-2: Memberships of Expelled Unions, 1949-1955 (in thousands) 
Union 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 Percent 
Change 
United Electrical 
Workers 
222.6 221.6 215.0 202.8 181.7 132.7 -40.4% 
Farm Equipment 
Union 
Merged with the United Electrical Workers, 1950 -- 
Mine, Mill and 
Smelter Workers 
68.6 70.0 76.6 76.2 69.9 72.1 +5.1% 
Food, Tobacco, 
Agricultural and 
Allied Workers 
Merged with the Distributive, Office and Processing Workers 
of America, 1950 
-- 
United Public 
Workers 
14.0 14.0 14.0 Dissolved 1953 -100% 
Office and 
Professional Workers 
Merged with the Distributive, Office and Processing Workers 
of America, 1950 
-- 
American 
Communications 
Association 
10.0 9.0 8.0 6.9 7.0 7.0 -30.0% 
Fur and Leather 
Workers 
44.8 44.8 45.4 45.4 43.1 Merged with 
Amalgamated 
Butchers and 
Meat Cutters, 
1955 
-3.8% 
Longshoremen Union 62.1 48.4 38.0 55.7 51.4 55.6 -10.5% 
Fishermen and Allied 
Workers 
Merged with the Longshoremen Union, 1950  
Marine Cooks and 
Stewards 
6.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 Dissolved, 
1955 
-100% 
Calculations based on figures from Leo Troy, Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962 (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965), Table A-2 (pp. A-20 to A-27), Table A-3 (pp. A-
28 to A-43), and notes (pp. A-52 to A-65). 
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Table 2-3: Memberships of Selected CIO Alternatives to Purged Unions, 1950-1954 (in 
thousands) 
 
Union 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 Percent 
Change 
Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers 
282.5 274.5 294.8 274.6 288.0 273.7 -3.1% 
Brewery Workers 57.0 51.1 59.6 59.5 65.3 65.8 +15.4% 
Gas and Chemical 
Workers  
47.1 51.4 59.5 68.5 72.0 72.0 +52.9% 
Government and 
Civic Workers 
-- 10.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 26.2 +162% 
International 
Union of 
Electrical, Radio 
and Machine 
Workers (IUE) 
-- 73.8 20.3.0 231.4 265.7 282.2 +282% 
Packinghouse 
Workers 
102.9 101.8 109.6 116.7 137.9 138.4 +34.5% 
Calculations based on figures from Leo Troy, Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962 (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965), Table A-2 (pp. A-20 to A-27). 
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Table 3-1: Results of Rival Union Proceedings Originating from Petitions Filed with the 
NLRB, January 1, 1951 to December 31, 1952 
 
 No. of 
Cases 
Per Cent of 
Cases 
No. of 
Employees 
Per Cent of 
Employees 
Total 1246 100 366,470 100 
Petitioner Won 408 32.8 62,504 17.1 
Recognized union won 339 27.2 186,808 51.0 
No union won 35 2.8 3401 0.9 
No election 464 37.2 113,757 31.0 
AFL Petitioners 542 100 155,127 100 
Petitioner Won 190 35 35,307 22.7 
Recognized union won 113 20.9 76,250 49.1 
No union won 10 1.8 263 0.2 
No election 229 42.3 43,307 28.0 
CIO Petitioners 704 100 211,343 100 
Petitioner won 218 31 27,197 12.9 
Recognized union won 226 32.1 110,558 52.3 
No union won 25 3.5 3,138 1.5 
No election 235 33.4 70,450 33.3 
Reprinted from NLRB records; CIO Washington Office Papers, Box 21, Fol. 15; WSU. 
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Table 3-2: Impact of No-Raiding Agreement 
 
Number of Union Members Affected by Raiding by AFL and CIO Unions, 1953-1955 
 1953 1954-55 Change % Change 
Totals 204,457 51,066 -153,391 -75% 
AFL v. CIO 58,017 25,188 -32,829 -56.5% 
CIO v. AFL 146,440 25,878 -120,562 -82.3% 
 
Number of Cases of Raiding Filed by AFL and CIO Unions, 1953-1955  
 1953 1954-55 Change % Change 
Totals 480 283 -197 -41% 
AFL v. CIO 248 129 -119 -48% 
CIO v. AFL 232 154 -78 -33.6% 
Reprinted from Memo from George Brown to Meany, “RE: Impact of AFL-CIO No-Raiding 
Agreement,” October 21, 1955; George Meany Papers, Box 62, Fol. 27; GMMA. 
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